SAXBY v. CITY OF NEW YORK (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Gina Abadi, J.), dated September 7, 2022.  The order granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defenses.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On December 15, 2017, a vehicle driven by the plaintiff was struck by a fire engine operated by the defendant Stephen Carrig, sued herein as “John” Carrig.  At the time of the incident, Carrig was responding to an emergency call with the lights and sirens of the fire engine activated.  As Carrig made a left turn onto Quincy Street from the right lane of Marcus Garvey Boulevard, the rear of the fire engine struck the front passenger side of the plaintiff's vehicle, which had pulled over to the left-hand side of Marcus Garvey Boulevard before the intersection.

The plaintiff commenced this personal injury action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries he alleged he sustained as a result of the accident.  The defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defenses.  In an order dated September 7, 2022, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion and denied the plaintiff's motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 qualifiedly exempts drivers of authorized emergency vehicles from certain traffic rules, as set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b), as long as the driver is involved in an emergency operation and has not acted in reckless disregard for the safety of others (see Anderson v. Commack Fire Dist., 39 N.Y.3d 495, 514, 191 N.Y.S.3d 292, 212 N.E.3d 309;  Criscione v. City of New York, 97 N.Y.2d 152, 158, 736 N.Y.S.2d 656, 762 N.E.2d 342).  “Any other injury-causing conduct of such a driver is governed by the principles of ordinary negligence” (Kabir v. County of Monroe, 16 N.Y.3d 217, 220, 920 N.Y.S.2d 268, 945 N.E.2d 461).  Conduct exempted by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(b) includes disregarding regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions (see id. § 1104[b][4]).

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by demonstrating that the reckless disregard standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 was applicable to Carrig's conduct (see Thomas v. City of New York, 172 A.D.3d 1132, 1133, 100 N.Y.S.3d 318) and that Carrig's conduct did not rise to the level of reckless disregard for the safety of others (see Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494, 503, 620 N.Y.S.2d 297, 644 N.E.2d 988;  McGough v. City of Long Beach, 174 A.D.3d 698, 699–700, 102 N.Y.S.3d 456).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572).  For similar reasons, the plaintiff failed to establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defenses.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion and denied the plaintiff's motion.

GENOVESI, J.P., FORD, WAN and LOVE, JJ., concur.