A.S., Plaintiff, v. L.S., Defendant. (2025)

Relevant Background & Procedural History

A.S. (hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Father”) and L.S. (hereinafter “Defendant” or “Mother”) were married on September 20, 2020, in the County of Westchester, State of New York. There are three children of the marriage, being: (1) J.S. (DOB: X/XX/XXXX); (2) B.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX); and (3) E.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX) (hereinafter collectively the “Children”).

On March 13, 2023, Defendant commenced a proceeding in the New York State Family Court, Westchester County against Plaintiff seeking custody of the Children, known as L.S. v. A.S., under file number XXXXXX and docket numbers X-XXXXX-XX; X-XXXXX-XX; and X-XXXXX-XX (hereinafter collectively “Defendant Family Offense Proceedings”).

On April 26, 2023, Plaintiff commenced a proceeding in the New York State Family Court, Westchester County against Defendant seeking custody of the Children, known as A.S. v. L.S., under file number XXXXXX and docket numbers X-XXXXX-XX; X-XXXXX-XX; and X-XXXXX-XX (hereinafter collectively “Plaintiff Family Offense Proceedings”).

On May 30, 2023, the Plaintiff commenced an action against Defendant, known as A.S. v. L.S., under index number XXXXX/XXXX (hereinafter “Matrimonial Action”), seeking a dissolution of the parties’ marriage, sole custody of the Children, and ancillary relief with the filing of a summons with notice and complaint (hereinafter “Complaint”).¹ At the time of commencement, Plaintiff was represented by Alexandra Halsey-Storch, Esq., of Miller Law Group (hereinafter “Plaintiff's Counsel #1”).

On June 7, 2023, Plaintiff's counsel filed a request for judicial intervention seeking the scheduling of a preliminary conference.²

On June 28, 2023, an administrative order was entered (Lubell, L.) transferring the Matrimonial Action from the Hon. Susan M. Capeci, A.S.C.J. of the Westchester Integrated Domestic Violence (hereinafter “IDV”) Part to the undersigned.³

On July 7, 2023, a Court notice was issued directing a preliminary conference to be held on July 17, 2023, at 9:00 a.m.⁴

On July 17, 2023, a preliminary conference was held wherein appearances were made by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant as a self-represented litigant, after which an order was entered confirming on consent the Plaintiff Family Offense Proceedings and Defendant Family Offense Proceedings would be consolidated with the Matrimonial Action, and the preliminary conference would be adjourned to August 4, 2023, at 11:00 a.m.;⁵ and a separate order of consolidation was entered to effectuate that order.⁶

On August 4, 2023, a conference was held after which an order was entered, affording a second adjournment to Defendant for additional time to retain counsel, directing a conference to be held on September 5, 2023, at 9:30 a.m.⁷

On August 7, 2023, this Court received a transfer of the files pertaining to the Plaintiff Family Court Proceedings and Defendant Family Court Proceedings.⁸

On August 16, 2023, a notice of appearance was filed by William V. Cally, Esq., as counsel for Defendant (hereinafter “Defendant's Counsel #1”).⁹

On September 5, 2023, a preliminary conference was held before the undersigned, wherein all parties and counsel appeared, after which the following orders were entered: (1) a preliminary conference order which directed the appointment of an attorney for the children and forensic evaluator with payment to be made 100% by Plaintiff subject to reallocation at trial, and a compliance conference to be held on November 16, 2023, at 9:00 a.m.;¹⁰ (2) an order appointing Faith G. Miller, Esq. (hereinafter “AFC”) as attorney for the Children;¹¹ (3) an order appointing neutral forensic evaluator appointing Elie Aoun, M.D.,¹² after which the appointed forensic evaluator accepted appointment.¹³

On September 8, 2023, Plaintiff's counsel filed a proposed interim custody order with a request that it be entered on consent,¹⁴ which on September 12, 2023, was entered providing the following regarding interim custody of the Children (hereinafter “Custody Consent Order #1”):¹⁵

“NOW, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Communication Between the Parties: The Greenburgh Orders of Protection are subject to the terms and conditions of this Order on Consent. Accordingly, the parties shall communicate with one another by text message only about the Children, including but not limited to their general health, well-being, and education. In the event of an emergency, the party with whom the Children are with at the time shall take whatever steps which are necessary to address and attend to the emergency circumstances, and said party shall, as soon as practicable, but in no event more than two (2) hours from when the emergency occurred, notify the other party by telephone of the circumstances surrounding the emergency situation, the prognosis of the Child or Children and their location.

2. Children's Legal Documents: The Plaintiff currently maintains the Children's legal documents, including their birth certificates, social security cards and health insurance cards. The Plaintiff shall provide the Defendant copies of all such documents within five (5) business days of this Order, to the extent that copies of such documents have not already been provided to the Defendant.

3. Parenting Time: The parties shall have access with the subject Children as follows:

a. The Defendant Mother shall have the Children from Monday at 5:00PM through Wednesday at 9:00AM.

b. The Plaintiff Father shall have the Children from Wednesday at 9:00AM through Friday at 5:00PM.

c. The parties shall alternate weekends with the Children from Friday at 5:00PM through Monday at 5:00PM.

d. Drop-off and pick-up shall occur at the front door of 42 XXXXXXXXXXX, Hastings on Hudson, New York, New York 10706, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Drop-off and pick-up of the Children at this address shall not be a violation of the Greenburgh Orders of Protection. The parties shall not speak with one another during drop-off and pick-up.”

On September 27, 2023, Defendant filed an answer with counterclaims.¹⁶

On October 6, 2023, a stipulation was so-ordered on consent of Plaintiff, Defendant and AFC amending Custody Stipulation #1 (hereinafter “Custody Consent Order #2”)¹⁷ providing:

“WHEREAS, the Parties agreed, inter alia, to an interim access schedule with the Children, subject to the TOPs by Pendente Lite Order of Custody and Parenting Time dated September 12, 2023; and

WHEREAS, both Parties have acknowledged that the Children have resided primarily with their paternal grandparents, M.S. and L.S. (the “Grandparents”) for the past year and agreed that it is in the Children's best interests for the Children to continue to do so until such time as Dr. Aoun completes submits his report of recommendations to the Court and

WHEREAS, this Stipulation shall modify Paragraph 3 of the Pendente Lite Order of Custody and Parenting Time dated September 12, 2023 entitled “Parenting Time.”

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby stipulated and agreed, that

l. The Children shall continue to reside with the Grandparents at 42 XXXXXXXXXXX, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York; and

2. The Grandparents shall have temporary residential and legal custody of the Children until Dr. Aoun issues his forensic report to the Court, or until further written agreement between the Parties or order of the Court:

3. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each have separate supervised access of no more than twice a week with the Children, during the hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., as agreed to in advance by the Grandparents and away from the Grandparents’ residence; and

4. Each Party shall request supervised access with the Children, in writing (email or text to suffice), at least 24 hours in advance; and

5. The Parties agree to use Carmen Candelario of Supervised Visitation Experts as the supervisor for the Parties’ access with the Children who shall provide regular reports to the Court and to the Attorney for the Children; and subscribed and acknowledged with the same formality as this Stipulation; and

6. Any written agreement between the Parties modifying this Stipulation shall be duly subscribed and acknowledged with the same formality as this Stipulation; and

7. All other terms of the Pendente Lite Order of Custody and Parenting Time dated September 12, 2023 not modified by this Stipulation remain in full force and effect; and

8. The foregoing terms and conditions are without prejudice to any and all claims or defenses that either party may assert in this action.”

On October 10, 2023, an amended order appointing forensic evaluator was entered wherein the evaluator was directed to expand the evaluation to include the paternal grandfather Mr. M.S. (hereinafter “Paternal Grandfather”) and Mrs. L.S. (hereinafter “Paternal Grandmother”) (hereinafter collectively “Paternal Grandparents”).

On October 12, 2023, an order for investigation ¹⁸ was entered directing the following:

“The Westchester County Department of Social Services is hereby directed to conduct a CPS Investigation concerning allegations that the Children are exposed to dangerous behaviors by the parents. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has been arrested on at least two occasions, he is allegedly abusing drugs and threatening Defendant. Defendant fears for her and the children's safety. There are also criminal cases pending against Defendant for which there is a stay away Order of Protection for Plaintiff and a refrain from certain acts for the eldest daughter, J.S. In December 2022, Defendant was hospitalized for two weeks with purported paranoid and delusional thoughts. Accordingly, the Court has concerns for the Children's safety and the veracity of each parent's allegations against the other. Moreover, the three children live with the paternal grandparents on consent of both parties in the Children's best interests.”

On November 8, 2023, the Paternal Grandparents commenced a proceeding in the New York State Supreme Court, Westchester County, known as M.S. (paternal grandfather) and L.S. (paternal grandmother) v. A.S. (father) and L.S. (mother), under index number XXXXX/XXXX, (hereinafter “Paternal Grandparents Custody Proceeding”), pursuant to DRL § 72, seeking an award of custody of the Children with the filing of a petition ¹⁹ asserting the following:

“Petitioners are the paternal grandparents of the children and as such, have the requisite standing to file the instant petition seeking custody of the children.

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Petitioners have been the primary caregivers for the children for the vast majority of the children's lives.

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Respondent A.S. is the biological father of the children and Respondent L.S. is the biological mother of the children.

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The temporary custody of the children has been agreed upon in the So-Ordered Stipulation, attached hereto. Petitioners have temporary residential and legal custody of the children pursuant to the So-Ordered Stipulation. Respondents each have separate supervised access of no more than twice a week with the children, during the hours of 9:00 am and 5:00 pm, as agreed to in advance by the Petitioners and away from the Petitioner's residence. (See Exhibit A) It would be in the best interests of the children for the Petitioners to have custody of the children for the following reasons:

There are extraordinary circumstances present in that since the children were born, they have primarily resided with the Petitioners as both Respondents have struggled to provide for and care for the children. Respondents have formally and informally voluntarily agreed that Petitioners would have temporary residential and legal custody of the children and that Respondents would have only supervised visitation. Petitioners are best positioned to provide the children with a long-term stable home environment, as they have been doing for the children's whole lives. Petitioner will facilitate the Respondents’ access to the children and will agree to a regular access schedule, consistent with the children's best interests.”

On December 12, 2023, the Westchester County Attorney's Office filed a report on the Court ordered investigation.²⁰

On December 12, 2023, the Grandparents filed, within the Grandparents Custody Proceeding, a request for judicial intervention and a motion by order to show cause seeking the entry of an order granting the following relief: (1) pursuant to CPLR § 602, consolidating the above-captioned special proceeding for grandparent custody with the matrimonial action, captioned S. v. S., Index No. XXXXX/XXXX currently pending before the Hon. James L. Hyer, J.S.C. of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Westchester; and (2) granting Petitioners further relief as is just and proper (hereinafter “Grandparents Custody Proceeding Motion Sequence No. 1”).²¹ This order to show cause was conformed,²² after which the relief was granted by the entry of an order of consolidation in both the Matrimonial Action and Grandparents Custody Proceeding.²³

On December 15, 2023, a conference was held after which an order was entered setting forth a discovery schedule and scheduling a compliance conference to be held on February 14, 2024.²⁴

On December 20, 2023, Plaintiff's Counsel #1 filed a pre-motion conference request to address issues including a request for leave to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiff,²⁵ after which an order was entered scheduling a pre-motion conference to be held on January 10, 2024, at 9:30 a.m.²⁶

On January 10, 2024, a conference was held before the undersigned wherein Plaintiff's Counsel #1 made an application to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff, which was granted without opposition, after which an order was entered directing that John Guttridge, Esq., would be appointed as 18-B counsel for Plaintiff (hereinafter “Plaintiff's Counsel #2”) and that Plaintiff's outgoing counsel provide an electronic hard copy of Plaintiff's complete file to Plaintiff's Counsel #2; and a separate order of appointment was entered effectuating the appointment of Plaintiff's Counsel #2.²⁷

On January 11, 2024, Defendant's Counsel #1 filed a motion by order to show cause (hereinafter “Motion Sequence No. 1”),²⁸ seeking the entry of an order granting the following relief: (1) awarding legal fees to Defendant's attorneys in the sum of $21,220 for fees past due and an additional $10,000 for future legal fees; and (2) other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

On January 12, 2024, Motion Sequence No. 1. was conformed,²⁹ setting a briefing schedule and a return date for January 26, 2024.

On January 19, 2024, a proposed interim custody order was filed with a request that the Court so-order same,³⁰ which the Court entered,³¹ (hereinafter “Custody Consent Order #3”), which provides the following:

“NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that all prior orders relating to visitation by the parents of the subject Children are modified and superseded by this Order; and it is further

ORDERED that the either Parent may use any Court approved agency, paid or unpaid supervisor who is approved by the subject children's Paternal Grandparents or the Attorney for the Children; and it is further

ORDERED that any access that is supervised by an agency or paid third-party supervisor shall be at the sole expense of the Parent exercising access; and it is further

ORDERED that either Parent may have visitation with a subject Child or Children supervised by the Paternal Grandparent or Grandparents and/or nanny or nannies jointly with the Mother's maternal grandmother [Redacted], as is agreed upon by the Paternal Grandparents or the Attorney for the Children; and it is further

ORDERED that visitation shall occur at such places and for such durations as agreeable to the Paternal Grandparents or Attorney for the Children; and it is further

ORDERED that all other terms and provisions set forth in the Interim Access Order and the Supervised Access Order on Consent not specifically modified herein shall remain in full force and effect.”

On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed submissions in opposition to Motion Sequence No. 1,³² after which Defendant filed a reply submission.³³

On March 12, 2024, an order was entered scheduling a conference to be held on April 5, 2024, at 9:00 a.m.³⁴

On March 22, 2024, a decision and order was entered pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 1,³⁵ granting Defendant's application to the extent Defendant was awarded $20,000.00 in interim counsel fees.

On April 5, 2024, a conference was held before the undersigned wherein a resolution was reached pertaining to the remaining issues arising out of the requested dissolution of the parties’ marriage through verbal settlement terms placed upon the record and a written parenting agreement (hereinafter “Parenting Agreement”)³⁶ being presented to the Court, which was so-ordered after the allocution of the parties, after which an order was entered directing the submission of a proposed documents needed for the Court's entry of a judgment of divorce by April 24, 2024.³⁷

The Parenting Agreement preamble confirmed the intent of the Plaintiff, Defendant and Paternal Grandparents to set forth a final agreement pertaining to the custody of the Children:

“WHEREAS, there are three unemancipated children of the marriage, J.S., born XX/XX/XXXX, B.S., born XX/XX/XXXX, and E.S., born XX/XX/XXXX (the “Children”); and

* * *

WHEREAS, the Parties have agreed upon the terms of a settlement relating to the legal, physical and residential custody of the children, each party's access to the children, and the time to be spent by each of them with the Children; and

WHEREAS, the Parties agree that this Parenting Agreement finally resolves only the issues of custody, decision making and access of the children, as well as child support owed to the Paternal Grandparents, and all other rights and claims of the Father and Mother arising from the Divorce Action are preserved and reserved, with the intention being that same shall be resolved and disposed of in accordance with an agreement of settlement executed by the Father and Mother or by order of the court after trial; and

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WHEREAS, each Party is represented by separate and independent counsel of his or her own choosing, and each party has discussed with his and her respective independent counsel his or her rights and obligations and the terms of this Parenting Agreement and the applicable law of the State of New York, including, without limitation, the Domestic Relations Law (“DRL”) of the State of New York §§ 240 and 72, and each Party fully understands the terms of this Parenting Agreement and the applicable law; and

WHEREAS, each Party has carefully read and is entering into this Parenting Agreement of his or her own free will and without force, coercion or duress of whatever nature and with the conviction that the terms set forth herein are fair, reasonable and equitable, and are in the Children's best interests; and

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, and with the intent to be legally bound, and for other good and valuable consideration, it is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the Parties as follows:”

Article II of the Parenting Agreement set forth the manner in which decision-making would be engaged in pertaining to the Children:

“The Paternal Grandparents will consult with the Parents via e-mail regarding all Major Decisions and receive any input from the Parents offered by them. The Children's welfare and best interests shall be the parties’ paramount concerns. If, after consultation, the Parties are not in agreement on any Major Decision, the Paternal Grandparents shall be permitted to make the final decision with respect to all Major Decisions.

The Paternal Grandparents shall have the right to make day-to-day, routine, and ordinary decisions regarding the Children.

In the event of an emergency which does not permit prior consultation between the Parties with respect to the health and welfare of a Child, the Paternal Grandparents shall have the right to do whatever is reasonably necessary based on emergency personnel's recommendations in such emergency and shall advise the Parents as soon as possible of such emergency, and, if available, the nature of the condition and the steps in treatment taken in connection therewith.”

Article III of the Parenting Agreement set forth the resolution pertaining to the physical custody and access schedule of the Children:

“The Paternal Grandparents shall have primary residential custody of the Children.

The Parents shall have visitation with the Children consistent with the terms of the order Modifying supervised Access, issued by the Hon. James L. Hyer, J.S.C., dated January 19, 2024, attached hereto as Exhibit A. Each Parent shall have supervised visitation with the Children, which shall occur at such places and for such durations as agreeable to the Paternal Grandparents. The Father may have visitation with a Child or Children supervised by a Paternal Grandparent or Grandparents and/or nanny or nannies, or as agreed upon by the paternal Grandparents. The Mother may have visitation with a Child or Children supervised by a Paternal Grandparent or Grandparents and/or nanny or nannies jointly with the Mother's maternal grandmother [Redacted], or as is agreed upon by the Paternal Grandparents.

The Parent may use any Court approved agency, paid or unpaid supervisor who is approved by the Parental Grandparents to supervise visitation with the Children, provided such access shall be at the sole expense of the Parent exercising visitation. If a parent wishes to seek expanded visitation, that Parent may request the appointment of a parent coordinator to work with the Parties to negotiate additional visitation times, at the sole expense of the Parent seeking expanded visitation, or the Parent may make an application with the Court seeking additional visitation.

Should the mother comply with the provisions of the Agreement for a period of six months, that shall constitute a sufficient change in circumstances upon the law to entitle her to seek a modification of access provisions of this agreement in order to seek an expanded access schedule.”

Article IV(12) of the Parenting Agreement (hereinafter “Non-Disparagement Provision”), set forth the parties’ clear understanding that none would engage in conduct that would constitute disparagement of the others, verbally or by their conduct:

“Non-Disparagement. The Parties will exert every possible effort to maintain free access and unhampered contact between each Child and each Party and to foster a feeling of love and affection between each Child and each Party. Each Party will refrain from any acts or actions, word or words, insinuations or any other form of expression or conduct, whether directed toward a child or toward a third party with whom a child has contact, which would in any way tend to lessen the respect of a Child for another Party, or which may estrange a Child from another party or injure a child's opinion as to another Party or which may hamper the free and natural development of a Child's love and respect for another party.”

The parties confirmed that they each were represented by their own respective legal counsel in the negotiation and execution of the Parenting Agreement in paragraph 17, that they executed the document voluntarily, representing that the terms were in the best interests of the Children:

“The Parties acknowledge that each has received independent legal advice from counsel of his or her own selection in the negotiation and execution of this Parenting Agreement. Each further acknowledges that he or she is executing this Parenting Agreement of his or her own free will and volition and has not been subjected to any duress or undue influence. Each Party further acknowledges that he or she believes that the provisions of this Parenting Agreement are in the best interests of the children.”

Paragraph 18 of the Parenting Agreement (hereinafter “Modification Provision”) set forth the manner within which the parties could amend the Parenting Agreement:

“This Parenting Agreement, or any provision hereof, may not be altered, amended, amplified, modified, terminated, rescinded or discharged orally, and no alteration, amendment, modification, termination, rescission or discharge hereof shall be binding, enforceable, valid or admissible in evidence in any court action or proceeding unless the same be in writing and duly executed by all Parties with the same formalities as this Parenting Agreement.”

Within the Parenting Agreement, the parties set forth three separate paragraphs as to how a party could obtain an award of legal fees from the other(s) in the event of post-settlement disputes pertaining to the Parenting Agreement:

“20. In the event that any Party breaches or defaults on any provision of this Parenting Agreement (the “Defaulting Party”) and such breach or default is not remedied within fifteen (15) days after written notice (e-mail to suffice) is made to the Defaulting Party specifying such breach or default, the Defaulting Party shall be liable to the other party (the “Complaining Party”) for reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with legal proceedings commenced to enforce this Parenting Agreement, provided, that such suit or legal proceeding results in a judgment, decree, award, or order by court of competent jurisdiction in favor of the complaining party. In the event the commencement of such suit or legal proceedings does not result in a judgment, decree, award, or order by a court of competent jurisdiction in favor the complaining party, then the Complaining Party shall be liable to the so-called Defaulting Party for reasonable attorney's fees incurred in connection with same.

21. Without limiting the provisions of the immediately preceding paragraph, if either party (the “Rescinding Party”) commences an action or proceeding seeking to vacate, rescind or set aside this Parenting Agreement or to declare any of the terms and conditions to be invalid, void or against public policy, for reasons of fraud, duress, incompetence, overreaching or unconscionability, then, if this Parenting Agreement is substantially upheld in such action or proceeding (whether by the Court or other tribunal or by settlement agreement), the Rescinding Party shall be liable for the costs and expenses incurred by the other party (the “upholding party”) including (a) reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable experts fees incurred in such action or proceeding, and (b) any other expenses incurred in connection with such action or proceeding. For the avoidance of doubt, a Party seeking to modify terms of the Parenting Agreement shall not be deemed a Rescinding Parry. The provisions of this Article are in addition to, and without prejudice to, any other rights and remedies available to any Party at law or in equity.

22. For the purposes of this Parenting Agreement, it is understood and agreed that in the event that any Party shall institute a suit or other proceeding against another Party to enforce any provision of this Parenting Agreement, and after the institution of such action or legal proceeding and before judgment is or can be entered the Defaulting Party complies with such provision of this Parenting Agreement, the suit, motion, or proceeding shall be deemed to have resulted in a judgment, award, decree, or order in favor of the complaining party entitling the Complaining Party to the reasonable counsel fees described in this Article. It is further understood and agreed that in the event the Complaining Party withdraws the suit or proceeding against the other party to enforce any provision of this Parenting Agreement before judgment is or can be entered and without the other party curing the alleged default or breach, it shall be deemed to have resulted in a judgment, award, decree, or order in favor of the so-called Defaulting Party entitling them to the reasonable counsel fees described in this Article.”

Within paragraphs 25 and 31 of the Parenting Agreement, the parties set forth their intention for the terms of the Parenting Agreement to be the entire understanding of the parties pertaining to the custody of the Children being binding upon the parties both as a contract between them with the terms being incorporated by reference, but not merged, into a judgment of divorce to be later entered:

“This Parenting Agreement is a valid and enforceable agreement and is made in accordance with DRL § 236(B)(3) and shall be incorporated in and survive, without merger, a Judgment of Divorce.

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This Parenting Agreement, and all of its terms and provisions, including the Recitals incorporated herein and made part hereof (a) constitutes the Parties’ entire understanding and agreement pertaining to decision making and access relating to the Children and child support; (b) shall be binding on the respective Parties’ estates, heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns; (c) shall be subject to the doctrine of severability; (d) is binding on current and successor counsel; and (e) may be submitted by any party to the court to be So-Ordered.”

On May 22, 2024, a so-ordered Court transcript was filed which reflects the allocution of the parties as to the agreements reached, after which the Court advised the parties and counsel that the Stipulation would be enforceable both as a contract and Court order or judgment:

“THE COURT: The Stipulation of Settlement that was memorialized in the parenting agreement and the terms that were placed upon the record will incorporate but not merge into the final Judgement of Divorce. This means that the stipulation will become part of the final Judgement of Divorce and be enforceable both as a contract between the parties and as a court order or judgment. As a court order or judgment it will be enforceable with all of the powers of the Court, including but not limited to contempt proceedings. Sir, do you understand that?

A.S.: Yes.

THE COURT: Sir?

MR. M.S.: Yes.

THE COURT: Ma'am?

L.S.: Yes.

THE COURT: Ma'am?

MRS. L.S.: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you all.”38

On June 17, 2024, a judgment of divorce was submitted on consent of the parties as evidenced by the signatures on the last page of the proposed judgment by their then respective counsel noting “approved as to form and consent and waived settlement period”, which was entered (hereinafter “Judgment of Divorce”),³⁹ which included the following decretals:

“ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the stipulation placed on the record in open court on April 5, 2024 and so-ordered on May 22, 2024 (the “Financial Stipulation”) and the So-Ordered Stipulation of Custody and Access, dated April 5, 2024 (the “Custody Stipulation”) are annexed hereto and the terms thereof are, without limitation, incorporated but not merged into this Judgment of Divorce, and the parties are hereby directed to comply with all legally enforceable terms and conditions of said Financial Stipulation and Custody Stipulation as if such terms and conditions were set forth in their entirety herein; and it is further

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ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that legal custody of and access with the minor children of the marriage shall be pursuant to the terms set forth in the Custody Stipulation; and it is further”

On June 17, 2024, a notice of entry of the judgment of divorce was filed with proof of service.⁴⁰

On May 7, 2025, Plaintiff commenced a family offense proceeding against Defendant in the New York State Family Court known as A.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX) v. L.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX), under file number XXXXXX and docket number X-XXXXX-XX, (hereinafter “Family Offense Proceeding #1”), with the filing of a petition asserting that Defendant had committed family offenses against Plaintiff which constitute: (1) assault, (2) attempted assault, (3) disorderly conduct, (4) harassment, (5) menacing, and (6) aggravated harassment.

The petition filed in Family Offense Proceeding #1 sets forth the allegations of Plaintiff against Defendant with respect to the specific family offenses claimed:

“On April 14, 2025, at 04:00 PM, at my residence, 269 XXXXXXXX, Dobbs Ferry, NY 10522, I went to obtain some of my belongings in the house, and the Respondent, L.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XX), started harassing me and would not stop. I went to the room and closed the door to avoid any conflict. The respondent and I are divorced in July 2024, but we'd been living in separate rooms at the residence. The harassment, disorderly conduct, threats, and intimidation by the Respondent have become so bad that I left temporarily. The Respondent refuses to accept that we are no longer married or that I don't want to be together, but she will not leave me alone. The Respondent is abusive and crazy, and I've had to file a previous Order of Protection against her due to the disorderly conduct, assaults, and harassment against me. Now the Respondent is threatening to kill me and my girlfriend. In the past, the Respondent can only see them through supervised visits. I'm tired of the ongoing and constant abuse and harassment by the Respondent. I seek the Court's assistance. Therefore, I A.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XX), request Full Order of Protection against the Respondent, L.S.

Additional incidents: There were numerous incidents at our previous address, 42 XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, Hastings-On-Hudson, NY 10706, dating back to 2022-2024, when the Respondent became physically, mentally and emotionally abusive.”

The petition filed in Family Offense Proceeding #1 indicates that Plaintiff sought that the Family Court: (1) adjudge the Respondent to have committed the family offenses alleged; (2) enter an order of protection, specifying conditions of behavior to be observed by the Respondent in accordance with Section 842 of the Family Court Act: vacate the premises immediately with the assistance of Dobbs Ferry Police; and stay away from me, my home, my job, or anywhere I am in the immediate vicinity; refrain from making any form of contact with me including by the way of a third party, social network, telephone, text, email, mail, or any other form of communication with me; and refrain from making any form of harassment, threats, intimidation, stalking, assaults, disorderly conduct, criminal mischief, or any form of criminal offense against me; (3) enter a finding of aggravated circumstances; (4) order such other and further reliefs as this Court deems just and proper.

On May 8, 2025, Defendant commenced a family offense proceeding against Plaintiff in the New York State Family Court known as L.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX) v. A.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX), under file number XXXXXX and docket number X-XXXXX-XX, (hereinafter “Family Offense Proceeding #2”), with the filing of a petition asserting that Plaintiff had committed family offenses against Defendant and/or the Children which constitute: (1) disorderly conduct, (2) harassment in the 1st degree, (3) harassment in the 2nd degree, (4) aggravated harassment in the 2nd degree, (5) attempted assault, (6) assault in the 2nd degree, (7) assault in the 3rd degree, (8) menacing in the 2nd degree, (9) menacing in the 3rd degree, (10) stalking in the 1st degree, (11) stalking in the 2nd degree, (12) stalking in the 3rd degree, (13) stalking in the 4th degree, (14) criminal mischief, (15) criminal obstruction breath blood circulation, (16) coercion in the 2nd degree (hereinafter “Family Offense Proceeding #2”).

The petition filed in Family Offense Proceeding #2 sets forth the allegations of Defendant against Plaintiff with respect to the specific family offenses claimed:

“On or about May 7, 2025, at night, Respondent arrived at Petitioner's home with his girlfriend and began banging loudly on the door, screaming for Petitioner to let him inside. Respondent, who moved out of the parties’ home over a month ago, appeared to be under the influence of drugs, and Petitioner was especially alarmed by his girlfriend's presence, as she has threatened Petitioner's life in the past and has also threatened to harm Petitioner's children. Petitioner refused to open the door, and Respondent yelled that he was going to call the police and falsely allege that Petitioner was threatening him. Petitioner kept the chain locked on the door and Petitioner called the police. Police arrived and Respondent continued to behave belligerently and uncooperatively toward the police. The police advised Respondent to leave and they advised Petitioner to seek an order of protection from Family Court. Upon information and belief, a Domestic Incident Report was filed.

On or about April 14, 2025, an argument ensued and Respondent threatened Petitioner that he was going to, “punch [her] in the face”. Petitioner was terrified by Respondent's conduct and she went to the bathroom, where she called the police. When the police arrived, Petitioner declined to press charges and said she did not want Respondent arrested. A Domestic Incident Report was filed (Incident #XX-XXXXXX-XX) and Respondent subsequently packed his belongings and moved out of the parties’ home.

On or about March 16, 2025, Respondent began arguing, cursing and screaming at Petitioner uncontrollably. Petitioner had just come out of the shower and was holding a bottle of body oil; Respondent grabbed the bottle and threw it at Petitioner. Respondent spit at Petitioner. Petitioner was horrified and frightened by Respondent, especially after what happened a few days earlier, and Petitioner called the police. Police arrived and a Domestic Incident Report was filed (Incident #XX-XXXXXX-XX).

On or about March 13, 2025, the parties were in the car driving to Manhattan when Respondent began screaming uncontrollably at Petitioner. They were at a red light when Respondent grabbed Petitioner by her neck and pressed her head to his lap. Respondent squeezed Petitioner's neck with such force that Petitioner had difficulty breathing and feared for her life. Respondent forcefully grabbed Petitioner's wrists and pulled Petitioner's hair. Respondent tried to kick Petitioner out of the car, but Petitioner was terrified of being abandoned in New York City at night with no way to get home, and she begged Respondent to take her home. Respondent brought Petitioner home and then left, and returned a short time later appearing to be sedated and under the influence of drugs. Respondent got on top of Petitioner and tried to pressure Petitioner to have sex, but Petitioner repeatedly declined. Petitioner was seriously alarmed at Respondent's behavior and she sustained lasting pain and was visible bruising on her eye and wrist that lasted approximately one week as a result of Respondent's conduct.

Respondent has a history of drug abuse and violent behavior that causes Petitioner ongoing alarm and fear for her safety and the safety of her children. In or about 2022, Respondent punched a hole in the wall and slammed their daughter's crib against the wall, breaking the crib and terrifying Petitioner and the child (J.S., DOB XX/XX/XXXX). In or about December 2021, Respondent drove with Petitioner and their daughter, J.S., in the back seat, to buy drugs illegally from a drug dealer. Petitioner was infuriated and seriously alarmed by Respondent's conduct. In or about 2019, Respondent thew Petitioner's dog, [Redacted], to the ground, frightening the dog and seriously alarming Petitioner. Respondent's physically and verbally abusive course of conduct causes Petitioner to fear for her safety and the safety of her children. As a result, Petitioner seeks an Order of Protection from Family Court at this time.”

The petition filed in Family Offense Proceeding #2 indicates that Defendant sought that the Family Court: (1) adjudge Respondent to have committed the family offenses alleged; (2) enter an order of protection, specifying conditions of behavior to be observed by the Respondent in accordance with Section 824 of the Family Court Act: stay away from Petitioner; stay away from Petitioner's children; stay away from Petitioner's home; stay away from Petitioner's workplace or school; stay away from Petitioner's children's school, daycare, babysitter; refrain from harassment, assault, threats, stalking, menacing, or any of the family offenses against Petitioner or Petitioner's children; no communication and no contact either directly or through Respondent's agent, by telephone, email, social media or otherwise, except for emergency matters pertaining to the parties’ children; order that Respondent not be in the presence of the children named herein under the influence of drugs or alcohol, nor consume drugs or alcohol in the presence of the children named herein; order that Respondent refrain from intentionally injuring or killing, without justification, any companion animal Respondent knows to be owned, possessed, leased, kept or held by Petitioner or a minor child residing in the household, namely Petitioner's Mini Australian Sheperd “[Redacted]”; ordering that Respondent promptly return specified identification documents to the Petitioner, including the following: Petitioner's children's birth certificates and hospital records; order that Respondent surrender to police any and all owned or possessed forearms, including but not limited to pistols, revolvers, rifles, and shotguns, and further ordering that Respondent's firearms license be suspended for the duration of the order of protection; entering a finding of aggravating circumstances, if applicable; and order such other and further relief as to the Court seems just and proper.

On May 19, 2025, Defendant filed a motion by order to show cause (hereinafter “Motion Sequence No. 2”),⁴¹ seeking the entry of an order granting relief, inter alia, modifying the custody of the Children, which was conformed ⁴² directing: (1) May 22, 2025, as the deadline for service of the motion; (2) June 6, 2025, as the deadline for the filing and service of any answering submissions and/or cross motions; and (3) June 20, 2025, as the deadline for the filing and service of any answering submissions to cross motions filed, being the return date for the motion and any cross motions filed.

In support of her application, Defendant filed an affidavit ⁴³ asserting:

“I am the defendant in this matter. I make this affidavit in support of this motion for an order. I am requesting an immediate judicial intervention and modification of the current custody arrangement due to no communication from the legal guardians, M.S. and L.S.

* * *

I believe the Court should grant this motion because the legal custodial grandparents are currently violating an existing stay-away order or protection that was issued by the Yonkers Family Court, in protection of myself, L.S. and, B.S. There has been no communication from the grandparents to myself or my mother [Redacted] after missing our scheduled visit and not returning any texts or calls letting us know the children are safe. Per our divorce decree, all custody modifications must be made through Hon. James L. Hyer, J.S.C. and I am having extreme difficulties reaching the grandparents or maintaining a stable and consistent schedule that is in alignment with our family values and my children's lives. I also want to mention to Judge James L. Hyer that prior to signing the divorce decree I was very unaware that all modifications would have to be made through Supreme Court and that if I did want to modify or change custody that I would be 100% responsible for the other parties attorneys’ fees, which is something I would have expressed concern if I knew before. I would have never signed the document if I knew I would have to go through so much trouble to see my children. I am asking the judge to please review all my documents and help me and my children during this time as this is my last resort.”

Defendant annexed a second Affidavit ⁴⁴ to her application, in support of the relief requested which included the following:

I am the Defendant in this action/proceeding. I request immediate judicial review of my—on the following grounds: I am the biological mother of J.S., E.S., and B.S. I respectfully request immediate judicial intervention and modification of the current custody arrangement. I am looking to regain custody of my children due to serious safety concerns and lack of communication and cooperation from their current custodians, M.S. and L.S. I have been excluded from decisions regarding my children's daily care and welfare. Despite being their legal parent I have been denied consistent contact, and my efforts to co-parent have been ignored. I am also concerned about past exposure to individuals who are the subject of a stay-away order of protection, which puts the children at continued risk. The current environment is not transparent or stable. I respectfully ask the court to remove my children from the parental grandparents, and return them to me, the biological mother. Please see the attached document giving details of the issues that have been ongoing.”

On June 6, 2025, the Paternal Grandparents filed a cross motion,⁴⁵ (hereinafter “Motion Sequence No. 3”), seeking the entry of an order granting the following relief: (1) Denying Respondent L.S.’s (“Respondent”) Motion in its entirety; (2) Granting an immediate Temporary and Permanent Order of Protection in favor of Petitioners, directing Respondent and to stay away from the Petitioners’ home, located at 289 XXXXXXXXXX, Dobbs Ferry, NY 10522, precluding Respondent from sending third parties to Petitioner's home, and prohibiting Respondent from, among other things, assaulting, menacing, harassing, recklessly endangering, disparaging and engaging in disorderly conduct towards Petitioners, J.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX), B.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX), and E.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX) (the “Children”), including by doing so through third parties, such as law enforcement; (3) Enjoining Respondent from bringing any further applications to modify the So-Ordered Parenting Agreement between A.S. and L.S. and Mr. M.S. and Mrs. L.S. dated April 5, 2024 (the “Agreement”) without the approval of the Court; and (4) Pursuant to Paragraph 21 of the Agreement, awarding Petitioners counsel fees in the sum of $16,703; and (5) Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

In support of the relief requested in Motion Sequence No. 3, the Grandfather submitted an affirmation wherein he asserted that in the weeks prior to his submission Defendant had engaged in a pattern of harassment towards the Paternal Grandparents and Children by repeatedly sending police to his home to conduct welfare checks based on false allegations that the Children were in danger, disrupted their sleep due to texting at inappropriate hours, and appearing at their home unannounced in violation of the Court's order.⁴⁶ He further asserted that Defendant has filed multiple frivolous proceedings seeking custody in the Family Court, has no stable income or housing, fails to meaningfully engage in access time with the Children and that the Children should remain in their home which provides a stable environment where the Children are thriving.⁴⁷ In support of his request for an order limiting Defendant's ability to engage in litigation without Court approval, he asserted that Defendant has commenced a proceeding seeking custody of the Children in the New York State Family Court in violation of the terms of the Parenting Agreement in June of 2024, which was dismissed due to the requirement that such applications must be made in the New York State Supreme Court.⁴⁸ He then requests an award of $16,703.00 as and for legal fees incurred in this post-judgment litigation.⁴⁹

On June 20, 2025, Defendant filed a reply submission.⁵⁰

On July 3, 2025, Decisions and Orders were entered pertaining to Motion Sequence Nos. 2 & 3,⁵¹ granting both applications to the extent that the relief requested therein would be determined following a hearing to be scheduled at a conference to be held on July 10, 2025; and that a separate order of appointment would be entered re-appointing as attorney for the Children Faith G. Miller, Esq.; after which a notice of entry of same with proofs of service were filed.⁵² On that date the Court further entered an order of appointment of the AFC.⁵³

Following requests for an adjournment by the AFC and Paternal Grandparents counsel,⁵⁴ and order was entered rescheduling the conference for July 10, 2025, at 9:00 a.m.⁵⁵

On July 10, 2025, a conference was held after which a so-ordered court transcript was filed (hereinafter “7/10/2025 Transcript”),⁵⁶ which reflects that appearances were made by Paternal Grandparents, Counsel for Paternal Grandparents, AFC, Plaintiff as a self-represented litigant and Defendant as a self-represented litigant. Plaintiff and Defendant were advised of their right to be represented by counsel and presented with two documents marked and filed as Court exhibits being: (1) Self-Represented Litigant Information Sheet; and (2) Part Rules of the Hon. James L. Hyer, J.S.C.⁵⁷

During the conference, all parties provided their request that this Court enter an order of consolidation wherein Family Offense Proceeding #1 and Family Offense Proceeding #2 would be consolidated with this action to be adjudicated as part of the post-judgment applications before this Court pertaining to Motion Sequence Nos. 2 & 3, having advised this Court that both proceedings were currently before the New York State Family Court scheduled for a hearing.⁵⁸

The AFC requested the entry of an order directing a Court-ordered investigation based upon allegations including sexual abuse:

“MS. MILLER: Certainly, Your Honor. I can tell you the children are okay because they are with the grandparents and I have every confidence that the grandparents are providing for their stability, safety, emotional and psychological growth of the children. They are loved, no doubt. I am extremely concerned about all of the acrimony, volatility, applications filing here, in Family Court, police reports, I am advised there is an ongoing CPS investigation. I am newly appointed as I said in my letter to the court yesterday, I have not yet had an opportunity to see the children. The children are extremely young, twins, not yet three, and a not yet four year old. I am going to try to reach out to the County Attorney to see if they will be filing anything. I would ask this court respectfully to consider a COI and having the caseworker come and make a report to this court. As I said, there are a lot of allegations flying in different petitions and police reports but they are extremely, extremely, disturbing. And no matter who is right and who is wrong, the mere fact that the police are coming to the house, caseworkers are investigating allegations of sexual abuse which we all know could require the children to be seen by the CAC and/or have gynecological examinations is in and of itself extraordinarily distressing. So I would ask that the Court have the County Attorney have the Department of Social Services present. We have to get to the bottom of this.”59

Following the AFC advising the Court that Defendant had made allegations of sexual abuse by the Paternal Grandparents,⁶⁰ Defendant confirmed that she was not seeking the appointment of counsel,⁶¹ and while under oath made the following statements pertaining to the allegations of sexual abuse:

“THE COURT: So, I am going to direct my questions to you. Do you have concerns that any of your children are being sexually abused?

L.S.: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Can you articulate why on the record. You are under oath. I know this is difficult. Take your time.

L.S.: E.S.’s speech therapist pulled me to the side and told me she wanted E.S. to see a psychologist because her behavior is very off. A few days after M.S.’s birthday on March 22nd, I watch me three year old go up to her grandfather and try to unbuckle his belt and unzip his pants. And I looked at her, and I said J.S. -- and he put his hands in front of his pants and he backed away and he said, J.S., that's not polite. I brought it up to some of my other friends who have children and I thought maybe she is just being a child. I brought it up to my mom who is a nurse. I don't feel -- I don't feel like it is okay. Especially -- which I feel uncomfortable bringing this up -- but when A.S. and I were together before we got married, he expressed there were some things that happened with his father. His sister does not come around at all. A.S. recanted his statement. It is just a lot of stuff in this family. So I want to make sure that my babies are okay. Especially when the speech therapist told me that they want the children, especially E.S. to see a psychologist. My baby does not play with other children. She does not interact. It is not normal behavior and she only speaks Chinese. She doesn't speak much English at all.

THE COURT: So, ma'am, let me ask you a couple of questions.

L.S.: Yes.

THE COURT: Other than that one incident is there anything else that has caused you to have concern that your child is being abused by anybody? Other than that one incident, and the fact that your child, perhaps, has other issues where she is not interacting and being more involved with other children in a social manner.

L.S.: There is a video that I provided to the Court on a flash drive that my aunt sent me. I thought it was weird. But, again, it was more J.S. going up to -- because J.S. and E.S. are two different people, by the way. So E.S. needed, I was told about the psychologist, she wanted -- the speech therapist wanted her to go see a psychologist. And then J.S. went up to M.S. so it was two different things but I find it just very, very inappropriate.

THE COURT: Can you describe for the record because this is very important. You are levying very serious charges. There are case law that deals with.

L.S.: Which is why I was hesitant to even say anything in the first place. When I have been alienated and not being able to see my kids, and I just didn't understand it. It doesn't make any sense to me.

THE COURT: I understand. What exactly was on the video? I watched it. Can you explain.

L.S.: So, I was at the twins’ birthday party and he was holding E.S. and his hands were like going towards her crotch and she was pulling away like she was uncomfortable and I didn't even notice. I didn't even notice. She was uncomfortable and his hands went so far up on her crotch.

THE COURT: Is there anything else that you wanted to say, ma'am?

L.S.: No.”62

In response to the allegations of sexual abuse by the Paternal Grandparents made by Defendant, counsel for the Paternal Grandparents provided the position of his clients asserting that these allegations were baseless and part of a larger orchestrated effort by Defendant to harass his clients done to the detriment of the Children:

“Our clients are responsible for taking care of these children in every possible way. They are doing a fantastic job. They are financially responsible for the children, completely, and they have stepped up in a way that a lot of grandparents would not do in order to make sure these children did not go into foster care and these children have a safe environment and a stable household. And the thanks that they have gotten in return for that is constant harassment. Just recently in May the police came to their house multiple times in a week because L.S. made false allegations that their needs to be a welfare check. It is clear from the police report that L.S. did that. The police came at 5:00 a.m., in the middle of the night one of those times. They woke up the entire household which is extremely disruptive for these young children.

On another occasion the police came and were banging on the door. It was terrifying for these children. Then on top of that, we have this false allegation of sexual abuse which I believe has already caused the children to have genital examinations which they should never have been subjected to. It is traumatic for these children. It is traumatic for my clients which is why we requested an order of protection. Our clients want L.S. to be healthy and to be involved in these children's lives. We signed an agreement that gives my clients the discretion to determine when visitation can occur based on how L.S.’s behaving. In this circumstance, when there was multiple times, police -- not just police — L.S. had her other family members coming to the house and knocking on the door and disturbing these children, which is extremely disruptive and clearly not in their best interests. So, from our client's perspective, they want L.S. to be involved, but they should not be subject to harassment and the children's interests must be protected above all. And the concern here is that given L.S.’s current state that she is not in the mental state to be a safe presence for the children which is very upsetting for I think everybody involved and our clients, you know, really their priority is the best interest of each of these children.”63

In response to the allegation that she had utilized welfare checks conducted by law enforcement to engage in harassment of the Paternal Grandparents, Defendant confirmed that she had requested two welfare checks due to a lack of communication between she and the Paternal Grandparents:

“I did two welfare checks. One was a week after missing visitation with no communication from the grandparents. The second welfare check was actually done after the 22nd of May after the court date when M.S. told the police officers that he was going to contact me to let me know what was going to happen with my children and nothing was said. There were two welfare checks and one phone call made from my mother. I just wanted to put that on the record because I was not harassing them. I did not physically go to their home until a week had past and M.S. did not answer any of my text messages that I sent which I am sure you got to look at, Judge, I provided them on the flash drive. I did not harass them. I just wanted clear communication when I was going to see my kids. If they were not going to allow me to see my children I just wanted to know what was going on. It was just the communication.”64

When turning to the scheduling of the hearing, the Court for a second time requested if Defendant sought the appointment of counsel after which Defendant made such application, the application was granted, the Court obtained the virtual appearance of Dana Foster-Navins, Esq., (hereinafter “Defendant's Counsel #2”), who confirmed that she had no conflicts and counsel confirmed that no conflicts existed preventing her appointment as counsel for Defendant, and the Court made the appointment to be followed by written order entered.⁶⁵

Following the conference the following were entered: (1) order for investigation;⁶⁶ (2) order appointing Defendant's Counsel #2 as 18-B counsel for Defendant;⁶⁷ (3) an order scheduling the hearing which provided that all pre-hearing disclosure would take place by October 17, 2025, with the hearing to commence on October 27, 2025 through October 31, 2025, from 9:00 a.m. — 5:00 p.m. each day;⁶⁸ and (4) an order consolidating Family Offense Proceeding #1 and Family Offense Proceeding #2 with this post-judgment litigation.⁶⁹

On September 16, 2025, a conference was held before the undersigned wherein all parties and counsel appeared, after which an order was entered confirming that the Westchester County Attorney's Office had appeared by Joseph Wester, Esq., and Laura Johnson, Esq., to advise that the Court Ordered Investigation pertaining to the allegations of sexual abuse of the Children by the Paternal Grandparents was unfounded.⁷⁰ A so-ordered copy of the Court transcript from that conference (hereinafter “9/16/25 Transcript”), reflects the following pertaining to the report of the County Attorney:

“THE COURT: I want to turn, first, to the County Attorney's office. There was a request for an investigation by order of the Court. Counsel, do you have a report?

MR. WESTER: Yes, your Honor. The department did submit a report yesterday or yesterday afternoon. The Court requested that the department look into or investigate multiple incidents of sexual abuse by both grandparents. The department has investigated said allegations and has determined that they're unfounded and cannot report anything further pursuant to Social Services Law 422.”71

During the conference Defendant's Counsel #2 made an application to be relieved, which was granted on consent, after which an Order ⁷² was entered providing the following:

“On September 19, 2025, all parties and counsel appeared virtually for a conference before the undersigned wherein Defendant's counsel made an application to be relieved as counsel for Defendant, which was granted on consent. Defendant made an application for appointment of new 18-B counsel, after which the Court made inquiry into the finances of Defendant and determined Defendant not to be indigent, and denied the application. The Court then marked and filed as Court Exhibits: (1) Part Rules of the Hon. James L. Hyer, J.S.C.; and (2) Self-represented Litigant Information Sheet.

It is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Dana S. Foster-Navins, Esq., is hereby relieved as counsel for Defendant in the above-captioned action, and following the date of this Order shall have no further duties to Defendant arising out of this action unless specified herein.

2. By September 24, 2025, Defendant's outgoing counsel shall serve on Defendant via email an outgoing attorney letter listing all documents in the file of the outgoing attorney on this matter excluding those available on NYSCEF, and by that date shall file proof of service.

3. This action shall be stayed until October 19, 2025.

4. The hearing scheduled pursuant to the Order filed as NYSCEF Doc. No. 222 shall remain as scheduled to commence on October 27, 2025, at 9:00 a.m., with pre-hearing disclosure to be filed and served by October 21, 2025.

5. Defendant's outgoing counsel shall order a copy of the Court Transcript, pay same from the office of assigned counsel, and submit to be so-ordered by October 19, 2025.

6. Unless otherwise modified herein, all prior judgements, decisions and orders entered in this action shall remain in effect.”

On October 6, 2025, counsel for the Paternal Grandparents filed a notice to admit (hereinafter “Notice to Admit”),⁷³ with proof of service.

On October 17, 2025, counsel for the Paternal Grandparents requested an adjournment of certain hearing dates,⁷⁴ after which an order was entered which granted the request to the extent that the hearing dates were amended only to reflect the hours of 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on October 27, 2025, and October 29, 2025.⁷⁵

On October 21, 2025, counsel for Paternal Grandparents filed pre-hearing disclosure including: proposed hearing exhibits 1-74;⁷⁶ Notice to Admit (listed as “Stipulated Facts”);⁷⁷ exhibit list enumerating proposed exhibits 1-80;⁷⁸ witness list enumerating six potential witnesses being Paternal Grandfather, Paternal Grandmother, Plaintiff, Defendant, R.Y.H.C., and D.D.⁷⁹

On October 21, 2025, counsel for Plaintiff filed pre-hearing disclosure including: proposed exhibits 1-14;⁸⁰ exhibit list enumerating proposed exhibits 1-14;⁸¹ witness list enumerating three potential witnesses being Plaintiff, Defendant and Paternal Grandfather.⁸²

On October 21, 2025, the AFC filed pre-hearing disclosure including: witness list enumerating three potential witnesses being Plaintiff, Defendant and R.Y.H.C.⁸³

On October 22, 2025, counsel for Paternal Grandparents filed additional pre-hearing disclosure including: proposed exhibits 75 & 76;⁸⁴ and amended exhibit list enumerating proposed exhibits 1-80.⁸⁵

On October 22, 2025, Defendant file pre-hearing disclosure including: response to Notice to Admit (hereinafter “Response to Notice to Admit”);⁸⁶ and twenty unnumbered proposed exhibits.⁸⁷

On October 22, 2025, on the request of the AFC, an order was entered adjourning the one date of hearing scheduled for October 28, 2025;⁸⁸ and on request of Defendant granting an extension to file pre-hearing disclosure by October 22, 2025.⁸⁹

On October 23, 2025, Defendant filed additional pre-hearing disclosure including: an exhibit list enumerating proposed exhibits 1-14 and a witness list enumerating three potential witnesses being Plaintiff, Paternal Grandfather and Paternal Grandmother;⁹⁰ and six unnumbered potential exhibits.⁹¹

On October 23, 2025, counsel for Paternal Grandparents filed additional pre-hearing disclosure including: one proposed exhibit;⁹² second amended exhibit list enumerating proposed exhibits 1 — 80;⁹³ and Notice to Admit (conformed):⁹⁴

On October 24, 2025, counsel for Paternal Grandparents filed additional pre-hearing disclosure including: third amended exhibit list enumerating proposed exhibits 1 — 80.⁹⁵

On October 24, 2025, counsel for Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to order to show cause (hereinafter “Motion Sequence No. 4”),⁹⁶ seeking the entry of an order granting the following relief: (1) Precluding the Respondent mother from introducing any documents or evidence submitted on NYSCEF after October 22, 2025; (2) Precluding the Respondent mother from introducing any evidence or testimony regarding events that occurred prior to the signing of the So-Ordered Parenting Agreement dated April 5, 2024 (the “Agreement”); (3) Precluding the Respondent mother from introducing any evidence or testimony to support a claim to set aside the Agreement; and (4) Granting Petitioners further relief as is just and proper.

Hearing Testimony and Documents in Evidence

The Court held a one-day hearing on October 27, 2025, a so-ordered transcript for same was filed (hereinafter “Hearing Transcript”).⁹⁷

At the hearing, Plaintiff was represented by legal counsel being Keneth S. Glasser, Esq., of Gallet Dreyer & Berkey, LLP; Defendant proceeded as a self-represented litigant; Paternal Grandparents were represented by legal counsel being Brett S. Ward, Esq., and Alexa B. Lutchen, Esq., of Blank Rome LLP; and the Children were represented by Faith Miller, Esq.

 Witnesses:

At the Hearing the following witnesses were called to provide testimony:

1. Mrs. L.S. [Paternal Grandmother]

2. Mr. M.S. [Paternal Grandfather]

 Exhibits:

At the hearing the exhibits admitted into evidence are reflected in the hearing transcript.

Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law

A. Motion Sequence No. 4

During the hearing, counsel for Paternal Grandparents withdrew Motion Sequence No. 4 without prejudice to make any evidentiary objections during the hearing.⁹⁸

B. Paternal Grandparent's Notice to Admit

The Appellate Division Second Department has set forth the purpose for which a notice to admit may be utilized at a hearing:

“The purpose of a notice to admit is only to eliminate from the issues in litigation matters which will not be in dispute at trial [citations omitted]. It is not intended to cover ultimate conclusions, which can *923 only be made after a full and complete trial [citations omitted].” Moreover, “the purpose of a notice to admit is not to obtain information in lieu of other disclosure devices, such as the taking of depositions before trial” (Tolchin v. Glaser, 47 AD3d 922, [2d Dept 2008] [internal citations omitted).

During the hearing, counsel for Paternal Grandparents made an application to admit into evidence, in lieu of a Stipulation of Facts, the Notice to Admit and Response to Notice to Admit, which was granted on consent of all parties.⁹⁹ Notably, the Response to Notice to Admit was affirmed under the penalties of perjury by Defendant.

C. Witness Credibility

As custody determinations depend in large part on the hearing court's assessments of the credibility, character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, the trial court's determination should be accorded deference, and its determination should not be disturbed unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record. (see, Sanchez v. Rexhepi, 30 N.Y.S.3d 170 [2d Dept 2016]. “In matters of this character ‘the findings of the nisi prius court must be accorded the greatest respect’ ” (Eschbach v. Eschbach, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658 [2d Dept. 1982], quoting, Matter of Irene O., 381 N.Y.S.2d 865 [1975]).

“The memory, motive, mental capacity, accuracy of observation and statement, truthfulness and other tests of the reliability of witnesses can be passed upon with greater safety by a trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses than by appellate judges who simply read the printed record” (Barnet v. Cannizzaro, 3 AD2d 745, 747 [2d Dept 1957] [citation omitted]; see also, LeBron v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 212 AD2d 512, 513 [2d Dept 1995]; Segal v. McDaniel Ford, 201 AD2d 717 [2d Dept 1994]).

“Where a witness *757 has given testimony that is demonstrably false, we may, in accordance with the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, choose to discredit or disbelieve other testimony given by that witness” (see DiPalma v. State of New York, 90 AD3d 1659, 1660, 936 N.Y.S.2d 464; Accardi v. City of New York, 121 AD2d 489, 490—491, 503 N.Y.S.2d 818; see generally People v. Becker, 215 NY 126, 144, 109 N.E. 127). Where a witness has provided testimony before a Court which contains material facts which conflict with material facts set forth by that witness in a sworn affidavit, even if such compromised testimony did not result in bad faith, that witness may not be deemed credible (Medina v. Essex Estates, 72 Misc 3d 1225(A) [Civ. Ct. New York City 2021]).

Based upon the demeanor and substance of the testimony of the Paternal Grandmother Mrs. L.S. and Paternal Grandfather Mr. M.S., the Court has found both to be credible witnesses. The Court made this determination based upon an assessment of the character, temperament and sincerity of both. Both Paternal Grandparents responded clearly to all questions presented to them.

While Defendant did not provide testimony as a witness during the hearing, as a self-represented litigant she was sworn in and thereafter made statements during the hearing.¹⁰⁰ The Court determines Defendant to lack credibility due her having made conflicting statements to this Court while under oath pertaining to material issues before this Court, including, but not limited to, the following:

1. Despite Defendant asserting during the hearing that she has “been extremely alienated from my three children,”101 paragraph 31 of the Response to Notice to Admit contains an admission by Defendant that following the execution of the Parenting Agreement the Paternal Grandparents made the Children available to her once per week and paragraph 33 contained another admission by Defendant that during some of those periods of time she saw the Children more than once per week.

2. Paragraph 61 of the Response to Notice to Admit contained a denial of Defendant that in June of 2025 she made a report to the Westchester County Department of Social Services (hereinafter “DSS”) accusing one or both Paternal Grandparents of sexually abusing one or more of the Children, despite Paragraph 63 of the document containing Defendant's admission that DSS determined that her report of sexual abuse was unfounded.

3. Paragraph 15 of the Response to Notice to Admit contains Defendant's denial that on April 5, 2024, the date she executed the Parenting Agreement that she testified under oath that the Parenting Agreement was fair and in the Children's best interests, despite paragraph 15 of the Response to Notice to Admit confirming Defendant's admission that Annexed hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and accurate copy of the Transcript from the Court appearance in front of the Hon. James L. Hyer on April 5, 2024, as that transcript provides that Defendant did testify that the Parenting Agreement was both fair and in the Children's best interests:

“THE COURT: To the extent that these settlement terms have been entered into, do you believe they're fair and reasonable to you, sir?

A.S.: Yes.

* * *

THE COURT: Ma'am?

L.S.: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you believe these terms are in the best interest of the subject children. Sir?

A.S.: Yes.

* * *

THE COURT: Ma'am?

L.S.: Yes.”

4. Paragraph 12 of the Response to Notice to Admit includes Defendant's denial that within the Parenting Agreement she acknowledged that she understood the terms of the agreement, despite the Parenting Agreement including the following provisions:

“WHEREAS, each Party is represented by separate and independent counsel of his or her own choosing, and each party has discussed with his and her respective independent counsel his or her rights and obligations and the terms of this Parenting Agreement and the applicable law of the State of New York, including, without limitation, the Domestic Relations Law (“DRL”) of the State of New York §§ 240 and 72, and each Party fully understands the terms of this Parenting Agreement and the applicable law; and [emphasis added]”

* * *

“IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written.

EACH OF THE PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE OR SHE HAS READ THIS PARENTING AGREEMENT; THAT HE OR SHE UNDERSTANDS THE TERMS OF THIS PARENTING AGREEMENT; THAT HE OR SHE UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS PARENTING AGREEMENT WILL BE BINDING ON HIM OR HER; [emphasis added]”

Moreover, when making a credibility assessment of Defendant, this Court further notes Defendant's admission that she engaged in apparent unlawful conduct as she admitted in paragraph 77 of the Response to Notice to Admit that she filed false income tax returns for the 2024 year by falsely declaring the Children as her dependents while not providing this Court with any testimony or evidence that she has sought to correct the filing or otherwise address the issue.¹⁰²

D. Family Offense Proceeding #1 & #2

“It is well established that the party seeking an order of protection has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the party for which the order is seeking to restrain has committed the alleged family offense, and whether a family offense has been committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the court, and its determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight (see Susan WW. On Behalf of Karri-Ann WW. v Alan WW., 161 AD3d 1249, 1250 [3d Dept 2018]; see also Family Court Act § 812). A party may establish by fair preponderance of evidence that another's actions constitute a family offense of harassment in second degree in repeatedly calling police to conduct wellness checks on the individual despite knowledge such checks were unnecessary served no legitimate purpose and established course of conduct undertaken with intent of seriously annoying or alarming the party, and the individual's intent to commit offense was fairly inferable from surrounding circumstances. (see, Inez A. v. David A., 222 AD3d 547 [1st Dept 2023]).

Based upon the submissions made to this Court and the evidence received at hearing, this Court determines that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant have proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence the claims set forth in Family Offense Proceedings #1 or #2. Notably, neither called any witnesses or presented any evidence to support the allegations upon which their respective petitions were founded.

Accordingly, Family Offense Proceedings #1 and #2 are hereby dismissed.

E. Request for Modification of Child Custody & Access

In making a determination as to this application, the Court must examine the rights of nonparents seeking custody of children within the State of New York and the manner within which orders granting custody to a nonparent, either on consent or following a finding of fact by a Court, may be modified, prior to applying that law to the instant motions.

1. Parental Preference And Extraordinary Circumstances Standard.

In New York State, it is well-settled that “[t]he State may not deprive a parent of the custody of a child absent surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness or other like extraordinary circumstances. If any of such extraordinary circumstances are present, the disposition of custody is influenced or controlled by what is in the best interest of the child (Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543 [1976]). The Court of Appeals in confirming such state held parental preference, made clear that absent such extraordinary circumstances it is not the Court's responsibility, nor any other function of state government, to make decisions concerning the custody of children simply because it could make a better decision regarding the custodian of the child:

“[i]t is not within the power of a Court, or, by delegation of the Legislature or court, a social agency, to make significant decisions concerning the custody of children, merely because it could make a better decision or disposition. The State is Parens patriae and always has been, but it has not displaced the parent in right or responsibility. Indeed, the courts and the law would, under existing constitutional principles, be powerless to supplant parents except for grievous cause or necessity [internal citations omitted]. Examples of cause of necessity permitting displacement of or intrusion on parental control would be fault or omission by the parent seriously affecting the welfare of a child, the preservation of the child's freedom from serious physical harm, illness or death, or the child's right to an education, and the like.

The parent has a ‘right’ to rear its child, and the child has a ‘right’ to be reared by its parent. However, there are exceptions created by extraordinary circumstances, illustratively, surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness, and unfortunate or involuntary disruption of custody over an extended period of time. It is these exceptions which have engendered confusion, sometimes in thought but most often only in language” (Id. at 545-546 [1976]).

The Court of Appeals, in its seminal decision of Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, created a two-prong inquiry for determining whether a nonparent may obtain custody as against a parent. “First, the nonparent must prove the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ such as ‘surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness, and unfortunate or involuntary disruption of custody over an extended period of time’ [internal citations omitted] ‘or other like extraordinary circumstances’ [internal citations omitted]. If extraordinary circumstances are established such that the nonparent has standing to seek custody, the court must make an award of custody based on the best interest of the child” (Suarez v. Williams, 26 NY3d 440 [2015]).

Relevant case law from the Appellate Divisions of the state have confirmed and applied such required standard when there is an appointment of someone other than the infant's parent as a guardian (see, Nancy C. v. Alison C., 57 AD3d 986 [2d Dept 2008] where the Court held it must make a threshold finding of “abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect [by the parent] or other extraordinary circumstances,” which is the standard used in child custody cases; see also, Michael G.B. v. Angela L.B., 219 AD2d 289 [4th Dept 1996] “Although no parent has an absolute right to custody of a child [internal citations omitted] it is settled law that, as between a biological parent [parent] and a nonbiological parent [nonparent], the parent has a superior right to custody that cannot be denied unless the nonparent can establish that the parent has relinquished that right because of ‘surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness or other like extraordinary circumstances’ ”).

Notably, the legislature created a carve out in New York Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter “DRL”) § 72(2) which specifically sets forth a grandparent's standing to seek custody of a child from a parent, where the grandparent demonstrates the existence of extraordinary circumstances:

“DRL § 72(2):

(a) Where a grandparent or the grandparents of a minor child, residing within this state, can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court the existence of extraordinary circumstances, such grandparent or grandparents of such child may apply to the supreme court by commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of habeas corpus to have such child brought before such court, or may apply to family court pursuant to subdivision (b) of section six hundred fifty-one of the family court act; and on the return thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to the parent or any other person or party having the care, custody, and control of such child, to be given in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may make such directions as the best interests of the child may require, for custody rights for such grandparent or grandparents in respect to such child. An extended disruption of custody, as such term is defined in this section, shall constitute an extraordinary circumstance.

(b) For the purposes of this section “extended disruption of custody” shall include, but not be limited to, a prolonged separation of the respondent parent and the child for at least twenty-four continuous months during which the parent voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child and the child resided in the household of the petitioner grandparent or grandparents, provided, however, that the court may find that extraordinary circumstances exist should the prolonged separation have lasted for less than twenty-four months.

(c) Nothing in this section shall limit the ability of parties to enter into consensual custody agreements absent the existence of extraordinary circumstances.”

The Court of Appeals in Suarez v. Williams, 26 NY3d 440 [2015] provides clarity as to the purpose and legislative intent of this carve out, specific to grandparents’ rights in conjunction with rights of other nonparents:

“The legislative intent, as stated in the bill enacting this amendment, was ‘to provide guidance regarding the ability of grandparents to obtain standing in custody proceedings involving their grandchildren,’ but was ‘in no way intended to limit the state of the law as it relates to the ability of any third party to obtain standing in custody proceedings’ against a birth parent (L. 2003, ch. 657, § 1). The sponsors’ memoranda articulate the purpose of the bill as being ‘[t]o define an extraordinary circumstance with respect to the legal rights of certain grandparents who wish to petition the court for custody of their grandchildren’ (Senate Introducer Mem. in Support, 2003 NY Senate Bill S4224A; Assembly Sponsor's Mem., 2003 NY Assembly Bill A8302B; see Matter of Carton, 51 AD3d at 1113, 857 N.Y.S.2d 775). The sponsors emphasized that the bill specifically **919 ***621 states that it is not intended to overrule existing case law relating to third parties obtaining standing in custody cases (see Senate Introducer Mem. in Support, 2003 NY Senate Bill S4224A; Assembly Sponsor's Mem., 2003 NY Assembly Bill A8302B)” (Suarez v. Williams, 26 NY3d at 447, [2015]).

2. Examples of Extraordinary Circumstances Analysis.

In analyzing whether extraordinary circumstances exist, Courts must consider all of the specific factors set forth in Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, supra, as well as “other like extraordinary circumstances”, indicating to this Court that the totality of the circumstances must be reviewed in providing such determination. This Court reviews such examples of the extraordinary circumstances analysis herein-below.

In Smith v. Cooks, 148 AD3d 814 [2d Dept 2017], the Court reviewed a custody petition by the child's maternal grandmother, based on the expectation that the mother, who had residential custody of the child, would shortly begin serving a term of incarceration. In Smith, the Court highlighted the nonparent's burden to show extraordinary circumstances, and affirmed the lower court's determination that the expectation of the mother's incarceration did not sufficiently allege the existence of extraordinary circumstances relating to the father, who had joint custody of the child, thus dismissing the petition for lack of standing (Id.).

In Donna SS. v. Amy TT., 149 AD3d 1211 [3d Dept 2017] the appellate court reversed the lower court's determination that extraordinary circumstances existed, holding that the grandparent “failed to proffer sufficient evidence to establish that this [an 11 month period following the Mother's move to Florida] was a prolonged separation of the mother and the child during which the mother voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child to her.” Specifically, the Court in Donna SS, held that courts, when determining if a parent voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child, must consider the totality of the circumstances, taking into account such factors as the quality and quantity of contact between the parent and child, the amount of time that the child has lived with the grandparent, the quality of the relationship between the child and the grandparent, and the length of time that the parent allowed the separation to continue before attempting to assume the primary parental role (Id.).

In Miller v. Orbaker, 17 AD3d 1145 [4th Dept 2005] extraordinary circumstances were found, and an award of custody was granted to the child's maternal aunt where the mother was diagnosed as delusional, and while she was on medication for seven years, the mother abruptly discontinued the use of such medication without advice of a physician, as well as refusing to acknowledge the child's health issues and special needs, indicating that she would not pursue medical treatment for the child.

In Wilson v. Smith, 24 AD3d 562 [2d Dept 2005] extraordinary circumstances were found, where a mother had voluntarily surrendered the child, had only sporadic contact with the child during the commencement of the proceeding, and gave no financial or other support to the child's caretakers, with whom the child had lived almost since birth and with whom the child had bonded psychologically.

In Re Sekou E., 32 AD3d 1024 [2d Dept 2006] extraordinary circumstances were found, where there were confirmed excessive acts of corporal punishment by the father, and consequently custody was granted to the maternal great-grandmother.

In Katherine D. v. Lawrence D., 32 AD3d 1350 [4th Dept 2006] extraordinary circumstances were found, where a mother's mental illness, and her delusional testimony, constituted extraordinary circumstances, and consequently, custody was granted to the paternal grandparents [“Petitioner was delusional during parts of her testimony, many of her answers were nonsensical and incredible, and it was apparent that petitioner suffered from a mental illness. Although petitioner had been in treatment for mental illness, at the time of the hearing she denied having a mental illness and testified that she was not seeking any treatment or on medication”].

In B.G. v. K.B., 12 Misc 3d 332 [Fam. Ct. Onondaga Cnty 2006] extraordinary circumstances were found, where a great-grandparent had been the child's primary caretaker and there were lengthy periods in which the mother did not visit or visited only sporadically, wherein the great-grandparent acted as surrogate parent for the child during these extended periods.

3. Modification of a Prior Order Granting Nonparents Custody.

Generally, “[O]nce the preferred status of the birth parent under Bennett [40 NY2d 543 [1976] has been lost by a judicial determination of extraordinary circumstances, the appropriate standard in addressing the possible modification of the prior order is whether there has been a change of circumstances requiring a modification of custody to ensure the best interests of the child” (Metcalf v. Odums, 35 AD3d 865 [2d Dept 2006] citing to, Matter of Guinta v Doxtator, 20 AD3d 47 [4th Dept 2005]). Said another way, if an order was entered directing custody of a child to a nonparent based on a judicial determination of extraordinary circumstances, modification of that prior order would require a substantial change in circumstances, followed by an analysis of the best interests of the child.

However, where there has not been a prior judicial determination of extraordinary circumstances, and such prior custody order was entered on consent or by stipulation, the parental preference solidified by the Court of Appeals still applies, and any application for a modification of such prior consent order would require the Court to engage in an extraordinary circumstances analysis, and assuming such circumstances exist, a review of the best interest of the child (see, Matter of Guinta v Doxtator, 20 AD3d 47 [4th Dept 2005]; “[i]n New York, the parental preference applies where there has been a voluntary placement of the child or an order entered upon the consent of the parties (see, Matter of Lewis v. Johnson, 302 AD2d 756, 757, 756 N.Y.S.2d 310; Cote, 299 AD2d at 877, 750 N.Y.S.2d 254). Indeed, we wrote in Gary G., 248 AD2d at 981, 670 N.Y.S.2d 270 that the extraordinary circumstances rule applies ‘even if there is an existing order of custody concerning [the] child unless there is a prior determination that extraordinary circumstances exist’ ”).

It is well-settled that the custodial nonparent has the burden of establishing that extraordinary circumstances exist to either, prevent such modification to a prior custody order made on consent, or in furtherance of seeking a modification of such order (see, Driscoll v. Mack, 183 AD3d 1229 [4th Dept 2020] where the Court held “the grandmother had the burden of establishing that extraordinary circumstances exist even though the prior order, which awarded her primary physical custody of the children for a period of time, was made upon consent of the parties”; see also, Gary G. v. Roslyn P., 248 AD2d 980 [4th Dept 1998] where the parents petitioned for custody of the child, seeking to modify a prior order which was entered without a finding of extraordinary circumstances, “the nonparent has the burden of proving that extraordinary circumstances exist, and until such circumstances are shown, the court does not reach the issue of the best interests of the child [internal citations omitted]. The foregoing rule applies even if there is an existing order of custody concerning that child unless there is a prior determination that extraordinary circumstances exist”).

4. Analysis.

Here, the Defendant-biological mother of the Children is seeking modification of the Judgment of Divorce, which incorporated by reference but did not merge the terms of the Parenting Agreement, granting legal and physical custody of the Children to the Paternal Grandparents. Plaintiff-biological father supports custody remaining with the Paternal Grandparents, thereby continuing his consent, and the Paternal Grandparents oppose any modification. Accordingly, as no prior findings of fact occurred causing an award of custody of the Children to the Paternal Grandparents, the Court must apply the law cited above to determine if extraordinary circumstances exist, and if so, to engage in a best-interests analysis prior to making any custody determination pertaining to the Children.

a. Extraordinary Circumstances.

For the reasons set forth herein, this Court does determine that extraordinary circumstances exist that, taken together in their collective entirety, require that this Court determine Defendant to be unfit to serve as the custodian of the Children. Initially, this Court must take into consideration the ability of Defendant to instill in the subject Children a strong sense of integrity, morals and ethics. This Court finds that the Defendant will not be able to do so as she has acknowledged that she has engaged in apparent unlawful conduct by filing false income tax returns and evading the payment of taxes by falsely claiming the Children as dependents in her 2024 income tax returns. Notably, while Article V of the Parenting Agreement provides a waiver of financial support for the Children, paragraph 80 of the Response to Notice to Admit contains an admission of Defendant that she has not paid anything for the Children's education, medical care, extracurricular activities or childcare since April 5, 2024. Moreover, as noted above, Defendant has been determined by this Court to lack credibility due to her multiple, contradictory sworn statements made to this Court pertaining to material matters involving this action.

Defendant's lack of sound judgment and stability is further illustrated through her acknowledgment in paragraph 81 of the Response to Notice to Admit that her vehicle was impounded in 2025 as she had allowed her vehicle insurance and registration to lapse; her acknowledgment in paragraph 85 of the Response to Notice to Admit that she was evicted from an apartment in August of 2025; and her acknowledgment in paragraph 86 of the Response to Notice to Admit that a warrant had been issued to her by the Village of Dobbs Ferry Court in July of 2025. These admissions reflect the Defendant's inability to manage her own basic activities of daily living and responsibilities without resulting chaos.

Defendant's erratic behavior is further evidence that she is unfit to be the custodian of the Children as illustrated by the credible testimony of the Paternal Grandfather that Defendant has made several unfounded allegations, including during this action before this Court, of child abuse and sexual molestation by the Parental Grandparents, which as noted above, Defendant acknowledged doing so on at least one occasion.¹⁰³ The Paternal Grandfather confirmed that these allegations led to social workers visiting their home and causing distress to the Children:

“Q. Can you please briefly describe how the — your observations of the children when you were visited by social workers?

A. Yes. They get frightened, like what's wrong, why are grandma and grandpa so upset, like what's going on here. We've had multiple, multiple reports, false reports, that we are either endangering the welfare of the children or sexually molesting them. This has led to invasive examinations of the children's genitalia. Completely based on false allegations. So they get frightened, they get upset, they get confused. It's a horrific situation.

Q. And to your knowledge what was the result of these Child Protective investigations?

A. Unfortunately, Mrs. L.S. and I have a stack of letters. We have a file where we keep all these letters, unfounded, unfounded, unfounded, unfounded. And so we have all of these records of all these allegations against us, and it's very upsetting.

Q. So is it fair to say that there has -- withdrawn. Is it fair to say that the investigations into allegations of abuse and maltreatment of the children have all been deemed to be unfounded?

A. One hundred percent. And, in fact, the social workers who have been to our house have commended us on the exemplary care that we provide to the children, the home environment we have for them, all of the resources we use to support their development. So we have been commended.”104

Repeated and unfounded allegations of neglect or abuse by one parent against the other have been held to constitute an act of interference with the parent-child relationship so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to raise a strong probability that the mother is unfit to act as custodial parent (see, Abramson v. Shaw, 154 AD3d 744 [2d Dept 2017]; see also, Tyrone v. Lucretia S., 4 AD3d 205 [1st Dept 2004]). This Court believes that the same presumption that a parent is unfit to act as the custodial parent if making such unfounded allegations against the other parent exists if the allegations are being made by a parent against a non-parent custodian as the same adverse impact would befall the subject children who have formed a similar bond between non-parent custodian and child, which could be jeopardized. This is true in this instance, as the Children have resided with the Paternal Grandparents for almost their entire lives the Paternal Grandmother testified that the twins came to live with them at only five days old, while the oldest child was four months old when she arrived.¹⁰⁵ This is largely corroborated by Defendant as paragraph 2 of the Response to Notice to Admit contains an admission of Defendant that “The Children have resided only with Petitioners since October 2023”.

Defendant's lack of sound judgment is further exhibited by her repeated requests for law enforcement to conduct welfare checks at the home of the Paternal Grandparents for the Children, which the Paternal Grandfather testified occurred four times in just 2025.¹⁰⁶ Within paragraphs 50, 52, 55 and 57, the Defendant admitted that she requested welfare checks for the Children on May 17, 2025, and May 20, 2025, with both requests resulting in law enforcement appearing at the home of the Parental Grandparents and Children. When asked how the welfare checks have impacted the Children, the Paternal Grandfather provided the following response:

“Q. Can you please briefly describe your observations that the -- withdrawn. Can you please describe how the children appeared to you when police officers were showing up to your house in response to calls that something was happening at your house?

A. Yes. We had multiple episodes where the police would be coming to our house. The worst of those many episodes was in the middle of the night. It was the night that we had the Mother's Day celebration in honor of L.S. and invited all of her extended family to our home. We had a wonderful buffet that Mrs. L.S. put out to honor them and to welcome them. And we had a conversation at the end of that party talking about how deescalating conflict and working together would be good for all of us, and that conversation was answered by the police showing up to our house in the middle of the night for a welfare check and being told that we were putting the children in danger. And the children got very upset, like what's going on, why are we being woken up from sleep, why are the police here, what is this. It's very upsetting to the entire household, to the children, to their grandparents, to everyone.”107

Despite Defendant's admissions in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Response to Notice to Admit that she executed the Parenting Agreement, which was later so-ordered by this Court, Defendant has engaged in multiple breaches of that agreement further demonstrating her erratic behavior. The Defendant's conduct in both making unfounded child abuse and molestation claims against the Paternal Grandparents, as well as making unnecessary requests for welfare checks for the children, are illustrations of Defendant's lack of sound judgment as these actions constitute a violation of the Non-Disparagement Provision of the Parenting Agreement.

Further, as admitted by Defendant in paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20, 29, 30,¹⁰⁸ of the Response to Notice to Admit, Defendant engaged in further violations of the Parenting Agreement by commencing two proceedings seeking custody of the Children in the New York State Family Court, in June of 2024 and in May of 2025, despite paragraph 18 of the Parenting Agreement, which directs that such applications shall only be filed in this Court.

b. Best Interests.

“The paramount concern when making such a determination is the best interests of the child under the totality of the circumstances” (Matter of Cabano v. Petrella, 169 AD3d 901, 902, 94 N.Y.S.3d 376; see Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 171, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 436 N.E.2d 1260; Baraz v. Polyakov, 198 AD3d at 854, 156 N.Y.S.3d 298)” (See, Burke v. Squires, 162 N.Y.S.3d 434 [2d Dept 2022]).

“Priority in custody disputes should usually be given to the parent who was first awarded custody by the court or to the parent who obtained custody by voluntary agreement” (See, White v. Mazzella—White, 84 AD3d 1068 [2d Dept 2011]) “Where possible, custody should be established on a long term basis, ‘at least so long as the custodial parent has not been shown to be unfit, or perhaps less fit, to continue as the proper custodian’ ” (Jackson v. Jackson, 31 AD3d 386 [2d Dept 2006], quoting, Obey v. Degling, 37 NY2d 768 [1975]).

“Factors to be considered include the relative fitness of the parents, the quality of the home environment, the parents’ financial status, the parental guidance given to the child, the ability of each parent to provide for the child's emotional and intellectual development, and the effect an award of custody to one parent might have on the child's relationship with the *681 other parent” (See, Hogan v. Hogan, 71 NY.S.3d 601 [2d Dept 2018]). “Furthermore, in determining custody, while the express wishes of children are not controlling, they are entitled to great weight, especially where their age and maturity would make their input particularly meaningful” (See, Canella v. Anthony, 4 N.Y.S.3d 533 [2d Dept 2015]). “Entrusting the custody of young children to their parents jointly, especially where the shared responsibility and control includes alternating physical custody, is insupportable when parents are severely antagonistic and embattled” (See, Braiman v. Braiman, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449 [1978]).

“Moreover, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 240(1)(a), in any action or proceeding concerning custody or parental access where domestic violence is alleged, ‘the court must consider’ the effect of such domestic violence upon the best interests of the child along with all the other relevant factors (see Matter of Felty v. Felty, 108 AD3d 705, 707, 969 N.Y.S.2d 557; Matter of Wissink v. Wissink, 301 AD2d 36, 39, 749 N.Y.S.2d 550), when the allegations of domestic violence are proven by a preponderance of the evidence (see Bressler v. Bressler, 122 AD3d 659, 660, 996 N.Y.S.2d 160; Matter of Andrews v. Mouzon, 80 AD3d 761, 761, 915 N.Y.S.2d 604)” (See, Scott v. Thompson, 166 AD3d 627 [2d Dept 2018]).

Initially, the Court notes that the Maternal Grandmother credibly testified to the current home within which the Children reside with the Paternal Grandparents, reflecting a loving and stable environment:

“I make sure every day they were fed, they were well-dressed, they were clean, and started little bit older I want them to get lessons every day. So we hired private tutors for them to teach them. So I have four tutors per week. Each of them teach the kids twice a week. And when they are little bit older, we signed up all the lessons. So I have to sign up the lesson at JCC for them to learn swim, to learn singing, to learn dancing, and then I have to sign — J.S. loves dance. I have to find the proper dance school for J.S. So I found MK Dance School for J.S. And the nannies, each nanny will take one day off per week. So the day when nanny is off, I have to cook for the whole family. I have to make sure everybody get food, get dressed, get everything. I take them to the doctors, and I have to go grocery shopping for the whole family. We have a ten-member household. So it's a very large household. So the household has tons of things to do, the maintenance for the household, the yard, the cleaning, the laundry, everything. I have to make sure everything runs right. So there were -- part of the time there was one nanny was off. I get up at 4:00 every morning to prepare the food, to make sure, you know, when children get up, they have food to eat. So now I'm very, very busy.

* * *

I read with the children. I make sure children focus very well. So I do the hand exercise with the children every day right now. So each kid has to do the hand practice with me so they can focus. I have to do -- I have to teach them art class every day, make sure. Each day I have new things to teach them. I teach them letters right now because J.S. is about to go to kindergarten next year. So she needs to read her name. The twins I started to teach them the numbers, so they can trace the numbers, use their pen. And I want to make sure they have communication skills. So every day after they come back from nursery school, I have individual chat with each kid. I want them to learn, to tell me what happened in the school, so they build the skill to communicate with me. I have to read each kids’ emotional development because that's very important for each of them. I want them to be strong. I want them to be independent. I want them to have a skill in future to do the work, to feed themselves.”109

The Paternal Grandmother testified that the Paternal Grandparents obtained full-time “24/7” nannies to assist with child care,¹¹⁰ with each of the four nannies assisting with one child and cooking,¹¹¹ explaining:

“We have a very big household. Three young children, four nannies. Because the children, the twins came to us when they were only five days old. J.S. came to us later, but start when she was four months old. She spent five days, five out of seven days per week with me. So at that time we cannot go just by myself to taking care of three young kids. We need help. So we decided to hire.”112

On the other hand, Defendant provided no testimony at the hearing regarding how she would care for the Children if a modification of custody was granted providing her with physical and/or legal custody of the Children. With respect to transportation, Defendant has provided no information to this Court regarding how she would transport the Children to their various appointments, medical and otherwise, and has acknowledged in paragraph 82 of the Response to Notice to Admit that she does not have a car, as she admitted in paragraph 81 that her car had been impounded due to a lapse in both registration and insurance.

With respect to Defendant's housing, she acknowledged in her opening statement at the hearing that she has “had housing issues,”¹¹³ a likely reference to her eviction from an apartment just a few months ago that she acknowledged in paragraph 85 of the Response to Notice to Admit, wherein she confirmed in paragraph 87 that she is currently residing in a studio apartment. While Defendant has made no assertion that she is seeking to reside with the Children in this apartment if granted custody of the Children, this Court has been provided with no alternate housing of Defendant where she would reside with the Children if granted custody, which this Court deems unsuitable as living accommodations for Defendant and the three Children.

With respect to the financial support of the Children, Defendant provided no plan if she was granted custody but as to her own finances, she acknowledged that “I have had financial hardships;”¹¹⁴ that she has not contributed to the Children's education, medical care, extracurricular activities or child care since April of 2024;¹¹⁵ and acknowledged that financially the Paternal Grandparents can provide the Children with “a better life.”¹¹⁶ While Defendant asserts that she would like the Children to “grow up in a home filled with love, stability and security,”¹¹⁷ in her own closing statement she thanks the Paternal Grandparents for providing that, “And I am so grateful for the stability that they have provided”¹¹⁸

With respect to the wishes of the Children, the AFC advised the Children's position that opposes the relief sought by Defendant.¹¹⁹ This Court will note that during the hearing the AFC advised that there are no diverging interests of the three separate Children that would require the appointment of separate attorneys to represent each and that she was substituting judgment:

“I am substituting judgment for all of the children. I have represented these children since they were literal infants. The first time that I was appointed, the twins were in strollers and could neither walk nor speak. Right now I visited with the children about two months ago at the grandparents’ home. I played with the children. I saw them interact with their grandparents. But they are not old enough or of a maturity level to have a conversation with me about their current circumstances, their relationship with their grandparents, their father, or their mother. So for that reason alone, Judge, yes, I am substituting judgment.”120

Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds that it is in the best interests of the Children for the Paternal Grandparents to retain sole legal and physical custody of the Children as set forth in the Parenting Agreement and Judgment of Divorce. In making this determination, this Court has taken into consideration the support provided for this custody arrangement by the Plaintiff. This Court has also evaluated the relative fitness of the Defendant and Paternal Grandparents, the quality of the home environment of the Defendant and Paternal Grandparents, the financial status of the Defendant and Paternal Grandparents, the guidance given to the Children by Defendant and Paternal Grandparents, the ability of Defendant and Paternal Grandparents to provide for the Children's emotional and intellectual development, and the effect an award of custody to Defendant or Paternal Grandparents might have on the Children's relationships with the Plaintiff, Defendant, and Paternal Grandparents.

F. Request for Order of Protection by Paternal Grandparents

“It is well established that the party seeking an order of protection has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the party for which the order is seeking to restrain has committed the alleged family offense, and whether a family offense has been committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the court, and its determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight (see Susan WW. On Behalf of Karri-Ann WW. v Alan WW., 161 AD3d 1249, 1250 [3d Dept 2018]; see also Family Court Act § 812). A party may establish by fair preponderance of evidence that another's actions constitute a family offense of harassment in second degree repeatedly calling police to conduct wellness checks on the individual despite knowledge such checks were unnecessary served no legitimate purpose and established course of conduct undertaken with intent of seriously annoying or alarming the party, and the individual's intent to commit offense was fairly inferable from surrounding circumstances (see, Inez A. v. David A., 222 AD3d 547 [1st Dept 2023]).

Here, as noted above, it is without question that on at least two occasions in 2025 Defendant called law enforcement to conduct wellness checks on the Children at the home of the Paternal Grandparents despite Defendant knowing that such checks were unnecessary, serving no legitimate purpose and established course of conduct undertaken with intent of seriously annoying or alarming the party, and Defendant's intent to commit offense was fairly inferable from surrounding circumstances. Accordingly, this Court determines that Paternal Grandparents have established by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant has engaged in a family offense of harassment in second degree against the Paternal Grandparents and Children, as all five individuals were proximately involved in Defendant's conduct as they resided in the home when the welfare checks were requested.

Therefore, this Court shall enter an order of protection for the benefit of Paternal Grandparents and Children against Defendant, restraining Defendant for a period which shall terminate on June 6, 2030, in the following manner:

1. L.S. (DOB XX/XX/XXXX) shall observe the following conditions:

a. Stay away from the home of Mrs. L.S. (DOB — to be furnished); Mr. M.S. (DOB: — to be furnished); J.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX); B.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX; and E.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX) located at 289 XXXXXXXXXXXXX, Dobbs Ferry, New York 10522;

b. Refrain from assault, stalking, harassment, aggravated harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, strangulation, criminal obstruction of breathing or circulation, disorderly conduct, criminal mischief, sexual abuse, sexual misconduct, forcible touching, intimidation, threats, identity theft, grand larceny, coercion, unlawful dissemination or publication of intimate image(s) or any criminal offense against Mrs. L.S. (DOB — to be furnished); Mr. M.S. (DOB: — to be furnished); J.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX); B.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX); and E.S. (DOB: XX/XX/XXXX).

G. Request to Enjoin Defendant

“A stipulation of settlement which is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce is a contract subject to principles of contract construction and interpretation” (Meccio v. Meccio, 76 NY2d 822 [1990]). Where a settlement agreement that is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce is “clear and unambiguous on its face,” the parties’ intent will be determined “from within the four corners of the instrument” (Id.). “An ambiguity exists only if the contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation” (Nappy v. Nappy, 40 AD3d 825 [2d Dept 2007]). “A court's fundamental objective in interpreting a contract is to determine the parties’ intent from the language employed and to fulfill their reasonable expectations” (Landmark Ventures, Inc. v. H5 Tech., Inc., 152 AD3d 657 [2d Dept 2017]). An unambiguous agreement “must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” (MHR Capital Partners LP v. Presstek, Inc., 12 NY3d 640 [2009]).

Here, the Parenting Agreement, which was incorporated but not merged into the Judgment of Divorce, includes the provision cited above which limits applications pertaining to the Parenting Agreement only to be brought in the New York State Supreme Court, Westchester County. Nonetheless, Defendant acknowledged in the Response to Notice to Admit that she commenced two separate proceedings in the New York State Family Court seeking modification of the Parenting Agreement, both of which were denied. When testifying about this litigation during the hearing the Paternal Grandfather provided the following testimony:

“Since the time that we've been caring for the grandchildren, there have been repeated cases. There were two by L.S. in the Family Court in Yonkers, despite the fact that the Family Court in Yonkers does not have jurisdiction. Then there was another action by her mother. So we went through three different court proceedings in Family Court in Yonkers after going through the major proceeding here in the Supreme Court in White Plains. And this has put quite a burden on me and Mrs. L.S. in many ways. So it's been time away from work for me, and I have to be busy at work to provide for all the needs of the children in terms of everything that they need from healthcare to housing to food and childcare and education. So it's been a financial burden. It's been a time burden. It's been a stress burden. So we would like the Court to offer us a reprieve from this burden.”121

In the event a litigant has engaged in vexatious litigation, they may forfeit their free access to the Courts (Rossrock Fund II, L.P. v. Toledo, 186 AD3d 1441, 1442—43 [2d Dept 2020]; see also, Sassower v. Signorelli, 99 AD2d 358 [2d Dept 1984]). In the context of custody litigation, injunctions have been entered where a finding has been made that a parent has engaged in vexatious and abusive litigation (Naclerio v. Naclerio, 132 AD3d 679, 680 [2d Dept 2015]; see also, Graham v. Rawley, 145 AD3d 721, 722—23 [2d Dept 2016]; Capruso v. Kubow, 226 AD3d 680, 684 [2d Dept 2024]; Soumare v. White, 214 AD3d 992, 993—94 [2d Dept 2023]; Matter of Isaac S., 178 AD3d 829, 830 [2d Dept 2019]).

Based upon the foregoing, this Court determines that Defendant has engaged in vexatious litigation by commencing two separate proceedings in the New York State Family Court seeking a modification of the Parenting Agreement despite clear and unequivocal language within the document that limited such applications being made to the New York State Supreme Court, Westchester County. While one such filing may have been argued to be a mistake, this Court is most troubled that Defendant filed two such proceedings leading to a finding that such actions were vexatious and abusive.

Accordingly, Defendant is hereby enjoined from bringing any further applications to modify the Parenting Agreement in the New York State Family Court without approval of this Court. Upon making this determination, this Court has balanced the equities considering the limiting impact that this directive would have on Defendant compared to how such a ruling would prevent the Parental Grandparents and Plaintiff from further vexations litigation, and the prior is significantly outweighed by the latter. Specifically, while Defendant may not commence any proceedings in the New York State Family Court pertaining to issues addressed in the Parenting Agreement without this Court's approval, she may commence such proceedings in this Court without limitation. Further, the Parental Grandparents and Plaintiff will be protected from unnecessary future litigation in the Family Court likely preventing the waste of both time and financial resources.

H. Request For Attorneys’ Fees

Here, Paternal Grandparents request an award of counsel fees to be awarded from Defendant in the amount of $16,703.00. In support of the application, the Paternal Grandparents entered into evidence Exhibit G72,¹²² being an engagement agreement between Paternal Grandparents and counsel for Paternal Grandparents for “services in connection with a prosecution of a grandparent custody action.” Also offered in support is Exhibit G73,¹²³ being an invoice from counsel for Paternal Grandparents noting net invoice total of $16,703.00 accrued for a matter described as “prosecution of a grandparent custody action.”

Based upon the foregoing, the Paternal Grandparents are awarded from Defendant, as and for counsel fees arising out of this post-judgment litigation in the sum of $16,703.00, which shall be paid by bank certified check payable to “Blank Rome” to be sent via overnight traceable delivery so as to be received in hand by December 31, 2025, by delivery to: Blank Rome, 1271 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10020, Attn: Brett S. Ward, Esq. In the event such payment is not made timely and completely, the Paternal Grandparents may file a proposed money judgment for the amount then due with notice of settlement on Plaintiff and Defendant.

I. Request for Other Relief.

Any relief specifically not granted or otherwise addressed herein is denied.

* * *

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Motion Sequence No. 2 and No. 3 are hereby decided as set forth herein; and it is further

ORDERED that Motion Sequence No. 4 was withdrawn by counsel for Paternal Grandparents; and it is further

ORDERED, that by December 18, 2025, counsel for Paternal Grandparents shall file a letter, copied to all opposing counsel and self-represented litigants, providing the dates of birth for each of the Paternal Grandparents to facilitate the entry of the order of protection referenced herein; and it is further

ORDERED that by December 18, 2025, counsel for Paternal Grandparents shall serve this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry on counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant, and shall by that date file an Affidavit of Service; and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent any relief sought has not been granted, it is expressly denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1 & 2.

2.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 5-7.

3.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 12.

4.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 13.

5.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 17.

6.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 18.

7.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 22.

8.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 23.

9.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 24.

10.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 26.

11.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 28.

12.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 29.

13.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 30.

14.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 31 & 32.

15.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 33.

16.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 37.

17.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 46.

18.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 51.; after which additional orders were entered to facilitate the investigation filed as NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 53, 55 & 57.

19.   See, Paternal Grandparents Custody Proceeding NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1 & 2; NOTE: hereinafter all documents filed on NYSCEF under index number XXXXXX/XXXX shall be identified in footnotes as “Paternal Grandparents Custody Proceeding NYSCEF Doc. No.”

20.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 73.

21.   See, Paternal Grandparents Custody Proceeding NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1-10.

22.   See, Paternal Grandparents Custody Proceeding NYSCEF Doc. No. 11.

23.   See, Paternal Grandparents Custody Proceeding NYSCEF Doc. 13 & NYSCEF Doc. No. 80.

24.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 81.

25.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 84.

26.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 86.

27.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 91.

28.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 92-101.

29.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 102.

30.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 106 & 107.

31.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 108.

32.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 112-122.

33.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 124.

34.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 135.

35.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 136.

36.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 138.

37.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 139.

38.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 153, Pg. 16:10-25-Pg. 17:1-3.

39.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 168.

40.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 171 & 172.

41.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 174-177.

42.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 178.

43.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 175.

44.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 177.

45.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 182-202.

46.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 183 ¶ 4.

47.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 183 ¶ 6; 48.

48.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 183 ¶ 30; 44.

49.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 183 ¶ 66.

50.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 205 & 206.

51.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 207 & 208.

52.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 210.

53.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 209.

54.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 213 & 214.

55.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 215.

56.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 237.

57.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 216 & 217; NYSCEF Doc. No. 237, 7/10/2025 Transcript, Pg. 2:1-25-Pg. 5:1-4.

58.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 237, 7/10/2025 Transcript, Pg. 9:1-25-Pg. 14:1-12.

59.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 237, 7/10/2025 Transcript, Pg. 6:21-25-Pg. 8:1-2.

60.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 237, 7/10/2025 Transcript, Pg. 14:18-22.

61.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 237, 7/10/2025 Transcript, Pg. 15:9-17.

62.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 237, 7/10/2025 Transcript, Pg. 15:18-25-Pg. 18:1-16.

63.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 237, 7/10/2025 Transcript, Pg. 19:8-25-Pg. 21:1-6.

64.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 237, 7/10/2025 Transcript, Pg. 45:18-25-Pg. 46:1-12.

65.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 237, 7/10/2025 Transcript, Pg. 49:16-25-Pg. 50:1-23.

66.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 220.

67.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 221.

68.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 222.

69.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 223.

70.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 241.

71.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 248, 9/16/25 Transcript Pg. 3:7-19.

72.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 251.

73.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 254 & 255.

74.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 257 & 258.

75.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 259.

76.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 261-334.

77.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 336.

78.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 338.

79.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 339.

80.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 341-354.

81.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 355.

82.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 356.

83.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 359.

84.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 364 & 365.

85.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 366.

86.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 367.

87.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 372-394.

88.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 395.

89.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 362.

90.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 397.

91.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 398-403.

92.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 404.

93.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 405.

94.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 406.

95.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 408.

96.   See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 410-417.

97.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517.

98.   See, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 20:17-25-Pg. 22:1-14.

99.   See, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 14:18-25-Pg. 17:1-4; Pg. 23:22-25-Pg. 26:1-14; see also, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 418 & 419.

100.   See, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 3:18-25-Pg. 1-4.; “Where a witness *757 has given testimony that is demonstrably false, we may, in accordance with the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, choose to discredit or disbelieve other testimony given by that witness (see DiPalma v. State of New York, 90 AD3d 1659, 1660, 936 N.Y.S.2d 464; Accardi v. City of New York, 121 AD2d 489, 490—491, 503 N.Y.S.2d 818; see generally People v. Becker, 215 NY 126, 144, 109 N.E. 127).” Where a witness has provided testimony before a Court which contains material facts which conflict with material facts set forth by that witness in a sworn affidavit, even if such compromised testimony did not result in bad faith, that witness may not be deemed credible. (Medina v. Essex Estates, 72 Misc 3d 1225(A) [Civ. Ct. New York City 2021]).

101.   See, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 102:11-14.

102.   See, New York State Tax Law Articles 22, 30, 37; see also, New York Penal Law § 175.35 Offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree; 6 NY Prac., Criminal Law § 17:12 94th ed.) “Offering a false instrument for filing — Tax returns as “written instruments” under false filing statute.

103.   See, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 133:24-25-Pg. 134:1-10.

104.   See, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 132:12-25-Pg. 133:1-16.

105.   See, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 120:1-7.

106.   See, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 134:11-20.

107.   See, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 131:15-25-Pg. 132:1-9.

108.   This Court notes that while Defendant “denied” ¶ 28 within her Response to Notice to Admit, being a request for admission of the following: “In May 2025, You filed a second Petition for an Article 6 custody proceeding seeking custody of the Children in Yonkers Family Court”, she admitted ¶¶ 29-30 which are admissions that Yonkers Family Court subsequently denied Defendant's Article 6 custody proceeding, and that her filing of such a petition in May 2025 constituted a violation of the Parenting Agreement.

109.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 121:6-25-Pg. 122:1-3;6-23.

110.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 108:19-25.

111.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 112:12-14; Pg. 113: 9-23.

112.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 120:1-7.

113.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 102:23-24.

114.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 102:23.

115.   See, Paragraph 80 of the Response to Notice to Admit.

116.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 9-12.

117.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 102:7-8.

118.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 165:6-7.

119.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 148:21-25-Pg. 150:1-4.

120.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 517, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 150:18-25-Pg. 151:1-4.

121.   See, Hearing Transcript, Pg. 153:14-25-Pg. 154:1-4.

122.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 512.

123.   See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 513.

James L. Hyer, J.