PEOPLE v. HALL (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Danny Chun, J.), rendered March 13, 2019, convicting him of grand larceny in the second degree, criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (four counts), and offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new trial.

The defendant's contention that his conviction of grand larceny in the second degree is not supported by legally sufficient evidence is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]).  Moreover, the defendant's arguments are based on matters dehors the record, which may not be considered on direct appeal (see People v. Saka, 197 A.D.3d 1331, 1332, 151 N.Y.S.3d 906;  People v. Manzanales, 170 A.D.3d 752, 753, 93 N.Y.S.3d 587).  A CPL 440.10 proceeding is the appropriate forum for considering such material with respect to the subject judgment of conviction (see id. § 440.10[1][g]).  In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt is not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

Nonetheless, we reverse the judgment and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new trial since the court failed to conduct the requisite inquiry before allowing the defendant to proceed pro se and the record does not reveal that the defendant was aware of the disadvantages of representing himself or the benefits of having an attorney (see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d 469, 481, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255;  People v. Crispino, 197 A.D.3d 1116, 1118, 153 N.Y.S.3d 502).  A court must determine that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is made competently, intelligently, and voluntarily before allowing that defendant to represent himself or herself (see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d at 481, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255;  People v. Lemmo, 192 A.D.3d 1143, 1144, 141 N.Y.S.3d 711).  To make that evaluation, the court “must undertake a ‘searching inquiry’ designed to ‘insur[e] that a defendant [is] aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel’ ” (People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d at 481, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255, quoting People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d 579, 582, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632).  The court's inquiry “must accomplish the goals of adequately warning a defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, and apprising a defendant of the singular importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication” (People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d 516, 520, 683 N.Y.S.2d 164, 705 N.E.2d 1205;  see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d at 482, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255).

Here, the record does not demonstrate that the Supreme Court inquired about the defendant's pedigree information, aside from the fact that he did not have a law license, or that the court ascertained whether the defendant was aware of the risks inherent in proceeding without a trial attorney and the benefits of having counsel represent him at trial (see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d at 482–483, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255;  People v. Lemmo, 192 A.D.3d at 1144, 141 N.Y.S.3d 711).  The court failed to ensure that the defendant understood the potential sentence that could be imposed or the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation (see People v. Lemmo, 192 A.D.3d at 1144, 141 N.Y.S.3d 711).  The court neither “tested defendant's understanding of choosing self-representation nor provided a reliable basis for appellate review” (People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154).  In addition, the defendant continually engaged in disruptive or obstreperous conduct (see generally People v. Wingate, 184 A.D.3d 738, 739, 125 N.Y.S.3d 724;  People v. Lundquist, 180 A.D.3d 806, 807, 119 N.Y.S.3d 496).  Under these circumstances, the defendant's purported waiver of his right to counsel was ineffective and the defendant is entitled to a new trial (see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d at 484, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255;  People v. Lemmo, 192 A.D.3d at 1144, 141 N.Y.S.3d 711).

The defendant's remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of this determination.

IANNACCI, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.