The People of the State of New York v. Michael Dicks, Defendant. (2025)

The defendant stands accused by indictment of two counts each of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (P.L. § 265.03(3)), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree (P.L. § 265.02(1)), and Criminal Possession of a Firearm (P.L. § 265.01-B(1)).

On July 24, 2025, the Court held a combined Mapp/Huntley/Dunaway/Payton hearing. The defendant moved to suppress two firearms, a Taurus pistol and a Raven Arms pistol, ammunition, and identifying documents, as well as a noticed statement.

The noticed statement, made on June 4, 2024 at approximately 12:41 A.M. at 1000 Sutter Avenue to Frederick Alleyne, was, in sum and substance, "My sister told me probation was at the door. Yes, I'm on probation for firearm. For two years, I just complete one. I live with my sister, her kids, and boyfriend. I have my own room. She told me my probation officers were at the door. I thought was my regular officer at the door so I got up and went to open the door. I told them where my space is at. They told me to get out they going to do a search. I said ok I don't mind. My probation officers always come and do it. I told them where my space is at, and they did not want to listen to me. I told them the other room was my sister. They went into my sister room and search, and they found whatever firearms was in there. My space was the other room which I explain to them and they took it to themselves to go to hers. Yes supposedly, firearms. She has different men around her all the time. I doubt it is hers. She never spoke to me about that. I don't feel like doing any DNA. I know me."

At the hearing, two witnesses, Probation Officer Garrett Hall and Det. Abir Noor, testified for the People. The People also introduced five exhibits: a photograph of the defendant, a copy of the conditions of supervision, a photograph of firearms, a collection of documents including envelopes and an apartment ledger, and the debriefing video. The defendant did not call any witnesses and did not introduce any exhibits. The Court finds that the witnesses testified credibly, and makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact

Probation Officer Hall testified that he has been employed by the New York City Department of Probation for 18 and a half years and has been assigned to the Critical Response Team, responsible for investigating firearm allegations and handling warrants, for four years. In that role, Officer Hall investigates individuals on probation who may be involved in illegal activities, works with outside law enforcement agencies, conducts home searches, and handles warrants. Previously, Officer Hall worked as part of a team that worked on investigations regarding possible criminal activity in the community and handled I-cards and violation of probation warrants. He does not supervise probationers. He has conducted hundreds of searches, and has searched homes, vehicles, safes, and individuals.

On June 4, 2024, at approximately 8:00 A.M., Officer Hall was working. He went to 1062 Elton Street, Apartment 215, for the purpose of conducting a home visit with the defendant. Officer Hall and his team were conducting searches in that area and were directed to the defendant's home because they had received information from Lt. Redmond of the 75th Precinct field intelligence team that the defendant is known to be affiliated with the Bloods gang and is a gun recidivist. Aside from the defendant's prior conviction for possession of a firearm, Officer Hall was not aware whether the defendant had been observed in possession of a firearm at any other time and did not have any information about a specific firearm being present in the home. Neither Officer Hall nor his team had previously searched the defendant's residence, and Officer Hall had not previously interacted with the defendant, who was normally supervised by Probation Officer Alexis. Officer Hall did not know if Officer Alexis had previously searched the defendant's home or if Officer Alexis is still employed by the Department of Probation.

Prior to going to the defendant's residence, Officer Hall reviewed an information sheet and photograph of the defendant, as well as the defendant's probation file, which included the search conditions and information about the defendant's lease. The search conditions, which were imposed by the Court, showed that the defendant's period of probation ran from March 19, 2024 to March 18, 2026 and that the defendant had consented to random searches of his person, vehicle, and home. Officer Hall also looked at the probation file to confirm that home visits had been made to the defendant's residence. He did not recall how many home visits had been made. He did not know if any contraband had been previously found at the defendant's residence, and was not aware whether anyone beside the defendant lived at the residence.

When Officer Hall arrived at the defendant's apartment building, he stood outside the door and listened for any signs of someone inside. He heard two voices, one male and one female. NYPD police officers from the 75th Precinct were present in the area, but Officer Hall was not sure exactly where they were. Officer Hall knocked on the door, identifying himself, his department, and his unit. After approximately two minutes, the defendant opened the door. To the direct left was a kitchen and living room. To the back on the right was a room with female clothing and shoes and an ultrasound image on the door. Further to the right was the rear room. Officer Hall was not accompanied by any NYPD police officers when he knocked on the door or when he entered the apartment.

Officer Hall introduced himself to the defendant and informed the defendant of the reason for his visit. Officer Hall briefly interviewed the defendant, asking him if he was a member of any street gangs, if he was employed, if he was in school, if he was involved in any criminal activity or if he had any knowledge of any criminal activity, and who else was in the apartment. The defendant refused to answer the question about gang activity. He denied having firearms, and stated that he was not employed or in school. He stated that the residence was under his control and informed Officer Hall that his sister, her two children, and his daughter were present in the apartment. Officer Hall reminded the defendant of the conditions of probation, specifically the search condition, and then informed him that a search would be conducted. The defendant became very distracted and nervous and repeatedly asked why.

Officer Hall observed the defendant's breathing become heavy and rapid, and asked if he was okay. The defendant declined to sit down, and tried to walk toward the front door. The defendant was asked to sit down. The defendant looked toward the rear of the apartment and said he needed to close the door and get his daughter out of the rear room. The defendant was not in handcuffs or otherwise physically restrained. Officer Hall informed the defendant that he could not close the door, and that the probation officers would escort him into the rear room to retrieve his daughter. Officer Hall did not memorialize the names of the other individuals who were present. The defendant and his sister were the only two adults in the home at that time.

When they entered the rear room, Officer Hall observed letters and other items with the defendant's name on them, as well as male clothing. He did not recall whether he observed any female clothing in the room. After the defendant's daughter had been removed from the room, Officer Hall began to search the room. NYPD police officers were not present in the apartment and did not assist in the search. Officer Hall found other letters and communications with the Department of Probation which included the defendant's name on them. Officer Hall did not recall seeing any envelopes addressed to Tatiana Dicks. The defendant called for his sister and told her to tell the probation officers that they were in her room. The defendant was asked why the items the probation officers had observed were in that room, and the defendant's sister said that her boyfriend has the exact same name, with the same middle initial. Officer Hall also observed a wallet, containing the defendant's EBT card and other items, on a makeshift nightstand, constructed of storage boxes, directly next to the bed.

Officer Hall then conducted a search of the room, and recovered two firearms from inside a two-handled bag in the closet.¹ Officer Hall alerted his supervisor and safeguarded the firearms. He did not know at the time if they were loaded or not. Officer Hall's partner and supervisor attempted to handcuff the defendant. The defendant resisted the probation officers, refused to be handcuffed, and tried to run out the door. There was a brief scuffle inside the apartment. After blocking the defendant from trying to flee the apartment, Officer Hall's partner and supervisor eventually succeeded in handcuffing the defendant. Two other individuals related to the defendant were objecting to his arrest. Officer Hall believed that one of the other probation officers present that day contacted NYPD for assistance; he did not know which officer called. The defendant's sister also called 911. When NYPD officers arrived, Officer Hall turned the firearms over to them. At some point while Officer Hall was in the apartment, the defendant's sister informed him that the room with the female clothing was her room and that the room with the firearms was the defendant's room.

Det. Noor testified that has been employed by the NYPD for approximately 10 years. As a detective and field intelligence officer in the 79th Precinct, he is responsible for investigating anything involving firearms, shootings, gangs, or narcotics. He has been a detective for approximately three and a half years and previously worked as a field intelligence officer in the 75th Precinct, conducting surveillance of gang activity. He has previously provided backup to probation officers conducting home visits.

On June 4, 2024, Det. Noor was working and assigned to the intelligence unit in the 75th Precinct. At approximately 8:30 A.M., he was working at 1062 Elton Street, in Kings County, with P.O. McCurry and Lt. Redmond. The officers were in uniform and stationed outside the building to conduct a joint operation with probation. The police officers were present to provide backup, security, and any other needed assistance, such as transportation, to the probation officers. Det. Noor's supervisor had communicated with the probation team prior to the arriving at the location; Det. Noor was not part of that conversation. The police officers were informed that if the probation officers needed their assistance, the probation officers would call them. Det. Noor was not told that the probation officers expected to find anything specific.

While Det. Noor and the other police officers were outside the building, Det. Noor's supervisor received a call from probation to go upstairs, and the police officers entered the building and went upstairs. Det. Noor did not know why the probation officers had requested police assistance.

When Det. Noor arrived upstairs, he heard a lot of commotion, including people screaming, coming from inside apartment 215. He entered that apartment, and observed the defendant in handcuffs, as well as a woman. Det. Noor had not previously interacted with the defendant and did not have any information that the defendant was affiliated with a gang. The probation officers told Det. Noor that there were firearms inside a bedroom, and brought him into the bedroom. Det. Noor observed two firearms and a brown bag on the bed.² He put the firearms, as well as some letters and an identification card with the defendant's name, in an evidence envelope.

Det. Noor then went to the 75th Precinct. While at the precinct, Det. Noor brought the defendant to an interview room. Det. Alleyne conducted the interview, for which Det. Noor was also present. Det. Alleyne read Miranda warnings to the defendant and the defendant agreed to speak with the police officers. The defendant had not been threatened, and no promises had been made to him. Neither detective had a firearm in the interview room. The interview was memorialized on video.

Conclusions of Law

Mapp/Dunaway/Payton

In a motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of unlawful police conduct, the People have the initial burden of production to establish the legality of the police conduct in the first instance. See People v. Berrios, 28 NY2d 361 (1971); People v. Whitehurst, 25 NY2d 389 (1969). Once that burden has been met, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the police conduct was unlawful. See Berrios, supra; People v. Dunbar, 188 AD3d 1247 (2d Dept. 2020).

"It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). "[T]his general rule does not apply with the same force to probationers or parolees . . . [and] it is clear that a parolee or a probationer may be arrested in his home without a judicial warrant," People v. Hernandez, 218 AD2d 167, 171 (2d Dept. 1996). However, it is also axiomatic that "a probationer's home is protected by the constitutional requirement that searches be reasonable." People v. Hale, 93 NY2d 454, 459 (1999). Thus, "in consequence of [a defendant] acquiring status as a parolee [or probationer], he [does] not surrender his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures." People v. Huntley, 43 NY2d 175, 181 (1977).³ When a search and seizure is undertaken by a parole or probation officer responsible for supervising the defendant, "whether the action was unreasonable and thus prohibited by constitutional proscription must turn on whether the conduct of the parole [or probation] officer was rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the parole [or probation] officer's duty." Id. Moreover, "[i]t would not be enough necessarily that there was some rational connection; the particular conduct must also have been substantially related to the performance of duty in the particular circumstances." Id. See also People v. LaFontant, 46 AD3d 840 (2d Dept. 2007).

Further, the fact that the one of the conditions of the defendant's probation included consent to random searches does not alter the analysis: "That authorization is not to be taken as an unrestricted consent to any and all searches whatsoever or as a blanket waiver of all constitutional rights to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures." Huntley, 43 NY2d at 182. Rather, it merely confirms "the right of the parole [or probation] officer . . . to conduct searches rationally and substantially related to the performance of his duty." Id. at 183.

In this case, as Det. Noor testified, Officer Hall searched the defendant's home as part of a joint operation conducted with the NYPD.⁴ The operation was initiated when the 75th Precinct field intelligence supervisor, Lt. Redmond, contacted the probation supervisor and informed the probation supervisor that the defendant had an affiliation to the Bloods gang and was a "gun recidivist." However, Officer Hall was unable to explain what he understood the term "gun recidivist" meant and was unaware of any information indicating the defendant had been in possession of any firearm beyond the one for which he had already been convicted of possessing and was serving a sentence of probation. No details were provided: Officer Hall had no information, for instance, that the defendant had recently engaged with a gang or participated in any gang activities, or had been seen in possession of a firearm, and he possessed no other information hinting at any criminal or unlawful behavior by the defendant. See People v. Spirito, 42 NY3d 934 (2024); People v. Johnson, 54 AD3d 969 (2d Dept. 2008). There was no evidence that the defendant had violated any of the terms of his probation (see People v. Thomas, 42 NY3d 236 (2024); People v. Blacks, 153 AD3d 720 (2d Dept. 2017)) or that he had failed to report or been uncooperative with the probation officer tasked with supervising him (see People v. Huntley, 43 NY2d 175 (1977); People v. Van Buren, 198 AD2d 533 (2d Dept. 1993)). Indeed, the only information regarding the defendant's track record on probation was that his probation officer had previously successfully conducted home visits at the address, confirming that the defendant resided at the address registered with probation. See People v. Johnson, 63 NY2d 888 (1984). There was "no indication that the defendant had proved unreliable." People v. Jackson, 46 NY2d 171, 175 (1978).

The source of Lt. Redmond's suspicion was never identified (see People v. Jackson, 46 NY2d 171 (1978)), nor was there any evidence corroborating the information Lt. Redmond provided (see People v. Clark, 167 AD3d 1035 (2d Dept. 2018)). Furthermore, the information regarding the defendant's gang affiliation appears to have been inaccurate, because Det. Noor testified that, at the time of the search, he was responsible for surveilling gangs in the 75th Precinct, and was aware of individuals affiliated with the gangs in the 75th Precinct, yet he did not know the defendant to be a member of or affiliated with any of the gangs in the 75th Precinct.

The record is thus devoid of any specific information that the defendant had violated or was at risk of violating a term of his probation, or had committed or was at risk of committing a crime. The Court was provided with no evidence to explain how the search of the defendant's home was "rationally and reasonably related to the performance of the [probation] officer's duty." Huntley, 43 NY2d at 181. There was no evidence explaining how the search of the defendant's home was intended either to "protect[ ] the public from the commission of further crimes" or to "assist [the defendant with] a proper reintegration into his community." Id. See also People v. Clark, 167 AD3d 1035 (2d Dept. 2018). There was no evidence that Officer Hall "initiated and undertook the search by virtue of his own responsibility for and relationship with the defendant, as his supervisor, motivated by his duty to monitor the terms of defendant's probation and rehabilitation." People v. Hale, 93 NY2d 454, 462 (1999).

In the absence of any evidence establishing which duty of probation was being furthered by the search, or any evidence establishing how the search was rationally and reasonably related to that duty, the People failed to meet their burden of production that the search was lawful. Compare People v. Lively, 42 NY3d 178 (2024) and People v. Jackson, 46 NY2d 171 (1978) with People v. Purnell, 166 AD3d 814 (2d Dept. 2018). Therefore, the defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence recovered as the result of the search of his home is granted.

However, it does not automatically follow that the defendant's statement must be suppressed as a fruit of the unlawful search. A statement "made after an arrest without probable cause is not subject to suppression if the People adequately demonstrate that the inculpatory admission was 'attenuated' from the improper detention; in other words, it was 'acquired by means sufficiently distinguishable from the arrest to be purged of the illegality.' " People v. Bradford, 15 NY3d 329, 333 (2010) (quoting People v. Conyers, 68 NY2d 982, 983 (1986)). "That determination requires consideration of the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." People v. Conyers, 68 NY2d at 983. "The postarrest administration of Miranda warnings by the police is an important but not a conclusive factor in determining whether the confession was obtained by exploitation of the illegal arrest." Id.

The defendant's statement was made after he had been transported to the precinct, processed, and brought to the interview room. The interview was conducted by Det. Alleyne, who appears not to have been present at the defendant's home. The defendant was offered water and a cigarette, and left alone in the interview room while Det. Alleyne went to retrieve some cigarettes for him. The change in location and personnel, as well as the passage of time, and the issuance of Miranda warnings "constituted a definite and pronounced break sufficient to dissipate the taint of any prior illegality associated with the defendant's arrest." People v. Alexander, 63 AD3d 1166, 1168 (2d Dept. 2009). Therefore, the defendant's motion to suppress the noticed statement as a fruit of an unlawful arrest is denied.

Huntley

At a Huntley hearing, the People bear the burden of going forward in the first instance, and must prove the voluntariness of any statements by the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 (1965); see also People v. Guilford, 21 NY3d 205 (2013). Statements obtained as the result of custodial interrogation must be suppressed unless they were made subsequent to proper Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); People v. Ferro, 63 NY2d 316 (1984); People v. Huffman, 41 NY2d 29, 33 (1976).

Miranda warnings are required prior to "custodial interrogation [that is] questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). "[B]oth the elements of police 'custody' and police 'interrogation' must be present before law enforcement officials constitutionally are obligated to provide the procedural safeguards imposed upon them by Miranda." People v. Huffman, 41 NY2d 29, 33 (1976).

In this case, the noticed statement was made at the precinct, while the defendant was in custody, after Det. Alleyne read Miranda warnings to the defendant. The defendant was brought into an interview room, uncuffed, and offered water and a cigarette. Prior to reading the warnings to the defendant, Det. Alleyne asked the defendant for his pedigree information, including his name and address. Typically, pedigree questions are an exception to the requirement that custodial interrogation be preceded by Miranda warnings, so long as the questions are "reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns[.]" People v. Wortham, 37 NY3d 407, 413 (2021). "[T]he pedigree exception [does] not apply if the questions, though facially appropriate, are likely to elicit incriminating admissions because of the circumstances of the particular case or . . . [are] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant." Id. at 414 (citing People v. Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 293 (1995)).

Thus, "there are times when pedigree questions seek inculpatory information and must be preceded by Miranda warnings, such as where a person's address might be important to establishing the criminal charges." People v. Myles, 216 AD3d 1419, 188 N.Y.S.3d 346, 350 (4th Dept. 2023) (citing People v. Slade, 133 AD3d 1203 (4th Dept. 2015)). See also People v. Tucker, 173 AD3d 1817 (4th Dept. 2019); People v. Hiraeta, 117 AD3d 964 (2d Dept. 2014).

The People bear the burden of "establish[ing] that the information contained in the defendant's statements constituted pedigree information under the circumstances of this case." People v. Rottela, 194 AD3d 1079, 1080 (2d Dept. 2021). In this case, the noticed statement was not elicited during the execution of a search warrant (see Wortham, supra), nor as part of the routine booking process (see Rodney, supra). Nor have the People identified any other police administrative concern which was served by the elicitation of the defendant's pedigree information. Therefore, the defendant's motion to suppress is granted with respect to portion of the defendant's statement that was made prior to the issuance of Miranda warnings. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the pedigree statement was voluntarily made under traditional due process standards, and so the People may use the statement for impeachment purposes. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).

The Court finds that the remainder of noticed the statement was sufficiently distinct from the pre-Mirandized portion. As an initial matter, the Court notes the general lack of coerciveness or intimidation inherent in obtaining pedigree information. See People v. Rivera, 26 NY2d 304 (1970). Moreover, because the predicate for suppression is "simply the failure timely to administer Miranda warnings," the action required to dissipate the taint of the late warnings is necessarily less than where there had been "actual coercion." People v. Guilford, 21 NY3d 205, 209 (2013).

The Court of Appeals has held that late Miranda warnings will protect the voluntariness of a later statement when "there is such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that the defendant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning." People v. Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 (1975). Factors that have been considered by the courts include "the time differential between the Miranda violation and the subsequent admission; whether the same police personnel were present and involved in eliciting each statement; whether there was a change in the location or nature of the interrogation; the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation, such as the extent of the improper questioning; and whether, prior to the Miranda violation, defendant had indicated a willingness to speak to police." People v. Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130-31 (2005). Another factor that can support a finding of voluntariness of a post-Mirandized statement is "the absence of any incriminating responses to the [pre-Mirandized] police questioning[.]" People v. Kinnard, 62 NY2d 910, 912 (1984); see also People v. White, 10 NY3d 286, 291 (2008).

When analyzing the voluntariness of a later statement, "[n]o one factor is determinative and each case must be viewed on its unique facts." Paulman at 131. In People v. White, the Court of Appeals found it significant that the initial, pre-Mirandized portion of the exchange between the detectives and the defendant "lasted no longer than five minutes." 10 NY3d at 292. The Court held: "Although the same police personnel were involved in eliciting each pre- and post-warned statement, and there was no change in the location of the interrogation, the brevity of the initial exchange is significant under Paulman." 10 NY3d at 292; see also People v. Malaussena, 10 NY3d 904 (2008). In White, the defendant received and acknowledged his Miranda rights "prior to making any substantive statement about the case, and the record shows that defendant freely indicated his willingness to speak." Id. Observing that the defendant's post-Miranda statement was initially exculpatory, the White Court found that he had been "returned, in effect, to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning." 10 NY3d at 292 (citing Chapple, 38 NY2d at 115); see also People v. Gray, 27 NY3d 78, 83 (2016).

Here, as in White, the exchange between the detective and the defendant prior to the administration of Miranda warnings was brief, in this case lasting less than one minute; there was no change in police personnel or location; and the defendant did not admit to possessing the recovered firearms either prior to receiving Miranda warnings or directly afterward. Following the administration of Miranda warnings, the defendant evinced a willingness to speak to Det. Alleyne, and he denied the allegations made against him.

Although the exchange was continuous, and did not contain the fifteen to twenty minute break found sufficient in White, "each case must be viewed on its unique facts." Paulman, 5 NY3d at 131. A determination about the voluntariness of a defendant's statement presents a mixed question of law and fact. E.g., People v. Scott, 86 NY2d 864 (1995). In this case, the Court benefitted from viewing the video recording which captured the entire exchange between the defendant and Det. Alleyne. The statute requiring that recording, C.P.L. § 60.45(3)(a), was passed in 2018. Consequently, previous decisions involving unrecorded statements had to rely almost exclusively on the testimony elicited at the hearing in order to determine whether the defendant's statements were voluntarily made. With the near ubiquity of video recordings, courts must no longer rely on summary descriptions, but can instead observe the defendant's demeanor, body language, tone of voice, and other intangible qualities in making that determination.⁵

After watching the video of the interrogation in this case and considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds a "general absence of coercive circumstances." People v. Morales, 184 AD3d 532 (1st Dept. 2020). Based on the video of the interrogation, including the defendant's demeanor and body language, as well as Det. Noor's testimony, the Court finds that the People have established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's post-Miranda statements were voluntarily made and that at the time of those statements, the defendant had effectively been returned to the status of one who was not under the influence of improper questioning. Moreover, once the defendant indicated his desire to consult with a lawyer, his rights were scrupulously honored. See People v. Ferro, 63 NY2d 316 (1984). The questioning immediately ceased. Det. Alleyne's only further interaction with the defendant was an invitation to the defendant to remain in the room so that the defendant could smoke a cigarette, and the detective wished the defendant good luck with his case as the detective departed the room. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the People established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's post-Miranda statement was voluntarily made. See People v. Jin Cheng Lin, 26 NY3d 701 (2016); People v. Anderson, 42 NY2d 35 (1977). Therefore, the defendant's motion to suppress the post-Miranda statement is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: September 17, 2025

Brooklyn, New York

Hon. Michael D. Kitsis, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Officer Hall did not know if the bag was marketed to men or women, and testified that it was similar to a gym bag or a suitcase bag.

2.   Det. Noor did not know if the bag was marketed to men or women.

3.   Although Huntley factually involved a defendant on parole, the Court of Appeals later clarified that the same protections apply to individuals on probation. See People v. Jackson, 46 NY2d 171 (1978); see also People v. Hale, 93 NY2d 454 (1999).

4.   The People argued that the probation officers were not acting as agents of the police because NYPD officers stayed outside and did not participate in handcuffing the defendant or in searching the residence. Even if the probation officers had acted on their own initiative, "the absence of evidence that parole [or probation] officers were acting as agents of the police, standing alone, is insufficient to render a parole search lawful. The Huntley standard must also be satisfied." People v. Lively, 42 NY3d 178, 183 (2024).

5.   In addition, the defendant's statement referenced his previous contacts with the criminal justice system, specifically his current status as a probationer, indicating a level of sophistication and experience in communicating with law enforcement. See People v. Gray, 27 NY3d 78, 83 (2016); People v. Cleverin, 140 AD3d 1080, 1081 (2d Dept. 2016).

Michael D. Kitsis, J.