PEOPLE v. COWAN (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Hyun Chin Kim, J.), rendered August 21, 2023, convicting him of assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of assault in the second degree.

The defendant's contention that the County Court denied him a fair opportunity to question prospective jurors by limiting defense counsel's voir dire during jury selection is without merit.  “A trial court has broad discretion to restrict the scope of voir dire by counsel and indeed must preclude repetitive or irrelevant questioning” (People v. Jean, 75 N.Y.2d 744, 745, 551 N.Y.S.2d 889, 551 N.E.2d 90 [citations omitted]).  “A restriction on the time allotted for voir dire is generally permissible where defense counsel is ‘afford[ed] ․ a fair opportunity to question prospective jurors about relevant matters’ ” (People v. Littlejohn, 92 A.D.3d 898, 899, 939 N.Y.S.2d 118, quoting People v. Jean, 75 N.Y.2d at 745, 551 N.Y.S.2d 889, 551 N.E.2d 90;  see CPL 270.15[1][c];  People v. Steward, 17 N.Y.3d 104, 110–111, 926 N.Y.S.2d 847, 950 N.E.2d 480).  Further, “the court shall not permit ․ questions as to a juror's knowledge of rules of law” (CPL 270.15[1][c]).  Here, the record demonstrates that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting defense counsel's questioning during the voir dire process because defense counsel impermissibly attempted to question the prospective jurors as to their knowledge of the rules of law (see id.).

The defendant's contention with respect to an allegedly grossly unqualified juror is also without merit.  “If at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the rendition of its verdict, ․ the court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case ․, the court must discharge such juror” (id. § 270.35[1]).  “[E]ach case must be evaluated on its unique facts to determine whether a particular juror must be disqualified under CPL 270.35” (People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290, 299, 514 N.Y.S.2d 191, 506 N.E.2d 901).  “[T]he trial court must question each allegedly unqualified juror individually in camera in the presence of the attorneys and defendant, conducting a probing and tactful inquiry into the unique facts of each case, including a careful consideration of the juror's answers and demeanor” (People v. Lau, 148 A.D.3d 932, 933, 50 N.Y.S.3d 401 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 214, 219, 524 N.Y.S.2d 422, 519 N.E.2d 333).  While the trial court is given great latitude, “the court may not speculate as to possible partiality based on equivocal responses but must be convinced that it is ‘obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict’ ” (People v. Whyte, 282 A.D.2d 629, 630, 725 N.Y.S.2d 347, quoting People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d at 298, 514 N.Y.S.2d 191, 506 N.E.2d 901).

Here, the County Court did not err in denying the defendant's application to discharge a particular juror.  After questioning the juror in camera, the court accepted the juror's assurances that he could be fair and impartial, despite possibly having a former business relationship with the victim (see People v. Blackshear, 125 A.D.3d 1384, 1386, 3 N.Y.S.3d 239;  cf.  People v. Furey, 18 N.Y.3d 284, 288, 938 N.Y.S.2d 277, 961 N.E.2d 668;  People v. Meyer, 78 A.D.2d 662, 663–664, 432 N.Y.S.2d 219).

The defendant's contention regarding the County Court's Molineux ruling (see People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286) is partially unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Cooper, 224 A.D.3d 925, 925, 206 N.Y.S.3d 674;  People v. Torres, 96 A.D.3d 881, 881, 946 N.Y.S.2d 225).  In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit (see People v. Espinal–Ramos, 225 A.D.3d 621, 621–622, 206 N.Y.S.3d 388;  People v. Delacruz, 207 A.D.3d 652, 653–654, 171 N.Y.S.3d 575).

The defendant's contention that the County Court, by the sentence it imposed, penalized him for refusing to accept a plea offer and exercising his right to a trial is without merit.  The record reveals no evidence of retaliation or vindictiveness against the defendant for electing to proceed to trial (see People v. Bradshaw, 229 A.D.3d 563, 564, 214 N.Y.S.3d 167;  People v. Garcia, 222 A.D.3d 659, 660, 201 N.Y.S.3d 181;  People v. Robinson, 195 A.D.3d 950, 952, 146 N.Y.S.3d 511).  Moreover, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., FORD, DOWLING and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.