IN RE: Maria UMALA (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate so much of an arbitration award dated February 1, 2023, as denied the petitioner's claim that under 29 CFR 785.18 she was entitled to compensation for breaks from work that lasted from 5 to 20 minutes, in which the respondents cross-petitioned, inter alia, to confirm that portion of the arbitration award, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Timothy J. Dufficy, J.), entered September 13, 2023.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the petition to vacate so much of the arbitration award as denied the petitioner's claim that under 29 CFR 785.18 she was entitled to compensation for breaks from work that lasted from 5 to 20 minutes and granted that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm that portion of the award.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner was employed by the respondents as a cashier.  The petitioner asserted various federal and state law wage and hour claims against the respondents, which were eventually resolved in an arbitration.  The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the respondents were required to pay her, as contemplated by 29 CFR 785.18, for breaks from work that lasted from 5 to 20 minutes, regardless of how the breaks were spent (hereinafter the subject claim).  In an award dated February 1, 2023, the arbitrator found, among other things, that the breaks related to the subject claim were meal breaks under 29 CFR 785.19 that did not require compensation.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate so much of the arbitration award as denied the subject claim on the ground that the arbitrator exhibited a manifest disregard of the law with respect to the subject claim.  The respondents cross-petitioned to confirm the award.  In an order entered September 13, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the petition and granted that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm so much of the award as denied the subject claim.  The petitioner appeals.

“[J]udicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited” (Matter of Richardson v. Markovich, 227 A.D.3d 999, 1000, 212 N.Y.S.3d 395 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Rivera v. New York City Tr. Auth., 216 A.D.3d 644, 645, 187 N.Y.S.3d 768).  “A party seeking to overturn an arbitration award bears a heavy burden and must establish a ground for vacatur by clear and convincing evidence” (Kotlyar v. Khlebopros, 176 A.D.3d 793, 795, 109 N.Y.S.3d 449;  see Matter of County of Nassau v. Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., 150 A.D.3d 1230, 1230, 52 N.Y.S.3d 880).  Generally, courts are bound by an arbitrator's factual findings and judgments concerning remedies (see Matter of Douglas Elliman of LI, LLC v. O'Callaghan, 220 A.D.3d 945, 947, 198 N.Y.S.3d 388;  Matter of Dedvukaj v. Shkreli, 180 A.D.3d 895, 897, 116 N.Y.S.3d 604).  Nonetheless, “an award may be vacated where ‘it exhibits a manifest disregard of law’ ” (Matter of Long Beach Professional Firefighters Assn. v. City of Long Beach, 214 A.D.3d 735, 736, 186 N.Y.S.3d 39 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 471, 480, 813 N.Y.S.2d 691, 846 N.E.2d 1201;  see Jewish Press, Inc. v. Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP, 221 A.D.3d 594, 595–596, 198 N.Y.S.3d 579).  To modify or vacate an award on this ground, “ ‘a court must find both that (1) the arbitrator[ ] knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator[ ] was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case’ ” (Matter of Panos v. Mid Hudson Med. Group, P.C., 204 A.D.3d 1016, 1018, 167 N.Y.S.3d 539 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d at 481, 813 N.Y.S.2d 691, 846 N.E.2d 1201).

Here, the petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the subject portion of the arbitration award exhibited a manifest disregard of the law (see Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d at 481, 813 N.Y.S.2d 691, 846 N.E.2d 1201;  Matter of Long Beach Professional Firefighters Assn. v. City of Long Beach, 214 A.D.3d at 737, 186 N.Y.S.3d 39;  Matter of Panos v. Mid Hudson Med. Group, P.C., 204 A.D.3d at 1019, 167 N.Y.S.3d 539).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition to vacate so much of the arbitration award as denied the subject claim and granted that branch of the cross-petition which was to confirm that portion of the award.

CHAMBERS, J.P., FORD, TAYLOR and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.