BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. ROCA (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants Janet Roca and Louis Roca appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Thomas F. Whelan, J.), dated October 26, 2023.  The order denied those defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) for leave to serve a late answer.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action against Janet Roca and Louis Roca (hereinafter together the defendants), among others, to foreclose a mortgage.  On April 5, 2023, after the defendants’ time to answer had expired, the defendants appeared at a settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408, thereby extending their time to serve an answer until 30 days after the settlement conference, to May 5, 2023 (see id. § 3408[m]).  On June 14, 2023, the defendants participated in a second settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408.  No settlement was reached, and the matter was released from the settlement conference part.

On June 21, 2023, the defendants interposed an answer, and the following day, the plaintiff rejected the answer as untimely.  The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) for leave to serve a late answer.  In an order dated October 26, 2023, the Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that the defendants failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default.  The defendants appeal.

“Upon the application of a party, the court may extend the time to appear or plead, or compel the acceptance of a pleading untimely served, upon such terms as may be just and upon a showing of reasonable excuse for delay or default” (id.;  see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hernandez, 204 A.D.3d 958, 960, 167 N.Y.S.3d 149).  “ ‘To extend the time to answer a complaint and to compel the plaintiff to accept late service of an answer pursuant to CPLR 3012(d), a defendant must provide a reasonable excuse for the default and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action’ ” (Carrington v. Northwell Health, 234 A.D.3d 659, 660, 226 N.Y.S.3d 237, quoting HSBC Bank USA v. Pantel, 208 A.D.3d 643, 644, 173 N.Y.S.3d 608).

“ ‘Whether a proffered excuse is reasonable is a sui generis determination to be made by the court based on all relevant factors, including the extent of the delay, whether there has been prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits’ ” (Cartessa Aesthetics, LLC v. Demko, 217 A.D.3d 821, 822, 191 N.Y.S.3d 494, quoting Nowakowski v. Stages, 179 A.D.3d 822, 823, 116 N.Y.S.3d 677).  “ ‘The determination as to what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” (Wilmington Trust, N.A. v. Pape, 192 A.D.3d 947, 949, 140 N.Y.S.3d 712, quoting Green Apple Mgt. Corp. v. Aronis, 55 A.D.3d 669, 669, 865 N.Y.S.2d 355).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) for leave to serve a late answer, as the defendants did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their failure to timely answer the complaint.  The defendants’ misguided strategy of waiting until settlement negotiations had failed to either hire an attorney or attempt to interpose an answer did not constitute a reasonable excuse for their default (see Singh v. Pradhan, 229 A.D.3d 472, 473, 214 N.Y.S.3d 149;  US Bank N.A. v. Salvatierra, 205 A.D.3d 757, 759, 168 N.Y.S.3d 477;  Soto v. Chelsea W26, LLC, 166 A.D.3d 1048, 1050, 89 N.Y.S.3d 199).

Since the defendants failed to establish a reasonable excuse for their default, it is unnecessary to consider whether they demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Salvatierra, 205 A.D.3d at 759, 168 N.Y.S.3d 477;  Bank of Am., N.A. v. Agarwal, 150 A.D.3d 651, 652, 57 N.Y.S.3d 153).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) for leave to serve a late answer.

GENOVESI, J.P., CHAMBERS, TAYLOR and HOM, JJ., concur.