PEOPLE v. TAYLOR (2025)

The defendant, Antoine Taylor, has submitted an omnibus motion, dated September 8, 2025, seeking: inspection of the Grand Jury minutes and dismissal or reduction of the indictment; suppression of evidence; pre-trial voluntariness hearings; preclusion of evidence; an order for a bill of particulars; several discovery related orders; Brady/Vilardi material; Sandoval relief; and leave to file further motions. The People's response, dated October 6, 2025, consents to some of the relief sought and opposes other relief. The court decides the motion as follows.

INSPECTION AND DISMISSAL OR REDUCTION

Defendant's motion to inspect the grand jury minutes is granted. The minutes reveal that a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence and at the time the prosecutor instructed the grand jurors on the law. The indictment substantially conforms to the requirements set forth in CPL § 200.50. The minutes reveal that a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence and at the time the prosecutor instructed the grand jurors on the law. The indictment substantially conforms to the requirements set forth in CPL 200.50. The instructions were not defective as a matter of law with respect to all counts except counts 1.

Count 1 of the indictment, which charges Driving While Intoxicated as a Class E felony (VTL § 1192[3]), states, “No person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.” Pursuant to VTL § 1193(1)(c)(i) this offense qualifies as a E felony where a defendant has one prior conviction for offenses under VTL §§ 1192(2) or 1192(3), as relevant here, in the preceding ten years.

To establish the necessary prior conviction, the prosecutor introduced documentary evidence that indicated the defendant had been convicted on April 20, 2008 of violating VTL § 1192(2). To bring the defendant's prior DWI conviction within the ten year look-back period, the prosecutor applied the tolling provisions of Penal Law section 70.06(1)(b)(v). The language of § 70.60(1)(b)(v) explicitly states “In calculating the ten year period under subparagraph (iv), any period of time which the person was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony shall be excluded and such ten year period shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time served under such incarceration.”

On September 22, 2011, the defendant was sentenced, after pleading guilty to Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree, to an indeterminate term of 28 months to 7 years. He was released from incarceration to parole on December 5, 2023.

In his final instruction with respect to count 1 of the indictment, the prosecutor instructed the grand jurors, “If the defendant has within the previous 10 years been convicted of a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1192(2), (2-a), (3), (4) or (4-a) or of Penal Law section 120.03, 120.04, 125.12, 125.13 or 125.14 this previous conviction elevates the crime of driving while intoxicated to a class E felony. Under our law, time spent incarcerated is excluded from the 10 years indicated in the instruction. As your legal advisor I'm informing you that the defendant, Antoine Taylor, was incarcerated from September 22, 2011 until December of 2023. You are instructed not to speculate, infer or deliberate as to the reason for this incarceration. You may only consider this information in your calculation within the ten years included in the instructions. You may not consider this information for any other purpose.”

Defense Counsel, unaware of the precise past conviction the People used to exclude the resulting period of incarceration, challenges the use of the look back period to defendant's 2008 DWI conviction. Defendant asserts “[s]ection 70.06 of the Penal Law outlines the sentence of imprisonment for second felony offenders. The tolling outlined in P.L. § 70.06(1)(b)(v) only applies when calculating the time between a potential predicate felony and a subsequent felony; it does not include predicate misdemeanors, nor does it apply to calculating the ten years period under V.T.L. § 1193(1)(c).

In this case, the People's use of tolling provisions of § 70.06(1)(b)(v) was not for the purpose of determining whether the defendant is a second felony offender, but whether he may be charged with a felony DWI.

This court finds the tolling provisions of § 70.06(1)(b)(v) inapplicable to the determination of whether a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated is within the ten years of the present offense. Based on the plain language of the statute, it is clear this statute is calendar based and cannot be tolled. In contrast, the Legislature provided a tolling provision for Aggravated Family Offense (Penal Law§ 240.75). In that statute, the Legislature provided that “in calculating the five year period, any period of time during which the defendant was incarcerated for any reason between the time of the commission of any such previous and the time of commission of the present crime shall be excluded and such five year period shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time served under such incarceration.” (id.) The tolling requirement in § 240.75, when relevant to the charge, is an element of the offense itself. For example, the defendant may admit the prior conviction but deny it was committed in the requisite time period. In that case, the People may prove the requisite time period. And the court would charge the jury: “The People alleged that the defendant had been convicted of the ‘specified offense’ within the immediately preceding five years of the alleged commission of the present specified offense. In calculating the five year period, any period of time during which the defendant was incarcerated for any reason between the time of the commission of any such previous offenses and the time of commission of the present crime shall be excluded and such five year period shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time served under such incarceration. (CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 240.75) The Legislature quite easily could have created a similar provision. In contrast, VTL § 1193, which elevates a DWI offense to a felony based on a prior conviction within a ten year look back period, conspicuously omits this ‘excluding time’ or tolling language. This absence is not an oversight. It demonstrates a deliberate legislative choice to apply different rules for VTL offenses compared to family offenses. The VTL look back period is a strict untolled calendar period, while Penal Law § 240.75 look back period contains specific language that tolls time by time spent in prison. This court cannot read this language into VTL § 1193 that the Legislature intentionally omitted. Accordingly, count 1 is reduced to a misdemeanor level offense.

In the indictment count 3 charges Operating a Motor Vehicle while under the Influence (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[3]) as a misdemeanor. The prosecutor failed to instruct the grand jury on the law as to this count. Accordingly, count 3 is dismissed.

The defendant challenges the sufficiency of counts 2 and 4. Upon inspection of the grand jury minutes, this court found that the evidence was legally sufficient to support count 2 and 3 of the indictment.

Count 2 of the indictment charges Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 120.20). To sustain the charge of reckless endangerment in the second degree, the People are required to establish that the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another, that he was aware of and consciously disregarded that risk and when that risk is of such nature and degree that disregard of it constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. (see CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 120.20)

Count 4 in the indictment charges reckless driving (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212). To sustain the charge of reckless driving, the People are required to establish the defendant operated his vehicle in a manner which unreasonably interfered with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public highway.

Here, the evidence that the People presented in support of the reckless endangerment charge consisted of testimony from Daniel Pineros Butrago. Mr. Butrago testified that he was the operator of a Tesla Model 3 on January 30, 2025. At about 11:50 p.m., he and two friends were stopped at a red light signal. As they waited at the light, the defendant's “car missed the other car” and hit his car on the right side. After the collision, vehicles moved to the side of the road and the Mr. Butrago and the defendant exchanged information. In that moment, Mr. Butrago explained he wanted to make a police report but the defendant returned to his vehicle and drove off causing Mr. Butrago to take evasive action to avoid being hit by the defendant. In doing so, the defendant engaged in conduct that created a substantial risk of serious physical injury.

Moreover, the circumstances described by Mr. Butrago made it clear the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded that risk. After Mr. Butrago and the defendant exchanged information, Mr. Butrago said the defendant “wanted to basically get out of there. He moved back, the car, he reversed it. Then tried to reverse even further to get past me. And my friends was trying to stop him to, you know, do the police report and make sure that we got pictures of the cars cause he still hasn't done, and then he was driving away. Basically, I was in front [of the defendant's vehicle]. It was also a point where my friend was in front on the side. Then [the defendant] kept driving forward. So, I had to move out of the way or else he would have hit me. (GJ tr at 4-6)

This evidence also demonstrates the risk that the defendant created was of such nature and degree that disregard of it constituted a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in that situation. The defendant's motion to dismiss counts 2 and 4 is denied.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The defendant's motion to suppress any post-seizure observations made by the police is granted to the extent that a Mapp/Dunaway hearing is granted. The defendant's request for the People to produce at the hearing the property seized from the defendant is denied. (cf. People v. Robinson, 118 A.D.2d 516, 500 N.Y.S.2d 122 [1st Dept. 1986].)

The defendant's motion to suppress his statements is granted to the extent that a Huntley/Dunaway is granted. At that hearing, the hearing court is to determine whether the defendant's statements were made in violation of his Miranda rights and whether the statements were involuntarily made within the meaning of CPL § 60.45.

The defendant's motion to suppress his refusal to submit to the breath test is granted to the extent that a hearing is ordered.(see People v. Cruz, 134 Misc 2d 115, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Crim. Ct., New York County 1986)). At the hearing, the court will determine whether: the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][a][1]); was the defendant given sufficient warnings, in clear and unequivocal language of the effect of such refusal (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][b][1],[f]; and was the defendant's refusal to take the test persistent Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][b][1],[f]). The hearing court will also determine whether the police officer afforded the defendant access to counsel in connection with their request that he submit to breathalyzer testing. (see People v. Washington, 23 N.Y.3d 228, 989 N.Y.S.2d 670, 12 N.E.3d 1099 [2014]; People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 239 N.E.2d 351 [1968]).

MOTION FOR PRETRIAL VOLUNTARINESS HEARING

The defendant's motion for a pretrial hearing to determine the voluntariness of any unnoticed statements he may have made to police officers or civilians that the People intend to introduce at trial is denied as premature. If it becomes clear that any such statements exist, the defendant has leave to move for such a hearing at that time.

PRECLUSION OF EVIDENCE

The defendant's motion to preclude any unnoticed statements or identification evidence pursuant to CPL§§ 60.45, 710.20(3) and 710.43(3) is denied. The determination of whether such evidence has been properly noticed is referred to the discretion of the hearing and trial courts before which any such evidence comes to light.

REQUEST FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS

The branch of the defendant's motion seeking a bill of particulars is granted to the extent provided by the People pursuant to CPL § 200.95.

DISCOVERY-RELATED MOTIONS

In his motion, the defendant has moved for a number of orders relating to discovery. First, the defendant has requested the preservation and production of all radio and other recorded police communications relating to this case. This motion is denied as moot, because the People certified in their Certificate of Compliance dated July 23 2025, and in their supplemental certificates of compliance dated August 27, 2025, August 29, 2025, and October 6, 2025 that they disclosed all 911 calls, police body-worn camera recordings and radio runs to the defense. Should the People become aware of any additional recorded police communications, they are directed to preserve and disclose such evidence to the defense in a timely fashion in accordance with their obligations pursuant to CPL § 245.20(1)(g).

Second, the defendant's motion requiring the People to request from all New York State and local law enforcement agencies a complete copy of all records related to the prosecution of this case is denied, as the People have certified that they satisfied their automatic discovery obligations pursuant to CPL§ 245.20(1) in their certificate of compliance and supplemental certificate of compliance.

Third, the defendant's motion for an order requiring an additional certificate of compliance is denied, as the People have already certified their compliance with their obligation to provide exculpatory and impeachment material. The People are, however, reminded of their ongoing duty to discovery obligations.

DEMAND TO COMPEL BRADY/VILARDI MATERIAL

As to the defendant's demand for Brady/Vilardi material, the People are reminded of their continuing duty to provide evidence or information that is favorable to the defendant and is referred to the court's standing Brady order, which appears below.

PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION OF ALL EVIDENCE REQUESTS

The People are directed to preserve all case related police body worn camera footage, 911 calls, radio runs, Sprint Reports, and other communication related materials.

SANDOVAL RELIEF

The defendant's request for a Sandoval hearing and, ultimately, the preclusion of evidence of prior bad acts is referred to the trial court. The People are reminded that the disclosure of Sandoval evidence that they intend to introduce at trial shall be made in accordance with the time frame set forth in CPL § 245.10(1)(b) and 245.20(3).

ORDER TO COUNSEL

This court issues this order as both a reminder and a directive that counsel uphold their constitutional, statutory and ethical responsibilities in the above-captioned proceeding:

 To the Prosecutor:

The District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case, or, if the matter is not being prosecuted by the District Attorney, the prosecuting agency and its assigned representative, is directed to make timely disclosures of information favorable to the defense as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 US 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), People v. Geaslen, 54 N.Y.2d 510, 446 N.Y.S.2d 227, 430 N.E.2d 1280 (1981), and their progeny under the United States and New York State constitutions, and pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 245 and Rule 3.8(b) of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct, as described hereafter.

• The District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case have a duty to learn of such favorable information that is known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police, and should therefore confer with investigative and prosecutorial personnel who acted in this case and review their and their agencies’ files directly related to the prosecution or investigation of this case.

• Favorable information could include, but is not limited to:

a) Information that impeaches the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness, including (i) benefits, promises, rewards or inducements, express or tacit, made to a witness by a law enforcement official or law enforcement victim services agency in connection with giving testimony or cooperating in the case; (ii) a witness's prior inconsistent statements, written or oral; (iii) a witness's prior convictions and uncharged criminal conduct; (iv) information that tends to show that a witness has a motive to lie to inculpate the defendant, or a bias against the defendant or in favor of the complainant or the prosecution; and (v) information that tends to show impairment of a witness's ability to perceive, recall, or recount relevant events, including impairment of that ability resulting from mental or physical illness or substance abuse.

b) Information that tends to exculpate, reduce the degree of an offense, or support a potential defense to a charged offense.

c) Information that tends to mitigate the degree of the defendant's culpability as to a charged offense, or to mitigate punishment.

d) Information that tends to undermine evidence of the defendant's identity as a perpetrator of a charged crime, such as a non-identification of the defendant by a witness to a charged crime or an identification or other evidence implicating another person in a manner that tends to cast doubt on the defendant's guilt.

e) Information that could affect in the defendant's favor the ultimate decision on a suppression motion.

• Favorable information shall be disclosed whether or not it is recorded in tangible form, and irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information.

• Favorable information must be timely disclosed in accordance with the United States and New York State constitutional standards, and in accordance with the timing provisions of CPL article 245. The prosecutor is reminded that the obligation to disclose is a continuing one. Prosecutors should strive to determine if favorable information exists. The prosecutor shall disclose the information expeditiously upon its receipt and shall not delay disclosure if it is obtained earlier than the time period for disclosure in CPL 245.10(1).

• A protective order may be issued for good cause pursuant to CPL 245.70 with respect to disclosures required under this order.

• Failures to provide disclosure in accordance with CPL Article 245 are subject to the available remedies and sanctions for nondisclosures pursuant to CPL 245.80.

• Only willful and deliberate conduct will constitute a violation of this order or be eligible to result in personal sanctions against a prosecutor.

To Defense Counsel:

Defense counsel, having filed a notice of appearance in the above captioned case, is obligated under both the New York State and the United States Constitution to provide effective representation of defendant. Although the following list is not meant to be exhaustive, counsel shall remain cognizant of the obligation to:

a) Confer with the client about the case and keep the client informed about all significant developments in the case;

b) Timely communicate to the client any and all guilty plea offers, and provide reasonable advice about the advantages and disadvantages of such guilty plea offers and about the potential sentencing ranges that would apply in the case;

c) When applicable based upon the client's immigration status, ensure that the client receives competent advice regarding the immigration consequences in the case as required under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010);

d) Perform a reasonable investigation of both the facts and the law pertinent to the case (including as applicable, e.g., visiting the scene, interviewing witnesses, subpoenaing pertinent materials, consulting experts, inspecting exhibits, reviewing all discovery materials obtained from the prosecution, researching legal issues, etc.), or, if appropriate, make a reasonable professional judgment not to investigate a particular matter;

e) Comply with the requirements of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct regarding conflicts of interest, and when appropriate, timely notify the court of a possible conflict so that an inquiry may be undertaken or a ruling made;

f) Possess or acquire a reasonable knowledge and familiarity with criminal substantive, procedural and evidentiary law to ensure constitutionally effective representation in the case; and

g) When the statutory requirements necessary to trigger required notice from the defense are met (e.g., a demand, intent to introduce particular evidence, etc.), comply with the statutory notice obligations for the defense as specified in CPL 250.10, 250.20, and 250.30.

LEAVE TO FILE FURTHER MOTIONS

The branch of the motion requesting leave to file additional motions is granted to the extent recognized by CPL 255.20(3).

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

The Clerk of the court is directed to distribute copies of this decision and order to the attorney for the defendant and to the District Attorney.

Gary F. Miret, J.