PEOPLE v. JONES (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Danny K. Chun, J.), rendered May 26, 2022, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a nonjury trial, of manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.15[1]).  He was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to a particular indeterminate term of imprisonment.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to disprove the defendant's justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt (Penal Law § 35.15;  see People v. Irving, 226 A.D.3d 703, 703, 208 N.Y.S.3d 284).  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the fact-finder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Supreme Court's rejection of the defendant's justification defense and the verdict of guilt were not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

“[E]vidence is relevant if it has any ‘tendency in reason to prove any material fact’ ” (People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d at 424, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053, quoting People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808).  All relevant evidence is admissible at trial unless barred by some exclusionary rule;  however, even where relevant evidence is admissible, it may still be excluded in the exercise of the trial court's discretion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for prejudice (see People v. Jin Cheng Lin, 26 N.Y.3d 701, 727, 27 N.Y.S.3d 439, 47 N.E.3d 718;  People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d at 424–425, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053).  “Relevant videotapes and technologically generated documentation are ordinarily admissible under standard evidentiary rubrics, and [t]he decision to admit or exclude videotape evidence generally rests ․ within a trial court's founded discretion” (People v. Abrams, 231 A.D.3d 963, 964, 219 N.Y.S.3d 407 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Patterson, 93 N.Y.2d 80, 84, 688 N.Y.S.2d 101, 710 N.E.2d 665).

Here, contrary to the People's contention, the defendant's contentions that the Supreme Court improperly admitted into evidence an enhanced compilation video and certain police body-worn camera footage are preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]).  Moreover, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in admitting into evidence the enhanced compilation video, which depicted, inter alia, a photograph of a knife while highlighting an object in the defendant's hand, and also depicted a photograph of the victim's fatal wound while highlighting what appeared to be blood on the victim's shirt, since the probative value of the enhanced compilation video was substantially outweighed by the potential for prejudice (see generally People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d at 424–425, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  cf.  People v. Stewart, 241 A.D.3d 1179, 1181, 241 N.Y.S.3d 22;  People v. Williams, 238 A.D.3d 1076, 1078, 234 N.Y.S.3d 613;  People v. Fernandez, 210 A.D.3d 693, 696, 177 N.Y.S.3d 631).  Similarly, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in admitting police body-worn camera footage, which depicted, among other things, the victim as he lay dying in the street, while a woman pleaded with him to open his eyes and a police officer attempted CPR (see generally People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d at 424–425, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  cf.  People v. Ewers, 195 A.D.3d 857, 857–858, 145 N.Y.S.3d 832).  However, any error with regard to these evidentiary determinations was harmless, since the proof of the defendant's guilt, without reference to the error, was overwhelming and there is no significant probability that the court would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error (see People v. Byer, 21 N.Y.3d 887, 889, 965 N.Y.S.2d 771, 988 N.E.2d 507;  People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787).

The defendant's contention that his adjudication as a second felony offender (Penal Law § 70.06) is unconstitutional is unpreserved for appellate review, as the defendant failed to raise a constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court and did not contest his criminal history (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Hernandez, 43 N.Y.3d 591, 597–598, 239 N.Y.S.3d 59, 265 N.E.3d 1076;  People v. Smith, 242 A.D.3d 775, 775, 240 N.Y.S.3d 241;  People v. Austin, 242 A.D.3d 763, 764, 240 N.Y.S.3d 232).  We decline to review the contention in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see People v. Smith, 242 A.D.3d at 775, 240 N.Y.S.3d 241;  People v. Austin, 242 A.D.3d at 764, 240 N.Y.S.3d 232).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Brisman, 43 N.Y.3d 322, 235 N.Y.S.3d 248, 262 N.E.3d 249;  People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit.

DILLON, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.