IN RE: AMERICAN TRANSIT INSURANCE COMPANY (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to vacate a master arbitration award dated July 26, 2022, Michelle Pfeffer appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Karen B. Rothenberg, J.), dated November 17, 2023.  The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon an order of the same court dated October 18, 2023, among other things, granting that branch of the cross-petition of Michelle Pfeffer which was pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorney's fees to the extent of awarding her additional attorney's fees in the sum of $500, awarded Michelle Pfeffer additional attorney's fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) in the sum of only $500.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding against Michelle Pfeffer pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to vacate a master arbitration award dated July 26, 2022, affirming an arbitration award entered in favor of Pfeffer.  Pfeffer cross-petitioned, among other things, pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) for an award of additional attorney's fees.  In an order dated October 18, 2023, the Supreme Court denied the petition, confirmed the master arbitration award, and granted that branch of the cross-petition to the extent of awarding Pfeffer additional attorney's fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) in the sum of only $500.  Thereafter, on November 17, 2023, the court, upon the order, issued a judgment, among other things, awarding Pfeffer additional attorney's fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $500.  Pfeffer appeals.

Pursuant to Insurance Law § 5106(a), if a valid claim or portion of a claim for no-fault benefits is overdue, “the claimant shall also be entitled to recover his [or her] attorney's reasonable fee, for services necessarily performed in connection with securing payment of the overdue claim, subject to limitations promulgated by the superintendent in regulations.”  The recoverable attorney's fees include those related to representation in a CPLR article 75 proceeding to vacate or to confirm a master arbitration award, and in such instances, the attorney's fees “shall be fixed by the court adjudicating the matter” (11 NYCRR 65–4.10[j][4];  see Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v. Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 236 A.D.3d 782, 783, 229 N.Y.S.3d 202).

“ ‘The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court’ ” (Hershfield v. Davidoff, 233 A.D.3d 923, 924, 222 N.Y.S.3d 646, quoting Lancer Indem. Co. v. JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 A.D.3d 1035, 1035–1036, 8 N.Y.S.3d 356;  see RMP Capital Corp. v. Victory Jet, LLC, 139 A.D.3d 836, 839–840, 32 N.Y.S.3d 231).  “The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community” (Lancer Indem. Co. v. JKH Realty Group, LLC, 127 A.D.3d at 1036, 8 N.Y.S.3d 356;  see Hershfield v. Davidoff, 233 A.D.3d at 924, 222 N.Y.S.3d 646).

Contrary to Pfeffer's contention, the Supreme Court acted within its discretion in awarding her additional attorney's fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) in the sum of $500 without first conducting a hearing (see People's United Bank v. Patio Gardens III, LLC, 143 A.D.3d 689, 691, 38 N.Y.S.3d 262).  As an initial matter, since Pfeffer failed to submit an affirmation or an affidavit in support of her cross-petition, inter alia, describing the nature of the work performed and the amount of time expended on the matter, it was within the court's discretion to determine a reasonable amount of attorney's fees (see TY Bldrs. II, Inc. v. 55 Day Spa, Inc., 167 A.D.3d 679, 682, 90 N.Y.S.3d 47).  Moreover, Pfeffer failed to request a hearing on the issue of an award of additional attorney's fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4) (see Sieratzki v. Sieratzki, 8 A.D.3d 552, 554, 779 N.Y.S.2d 507).  Under these circumstances, and given the legislative intent of the no-fault insurance law “to promptly resolve no-fault reimbursements, ‘reduce the burden on the courts and to provide substantial premium savings to New York motorists’ ” (American Tr. Ins. Co. v. Comfort Choice Chiropractic, P.C., 239 A.D.3d 1, 9, 229 N.Y.S.3d 514, quoting Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v. Country–Wide Ins. Co., 25 N.Y.3d 498, 505, 14 N.Y.S.3d 283, 35 N.E.3d 451;  see Matter of Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v. Serio, 100 N.Y.2d 854, 860, 768 N.Y.S.2d 423, 800 N.E.2d 728), the court was not required to conduct a hearing prior to awarding the additional attorney's fees pursuant to 11 NYCRR 65–4.10(j)(4).

Pfeffer's remaining contention is academic in light of our determination.

DUFFY, J.P., MILLER, GOLIA and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.