PEOPLE v. EDWARDS (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (Jennifer Sober, J.), rendered March 31, 2021, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

In January 2019, law enforcement initiated a welfare check at defendant's residence prompted by a call from the victim's mother indicating that she had failed to come home after visiting defendant with her child.  Law enforcement attempted to conduct a wellness check but received no response after knocking and identifying themselves outside defendant's door.  Meanwhile, approximately 45 minutes after police had arrived at defendant's apartment, defendant appeared at a nearby hospital with multiple stab wounds to the abdomen.  The hospital advised law enforcement of defendant's arrival and, shortly after that message was relayed to officers at defendant's residence, they entered the apartment to look for the victim and child.  On the first pass through the residence, law enforcement discovered the deceased victim in defendant's bedroom but did not locate the child, prompting two subsequent sweeps to ensure that the child was not secreted inside.  Law enforcement subsequently learned that the child was with one of defendant's family members.

Defendant was thereafter charged by sealed indictment with murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.  In June 2019, defendant moved to suppress all of the physical evidence, arguing that the physical evidence obtained by police was seized pursuant to an illegal, warrantless search of his residence.  The People opposed the motion, arguing, in relevant part, that the police acted appropriately in circumstances constituting an emergency.  Following a suppression hearing, County Court denied the motion, finding that “the police had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an emergency at hand and there was an immediate need for their assistance,” and that the search was not motivated by any purpose other than to ensure the safety of the victim and the child.  Defendant then pleaded guilty to both counts of the indictment and was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to concurrent prison terms of 23 years to life for his conviction of murder in the second degree and 31/212 to 7 years for his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.  Defendant appeals.

The sole contention that defendant advances on appeal pertains to the denial of his suppression motion.  On that, defendant contends there were no facts or circumstances to justify the emergency exception to a warrantless search and that all of the evidence procured after that point should have been suppressed.  We disagree.  “Subject only to carefully drawn and narrow exceptions, a warrantless search of an individual's home is per se unreasonable and hence unconstitutional” (People v. Jenkins, 24 N.Y.3d 62, 64, 995 N.Y.S.2d 694, 20 N.E.3d 639 [2014] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted];  accord People v. Sears, 165 A.D.3d 1482, 1483, 86 N.Y.S.3d 645 [3d Dept. 2018], lv dismissed 32 N.Y.3d 1129, 93 N.Y.S.3d 267, 117 N.E.3d 826 [2018];  see People v. Alberts, 161 A.D.3d 1298, 1301–1302, 77 N.Y.S.3d 207 [3d Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1114, 81 N.Y.S.3d 374, 106 N.E.3d 757 [2018]).  However, “the emergency exception to the warrant requirement permits the police to make a warrantless entry into a protected area if three prerequisites are met:  (1) the police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property;  (2) the search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence;  (3) and there must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched” (People v. Weber, 226 A.D.3d 1158, 1161, 209 N.Y.S.3d 626 [3d Dept. 2024] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 42 N.Y.3d 931, 216 N.Y.S.3d 91, 240 N.E.3d 810 [2024];  see People v. Gibson, 117 A.D.3d 1317, 1318, 986 N.Y.S.2d 660 [3d Dept. 2014], affd 24 N.Y.3d 1125, 3 N.Y.S.3d 320, 26 N.E.3d 1175 [2015]).  “[T]he requirement of reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency existed must be applied by reference to the circumstances then confronting the officer, including the need for a prompt assessment of sometimes ambiguous information concerning potentially serious consequences” (People v. Gibson, 117 A.D.3d at 1319, 986 N.Y.S.2d 660 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).  “Indeed, people could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process.  Accordingly, what would be otherwise illegal absent an emergency becomes justified by the need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury” (People v. Samuel, 152 A.D.3d 1202, 1204, 59 N.Y.S.3d 632 [4th Dept. 2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses and citations omitted], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 983, 67 N.Y.S.3d 585, 89 N.E.3d 1265 [2017];  see People v. Doll, 21 N.Y.3d 665, 670, 975 N.Y.S.2d 721, 998 N.E.2d 384 [2013], cert denied 572 U.S. 1022, 134 S.Ct. 1552, 188 L.Ed.2d 568 [2014]).

Beginning with the first prong, we find that the evidence sufficiently “provided the necessary objective, empirical facts” for law enforcement to reasonably determine that there was an emergency at hand (People v. Musto, 106 A.D.3d 1380, 1382, 966 N.Y.S.2d 263 [3d Dept. 2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 21 N.Y.3d 1007, 971 N.Y.S.2d 258, 993 N.E.2d 1281 [2013];  see People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 178, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607 [1976], cert denied 426 U.S. 953, 96 S.Ct. 3178, 49 L.Ed.2d 1191 [1976]).  Dispatchers informed the responding officers that the victim's family had relayed their concerns about the victim and her young child, who had not returned home after visiting with defendant at his residence, and that the victim's cellphone was “pinging” in the area of defendant's residence.  The victim's mother also advised dispatchers that the victim and defendant had a past history of domestic violence, and the responding officers were advised that defendant and the victim could have been arguing.  After discussing the circumstances with the sergeant on duty, the decision was made not to enter the residence at that time.  However, when the sergeant learned that defendant had arrived at a nearby hospital with stab wounds, he gave the directive to the initial responding officers to enter the residence once another officer arrived on scene.

Defendant contends that the delay in entering defendant's residence occasioned by the sergeant's order to wait for another officer to arrive before entering negates the finding of an emergency.  We reject that argument.  “Defining an emergency with the rigidity defendant proposes may encourage police – so as to give their actions the appearance of an emergency – to break in prematurely, before exhausting other reasonable means of gaining access ․ The appropriately measured response of the police should not be declared illegal merely because they thoughtfully delayed entry for a relatively brief time” (People v. Molnar, 98 N.Y.2d 328, 334, 746 N.Y.S.2d 673, 774 N.E.2d 738 [2002];  see People v. Greenleaf, 222 A.D.2d 838, 840, 634 N.Y.S.2d 892 [3d Dept. 1995], lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 973, 642 N.Y.S.2d 202, 664 N.E.2d 1265 [1996];  see also People v. Samuel, 152 A.D.3d at 1204, 59 N.Y.S.3d 632).  To that end, we do not believe that the short delay in entry from the time that law enforcement learned of defendant's appearance at the hospital casts doubt on the presence of emergent circumstances (compare People v. Mormon, 100 A.D.3d 782, 783, 954 N.Y.S.2d 152 [2d Dept. 2012], lv denied 20 N.Y.3d 1102, 965 N.Y.S.2d 798, 988 N.E.2d 536 [2013]).  Accordingly, we find that the totality of facts known to law enforcement prior to their entry into defendant's residence provided a reasonable basis to conclude “that there was an emergency at hand and that there was an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life” (People v. Junious, 145 A.D.3d 1606, 1608, 45 N.Y.S.3d 734 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1033, 62 N.Y.S.3d 302, 84 N.E.3d 974 [2017];  see People v. Holmes, 210 A.D.3d 1510, 1511, 178 N.Y.S.3d 357 [4th Dept. 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1073, 183 N.Y.S.3d 809, 204 N.E.3d 445 [2023];  People v. Musto, 106 A.D.3d at 1382, 966 N.Y.S.2d 263;  People v. Rossi, 99 A.D.3d 947, 951, 952 N.Y.S.2d 285 [2d Dept. 2012], affd 24 N.Y.3d 968, 995 N.Y.S.2d 692, 20 N.E.3d 637 [2014];  People v. Manning, 301 A.D.2d 661, 663, 756 N.Y.S.2d 58 [2d Dept. 2003], lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 656, 760 N.Y.S.2d 121, 790 N.E.2d 295 [2003];  see also Colao v. Mills, 39 A.D.3d 1048, 1051, 834 N.Y.S.2d 375 [3d Dept. 2007];  compare People v. Ringel, 145 A.D.3d 1041, 1042–1045, 44 N.Y.S.3d 152 [2d Dept. 2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 952, 54 N.Y.S.3d 382, 76 N.E.3d 1085 [2017]).

These facts also establish that there was a reasonable basis to associate the emergency with defendant's residence.  On this, defendant suggests that there was no indication that he was stabbed in his residence and that law enforcement could not be sure that the tracking of the victim's cellphone to his residence was sufficiently precise so as to locate the victim inside.  However, “the emergency doctrine is premised on reasonableness, not certitude” (People v. Doll, 21 N.Y.3d at 671, 975 N.Y.S.2d 721, 998 N.E.2d 384).  These factors are not viewed in isolation;  rather, we may look to the “uncertainty created by the totality of circumstances [in assessing the] need for the police to take immediate action” (People v. Molnar, 288 A.D.2d 911, 911, 732 N.Y.S.2d 788 [4th Dept. 2001] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], affd 98 N.Y.2d 328, 746 N.Y.S.2d 673, 774 N.E.2d 738 [2002]).  The cellphone tracking is only one piece of information that law enforcement possessed, as they were also aware that the victim had informed her family that she was going to defendant's residence and that she and the child remained unaccounted for (see People v. Weber, 226 A.D.3d at 1161, 209 N.Y.S.3d 626;  People v. Radcliffe, 185 A.D.2d 662, 662, 585 N.Y.S.2d 653 [4th Dept. 1992], lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 976, 591 N.Y.S.2d 145, 605 N.E.2d 881 [1992]).  Whatever might have been uncovered by a thorough assessment of the tracking capabilities of the victim's phone is inapposite, as the emergency doctrine contemplates that decisions must be made swiftly and without the luxury of intense scrutiny of any potential flaws or ambiguity in the information on hand (see People v. Gibson, 117 A.D.3d at 1319, 986 N.Y.S.2d 660;  People v. Rodriguez, 77 A.D.3d 280, 291, 907 N.Y.S.2d 294 [2d Dept. 2010], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 955, 917 N.Y.S.2d 115, 942 N.E.2d 326 [2010]).  Thus, we find no infirmity in law enforcement considering the aforementioned information alongside the sudden appearance of defendant at the hospital with stab wounds, which collectively provided a reasonable basis to believe that the victim and the child were in danger inside defendant's residence (see People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d at 179, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607;  see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 [2009]).

Lastly, although defendant does not focus his argument on the second prong of analysis, to the extent that it remains applicable under the N.Y. Constitution (see People v. Musto, 106 A.D.3d at 1381, 966 N.Y.S.2d 263;  see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404–405, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 [2006];  People v. Dallas, 8 N.Y.3d 890, 891, 832 N.Y.S.2d 893, 865 N.E.2d 1 [2007];  People v. Carey, 237 A.D.3d 741, 742, 230 N.Y.S.3d 655 [2d Dept. 2025]), we find that the testimony at the fact-finding hearing provides an objective basis to conclude that law enforcement's entry into his residence was not motivated by an intent to seize evidence or make an arrest (see People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d at 178–179, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607;  People v. McKnight, 261 A.D.2d 926, 926, 689 N.Y.S.2d 832 [4th Dept. 1999], lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 826, 702 N.Y.S.2d 596, 724 N.E.2d 388 [1999]).  Accordingly, County Court properly denied defendant's suppression motion.  Defendant's remaining contentions, to the extent they are not explicitly addressed, have been considered and found unavailing.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

McShan, J.

Pritzker, J.P., Fisher, Powers and Mackey, JJ., concur.