KLD v. SBPH (2026)

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 002) numbered 37-44, 48-70 were read on this motion. The Court has considered the Defendant's Order to Show Cause dated November 24, 2025; the Defendant's Affirmation in Support; the Affirmation of Anthony W. Krummel, Esq., with exhibits; the Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition dated December 19, 2025; the Affirmation of Father PS; the Plaintiff's Attorney Affirmation of Juan P. Luciano, Esq.; and all pleadings and proceedings herein.

II. Facts

The parties were married on XX XX, 1981, in Colombo, Sri Lanka. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 48 at ¶2). Two children were born of the marriage. (see id). The parties resided together in Sri Lanka for several years. (see id). In or about 1991, Defendant immigrated to the United States. (see id at ¶3). Plaintiff and the parties’ children remained abroad until approximately 2000. (see id at ¶4).

Plaintiff establishes that in late 2000 she and the parties’ children traveled to Canada (see id at ¶4; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 52) and thereafter entered the United States through Massena, New York, on November 11, 2000 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 48 at ¶4; 53). Plaintiff thereafter resided in Chicago, Illinois, and temporarily in California during early 2001, before returning to Chicago. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 48 at ¶4). Plaintiff further establishes that during this period she was seeking asylum in the United States and could not travel outside the country without jeopardizing that status. (see id at ¶6).

Defendant asserts that the parties “decided to divorce” and that a divorce decree was entered in Sri Lanka in July 2001. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 38 at ¶2). Defendant submits certified documentation purporting to evidence that decree. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 40).

Plaintiff unequivocally denies any participation in a Sri Lankan divorce proceeding. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 48 at ¶8). She states that she was never served with divorce papers, never appeared personally or through counsel in Sri Lanka, never retained an attorney there, and was not physically present in Sri Lanka at any time in 2001. (see id). Plaintiff further avers that the Sri Lankan decree contains factual assertions that are false, including statements regarding her presence, representation, and receipt of funds. (see id at ¶9).

Plaintiff establishes that she first learned of the existence of the purported Sri Lankan divorce in September 2025, after commencement of the present action. (see id at ¶8). Plaintiff further details extensive efforts undertaken over several years to locate and serve Defendant in New York so that a matrimonial action could proceed. (see id at ¶7).

The affirmation of Father PS corroborates Plaintiff's sworn statements regarding her immigration status and inability to travel internationally in 2001 and further confirms that Plaintiff was residing in the United States during that period. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 50).

Defendant has not produced proof demonstrating service upon Plaintiff in the Sri Lankan proceeding, Plaintiff's appearance therein, or Plaintiff's submission to the jurisdiction of the Sri Lankan court, beyond the face of the foreign decree itself.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Governing Principles of Comity in Foreign Divorce Recognition

Judgments of foreign nations are not entitled to automatic recognition in New York. (see Pearson v Pearson, 69 NY2d 919 [1987]; Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d 368 [1980]; Schoenbrod v Siegler, 20 NY2d 403 [1967]; Martens v Martens, 284 NY 363 [1940]; Ramm v Ramm, 34 AD2d 667 [2d Dept 1970]). Unlike judgments of sister states, which are entitled to full faith and credit by constitutional command, foreign judgments are recognized, if at all, under the common-law doctrine of comity. (see O'Connell v Corcoran, 1 NY3d 179 [2003]; Bourbon v Bourbon, 300 AD2d 269 [2d Dept 2002]; Matter of Sannuto v Palma-Sannuto, 32 AD3d 443 [2d Dept 2006]).

Comity is not an obligation; it is a discretionary doctrine grounded in respect for foreign tribunals, tempered by the forum's duty to safeguard fundamental fairness and public policy. (see J-K Apparel Sales Co., Inc. v Jacobs, 189 AD3d 1011 [2d Dept 2020]; Badawi v Alesawy, 135 AD3d 792 [2d Dept 2016]; Hubbard v Hubbard, 228 NY 81 [1920]).

New York courts will generally recognize a foreign divorce decree only where the decree was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon notice, and with an opportunity for the adverse party to be heard.

The Court of Appeals has made clear that comity must be withheld where recognition would sanction a judgment obtained through fraud, without jurisdiction, or in derogation of basic due process. (see Gotlib v Ratsutsky, 83 NY2d 696 [1994]; Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d 368 [1980]; Feinberg v Feinberg, 40 NY2d 124 [1976]; In re Rathscheck, 300 NY 346 [1950]). A foreign decree that dissolves a marriage without notice to one spouse, and without that spouse's participation, is not entitled to enforcement in this State. (see Farag v Farag, 4 AD3d 502 [2d Dept 2004]; Dab v Mas, 2022 NYLJ LEXIS 2155 [Sup Ct Richmond County 2022]; Kuznetsov v Kuznetsova, 39 Misc 3d 1215(A) [Sup Ct Kings County 2013]; TT v KA, 20 Misc 3d 1104(A) [Sup Ct Nassau County 2008]).

B. Notice, Participation, and Jurisdiction

The decisive inquiry in determining whether to recognize a foreign divorce decree is not whether the decree exists, but whether the foreign court possessed personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse and whether the proceeding comported with elementary principles of fairness.

Here, Plaintiff has established that she did not receive notice of the Sri Lankan divorce proceeding, did not appear in that proceeding, and did not submit herself to the jurisdiction of the Sri Lankan court. Plaintiff has further established that she was physically present in the United States at the time the divorce was purportedly granted and was unable, as a matter of law and practical necessity, to travel abroad.

New York courts have repeatedly refused recognition to foreign divorce decrees obtained under similar circumstances. In Greschler v. Greschler, (51 NY2d 368 [1980]) the Court of Appeals recognized that comity is properly denied where the foreign proceeding lacks jurisdictional legitimacy or procedural fairness. In Farag v. Farag, (4 AD3d 502 [2d Dept 2004]) the Appellate Division declined to recognize a foreign divorce obtained without meaningful notice to the non-appearing spouse. In Azim v. Saidazimova, (280 AD2d 566 [2d Dept 2021]), the Court rejected a foreign decree where the defendant spouse neither appeared nor was served, emphasizing that jurisdictional defects are fatal to recognition.

The principle was further reaffirmed in Badawi v. Alesawy, (135 AD3d 792 [2d Dept 2016]), where the Court held that New York will not extend comity to a foreign divorce decree where the circumstances surrounding its procurement raise serious questions as to fairness and legitimacy.

The Defendant's reliance upon the facial validity of the Sri Lankan decree is insufficient. Facial regularity does not cure the absence of jurisdiction, nor does it substitute for proof of notice and participation. The law of this State does not permit marital status to be altered by a foreign tribunal in secret, without affording the absent spouse an opportunity to be heard. (see Farag v Farag, 4 AD3d 502 [2d Dept 2004]; Dab v Mas, 2022 NYLJ LEXIS 2155 [Sup Ct Richmond County 2022]; Kuznetsov v Kuznetsova, 39 Misc 3d 1215(A) [Sup Ct Kings County 2013]; TT v KA, 20 Misc 3d 1104(A) [Sup Ct Nassau County 2008]).

C. Fraud and Misrepresentation

Plaintiff further alleges that the Sri Lankan decree contains false statements regarding her presence, representation, and receipt of funds. While a full adjudication of fraud is not required at this juncture, such allegations, when specific, sworn, and corroborated, further militate against recognition of the decree.

New York courts have consistently held that comity must be withheld where a foreign judgment is alleged to have been procured through misrepresentation or fraud that deprived the opposing party of an opportunity to defend. (see Gotlib v Ratsutsky, 83 NY2d 696 [1994]; Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d 368 [1980]; Feinberg v Feinberg, 40 NY2d 124 [1976]; In re Rathscheck, 300 NY 346 [1950]; Shaw v Shaw, 97 AD2d 403 [2d Dept 1983]). Recognition under such circumstances would offend the strong public policy of this State favoring procedural integrity in matrimonial adjudications.

D. Res Judicata

The doctrine of res judicata applies only where there exists a valid, final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. (see Burgos v New York Presbyt Hosp, 155 AD3d 598 [2d Dept 2017]; Matter of AutoOne Ins Co v Valentine, 72 AD3d 953 2d Dept 2010]). A judgment obtained without jurisdiction, without notice, or through fraud is not entitled to preclusive effect. (see Berlin v Sordillo, 179 AD2d 717 [2d Dept 1992]; Shaw v Shaw, 97 AD2d 403 [2d Dept 1983]).

Because this Court finds that the Sri Lankan divorce decree is not entitled to recognition under the doctrine of comity, it necessarily follows that the decree cannot operate as a bar to this action under res judicata. The Defendant's alternative ground for dismissal therefore fails as a matter of law.

E. Counsel Fees

Defendant seeks an award of counsel fees on the ground that Plaintiff's action is improper and duplicative. Given this Court's determination that the foreign decree is not entitled to recognition, and that Plaintiff's action is properly maintained, Defendant has failed to demonstrate any basis for shifting fees.

Plaintiff's pursuit of relief in this forum, under these circumstances, cannot be characterized as frivolous, vexatious, or undertaken in bad faith.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Defendant's Order to Show Cause seeking dismissal of the action pursuant to the doctrine of comity is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's request to dismiss the action pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Sri Lankan divorce decree dated July 2001 is not recognized by this Court for purposes of this action; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's request for counsel fees is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that this action shall proceed to a Preliminary Conference forthwith.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.