IN RE: AMERICAN TRANSIT INSURANCE COMPANY (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated August 25, 2022, Jong Won Yom appeals from an amended judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Peter P. Sweeney, J.), dated July 19, 2023.  The amended judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon an order of the same court dated May 26, 2023, inter alia, granting that branch of the cross-petition of Jong Won Yom which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) for an award of an additional attorney's fee to the extent of awarding Jong Won Yom an additional attorney's fee in the sum of $600, awarded Jong Won Yom an additional attorney's fee in the sum of only $600.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding against Jong Won Yom pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a master arbitration award dated August 25, 2022, affirming an arbitration award entered in favor of Yom. Yom cross-petitioned, among other things, to confirm the master arbitration award and pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorney's fees.  In an order dated May 26, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the petition, confirmed the arbitration award, and granted that branch of the cross-petition to the extent of awarding Yom an additional attorney's fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $600.  Thereafter, on July 19, 2023, the court, upon the order, issued an amended judgment, among other things, awarding Yom an additional attorney's fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $600.  Yom appeals.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney's reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to the limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.”  The recoverable attorney's fees include those related to representation in a CPLR article 75 proceeding to vacate or confirm a master arbitration award, and, in such instances, “shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65–4.10[j][4];  see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v. Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 A.D.3d 782, 783, 229 N.Y.S.3d 202).

“ ‘The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court’ ” (Hershfield v. Davidoff, 233 A.D.3d 923, 924, 222 N.Y.S.3d 646, quoting Lancer Indem. Co. v. JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 A.D.3d 1035, 1035–1036, 8 N.Y.S.3d 356;  see RMP Capital Corp. v. Victory Jet, LLC, 139 A.D.3d 836, 839–840, 32 N.Y.S.3d 231).  “The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” (Lancer Indem. Co. v. JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 A.D.3d at 1036, 8 N.Y.S.3d 356;  see Hershfield v. Davidoff, 233 A.D.3d at 924, 222 N.Y.S.3d 646).

Contrary to Yom's contention, the Supreme Court acted within its discretion in awarding Yom an additional attorney's fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $600 without first conducting a hearing (see People's United Bank v. Patio Gardens III, LLC, 143 A.D.3d 689, 691, 38 N.Y.S.3d 262).  As an initial matter, since Yom failed to submit an affirmation or affidavit in support of the cross-petition, inter alia, describing the nature of the work performed and the amount of time expended on the matter, it was within the court's discretion to determine a reasonable amount of an attorney's fee (see TY Bldrs. II, Inc. v. 55 Day Spa, Inc., 167 A.D.3d 679, 682, 90 N.Y.S.3d 47).  Moreover, Yom failed to request a hearing on the issue of an award of an additional attorney's fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) (see Sieratzki v. Sieratzki, 8 A.D.3d 552, 554, 779 N.Y.S.2d 507).  Under these circumstances, and given the legislative intent of the no-fault insurance law “to promptly resolve no-fault reimbursements, ‘reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings to New York motorists’ ” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v. Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 A.D.3d 1, 9, 229 N.Y.S.3d 514, quoting Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v. Country–Wide Ins. Co., 25 N.Y.3d 498, 505, 14 N.Y.S.3d 283, 35 N.E.3d 451;  see Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v. Serio, 100 N.Y.2d 854, 860, 768 N.Y.S.2d 423, 800 N.E.2d 728), the court was not required to conduct a hearing prior to awarding the additional attorney's fee pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4).

Yom's remaining contentions are either academic or without merit.

DUFFY, J.P., MILLER, WARHIT and LOVE, JJ., concur.