MILLER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Anthony Brindisi, J.), entered April 16, 2024, which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

In May 2021, claimant's minor child was found in the early morning hours outside the home of a friend miles away from where she resided with claimant.  Upon speaking with that friend's sister, the child made certain disclosures of abuse by claimant precipitating a State Police investigation.  During that investigation, the child continued to make consistent disclosures of abuse and, ultimately, claimant was arrested and charged with four misdemeanors.  These charges included two counts of endangering the welfare of a child (see Penal Law § 260.10), criminal obstruction of breathing (see Penal Law § 121.11) and criminal contempt in the second degree (see Penal Law § 215.50).  These charges were later dismissed and, as a result, claimant brought this claim alleging causes of action for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.  Following joinder of issue, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim.  The Court of Claims granted the motion, finding that probable cause to arrest claimant at the time precluded the claims.  Claimant appeals.

As the movant, defendant “bore the burden of making a prima facie showing that [claimant] will be unable to establish at least one of the elements” of his claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution (Gagnon v. Village of Cooperstown, N.Y., 189 A.D.3d 1724, 1726, 137 N.Y.S.3d 193 [3d Dept. 2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]).¹  “[T]he elements of a cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment are (1) an intentional confinement (2) of which [the] plaintiff was conscious and (3) to which [the] plaintiff did not consent, and (4) that was not otherwise privileged” (Barkley v. Lisbon Cent. Sch. Dist., 220 A.D.3d 1089, 1090, 198 N.Y.S.3d 614 [3d Dept. 2023] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).  Nonetheless, “[t]he existence of probable cause serves as a legal justification for the arrest and an affirmative defense to the claim” (Shioya v. Hanah Country Inn Mgt. Corp., 207 A.D.3d 916, 920, 172 N.Y.S.3d 761 [3d Dept. 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).  Additionally, “[t]o make out a claim for malicious prosecution, a claimant must establish:  (1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the claimant, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding, and (4) actual malice” (Michaels v. State of New York, 203 A.D.3d 1345, 1346, 160 N.Y.S.3d 922 [3d Dept. 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).  Consequently, as to both causes of action, “[t]he existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense” (Fields v. County of Nassau, 219 A.D.3d 882, 884, 195 N.Y.S.3d 294 [2d Dept. 2023] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

In support of the motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim, defendant submitted, among other things, the incident report detailing the investigation underlying the charges against claimant.  Therein, it states that the child's friend had observed certain abuse in the past, and the child's friend's sister informed responding law enforcement officers that the child had disclosed to her that claimant had kicked her that night.  Upon law enforcement speaking with the child, she disclosed that claimant lifted her off the ground while choking her, threw her into a wall and punched her in the face – allegations which claimant denied when interviewed by law enforcement.  During his interview, claimant notified law enforcement that the child had made allegations of abuse in the past which she then retracted when interviewed by child protective caseworkers, though claimant confirmed he was present during that interview.  A forensic interview of the child was conducted the following day, which was both described in the incident report as well as recorded and provided as a separate exhibit.  During that interview, the child made consistent disclosures and stated that she had retracted her prior disclosure because claimant was present during the interview, leaving her fearful to tell the truth.  Defendant also provided the deposition testimony of the State Police investigator who attested that the child did not have any marks, scars or bruises but that he did not find this to mean that the child was not being abused, as physical evidence is not always present in instances of abuse.  The investigator affirmed that all those involved, including personnel from her school, found the child to be credible, except for the caseworker involved who found the child incredible based upon the prior recantation.  The investigator was clear that he was not informed prior to claimant's arrest that the child had any mental health diagnoses that made her prone to dishonesty, which was contradicted only by claimant's deposition testimony that the investigator was so informed.

Although there is a presumption that a warrantless arrest was unlawfully made (see Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 458, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 [1975], cert denied 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257 [1975];  Lynn v. State of New York, 33 A.D.3d 673, 674, 822 N.Y.S.2d 600 [2d Dept. 2006]), the foregoing proof demonstrates the absence of any material issues of fact as to whether claimant's arrest was supported by probable cause.  “As the very name suggests, probable cause depends upon probabilities, not certainty” (People v. Rodriguez, 168 A.D.2d 520, 521, 562 N.Y.S.2d 759 [2d Dept. 1990] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 926, 573 N.Y.S.2d 478, 577 N.E.2d 1070 [1991]).  Thus, “[p]robable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed” (People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451 [1985];  accord Nolasco v. City of New York, 131 A.D.3d 683, 684, 15 N.Y.S.3d 449 [2d Dept. 2015]).  The proof proffered by defendant establishes that law enforcement did not have any reason to doubt the child's veracity based upon the information available to them at the time of claimant's arrest.  Other than the prior retracted disclosure of abuse – which the child had explained was the result of claimant's presence while she was being interviewed – those involved confirmed to law enforcement that the child was generally known to be truthful.  Therefore, claimant's arrest was supported by probable cause since “an identified citizen provide[d] information accusing [claimant] of committing a specific crime” and there were no “circumstances that would materially impeach the proffered information” (People v. Vanness, 106 A.D.3d 1262, 1264, 964 N.Y.S.2d 763 [3d Dept. 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 1044, 981 N.Y.S.2d 378, 4 N.E.3d 390 [2013];  see CPL 70.10[2];  Medina v. City of New York, 102 A.D.3d 101, 104, 105, 953 N.Y.S.2d 43 [1st Dept. 2012];  People v. Mendoza, 49 A.D.3d 559, 560, 853 N.Y.S.2d 364 [2d Dept. 2008], lv denied 10 N.Y.3d 937, 862 N.Y.S.2d 343, 892 N.E.2d 409 [2008]).

Consequently, defendant eliminated any material issues of fact as to whether law enforcement possessed probable cause to arrest claimant, shifting the burden to claimant to raise a triable issue of fact on his claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution (see Shioya v. Hanah Country Inn Mgt. Corp., 207 A.D.3d at 921–922, 172 N.Y.S.3d 761;  Michaels v. State of New York, 203 A.D.3d at 1346, 160 N.Y.S.3d 922;  compare Mitchell v. City of New York, 241 A.D.3d 1165, 1165, ––– N.Y.S.3d –––– [1st Dept. 2025];  Thomas v. Niagara Frontier Tr. Auth., 237 A.D.3d 1476, 1478, 234 N.Y.S.3d 707 [4th Dept. 2025];  Ballinger v. City of Mount Vernon, 233 A.D.3d 736, 738, 223 N.Y.S.3d 679 [2d Dept. 2024]).  Claimant failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant's motion.  Relevant to the issue of probable cause and the child's associated veracity, claimant provided affidavits from, among others, himself and the child's treating mental health counselors.  These affidavits claim that the child has certain mental health diagnoses which may cause her to lie.  Nevertheless, these diagnoses came after the arrest in question and, therefore, law enforcement had no reason to know that the child could, at some point in the future, be so diagnosed.  As a result, this proof does not “materially impeach the proffered information” and, therefore, fails to raise any triable issue of fact as to whether law enforcement had probable cause to arrest claimant at the time the arrest was made (People v. Vanness, 106 A.D.3d at 1264, 964 N.Y.S.2d 763;  see Shioya v. Hanah Country Inn Mgt. Corp., 207 A.D.3d at 922, 172 N.Y.S.3d 761;  see also Nolasco v. City of New York, 131 A.D.3d at 685, 15 N.Y.S.3d 449).  Even crediting that the investigator may have referred to claimant utilizing demeaning language prior to the arrest and stated that he would presumably arrest claimant regardless of a directive to do so from his supervisor, this did not negate the established probable cause to execute the arrest.

As a result, the Court of Claims properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims (see Burns v. City of New York, 181 A.D.3d 554, 556, 120 N.Y.S.3d 360 [2d Dept. 2020];  Dann v. Auburn Police Dept., 138 A.D.3d 1468, 1470, 31 N.Y.S.3d 335 [4th Dept. 2016];  Medina v. City of New York, 102 A.D.3d at 108, 953 N.Y.S.2d 43;  see also Dawoodi v. City of New York, ––– A.D.3d ––––, ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 05498 [2d Dept. 2025]).  Claimant's additional arguments that the Court of Claims erred in failing to direct disclosure of the child's medical records (see generally CPLR 3101[a];  Cooke v. Greenhouse Hudson, LLC, 230 A.D.3d 841, 845, 217 N.Y.S.3d 265 [3d Dept. 2024]) and improperly dismissed his state constitutional claims (see Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 97 N.Y.2d 78, 83, 735 N.Y.S.2d 868, 761 N.E.2d 560 [2001];  Oppenheimer v. State of New York, 152 A.D.3d 1006, 1008–1009, 60 N.Y.S.3d 524 [3d Dept. 2017]) have been reviewed and found to be lacking in merit.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Causes of action for false arrest and false imprisonment are synonymous and, therefore, will be referred to collectively as false arrest (see Ballinger v. City of Mount Vernon, 233 A.D.3d 736, 737, 223 N.Y.S.3d 679 [2d Dept. 2024];  Fischetti v. City of New York, 199 A.D.3d 891, 892, 158 N.Y.S.3d 163 [2d Dept. 2021]).

Powers, J.

Pritzker, J.P., Reynolds Fitzgerald, Ceresia and McShan, JJ., concur.