TASLAKIAN v. TASLAKIAN (2025)

Plaintiff, Sela Batouzian, f/k/a Sela Taslakian, and defendant, Bedros Taslakian, were married in New York on November 6, 2019. (NYSCEF No. 2 at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff and defendant later moved in together in January 2021. (Id. at ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff alleges that after the move-in, defendant carried out multiple acts of physical and offensive conduct against her. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-45.) Plaintiff claims these acts were motivated by animus towards plaintiff's gender. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that defendant secretly recorded her committing intimate acts with another man and disseminated the recording to her family members and friends without her consent. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-61.) The parties settled their divorced in 2024.

Plaintiff raises four causes of action against defendant: (1) disclosure of intimate recording without consent in violation of the New York City Administrative Code § 10-180; (2) unlawful dissemination of an intimate image in violation of New York Civil Rights Law § 52-b (NYCRL); (3) assault in violation of Administrative Code § 10-1101 et seq.; and (4) battery in violation of Administrative Code § 10-1101 et seq.

On this motion, defendant moves under CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (failure to state a cause of action) and (a) (5) (estoppel) to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

A. CPLR 3211 (a) (7)

i. Administrative Code § 10-180 and NYCRL § 52-b (First and Second Causes of Action)

Defendant argues that plaintiff's first and second causes of action should be dismissed because audio recordings are not “intimate images” under Administrative Code § 10-180 and NYCRL § 52-b. (NYSCEF No. 23 at 3-4.)

Plaintiff argues that public policy and the legislative intent behind the Administrative Code and NYCRL suggest that audio recordings, such as the one recorded by defendant, give plaintiff a legally cognizable cause of action. (NYSCEF No. 20 at 5-8.) Plaintiff argues specifically, that the respective Legislatures behind each law intended to mitigate the harm caused by “revenge pornography” and that excluding audio recordings from providing a valid cause of action for victims such as plaintiff would defeat the Legislatures’ intent. (Id.)

Under Administrative Code § 10-180, any individual who suffers harm from the unlawful disclosure of an intimate image has a civil cause of action against the individual who unlawfully discloses the image. Subdivision (a) of Administrative Code § 10-180 defines “intimate image” as “a photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other reproduction of an image of a depicted individual.” (Emphasis added.)

NYCRL § 52-b provides that “[a]ny person depicted in a still or video image, including an image created or altered by digitization, regardless of whether or not the original still or video image was consensually obtained, shall have a cause of action against an individual who, for the purpose of harassing, annoying or alarming such person, disseminated or published, or threatened to disseminate or publish, such still or video image.” (Emphasis added.)

Here, plaintiff represents that defendant disclosed an intimate “audio recording,” not a video image. (NYSCEF No. 19 at ¶ 12, 14.) Although the above statutes permit a private right of action for the unlawful disclosure of an intimate image, they do not cover disclosure of an audio recording. The branch of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's first and second causes of action under is granted.

ii. Assault and Battery Under Administrative Code § 10-1101 et seq. (Third and Fourth Causes of Action)

Defendant argues that plaintiff's claims under Administrative Code § 10-1101 et seq.,— the Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law—should be dismissed. According to defendant, plaintiff alleges only in a conclusory way that defendant committed assault and battery toward plaintiff motivated by animus toward plaintiff's gender. (NYSCEF No. 23 at 5.) Defendant further argues that claims brought under Administrative Code § 10-1101, et seq., “require fact pleading that defendant's purported acts were ‘motivated by gender animus.’ ” (NYSCEF No. 24 at 11.) Defendant also argues that plaintiff's allegation that defendant was “motivated by gender animus” without any actions or statements that indicate gender animus is analogous to alleging that defendant acted recklessly without alleging conduct that evinces recklessness. (NYSCEF No. 25 at 4.)

Plaintiff argues that New York's liberal pleading standards ensure that her complaint has valid causes of action under Administrative Code § 10-1101, et seq. (NYSCEF No. 20 at 8-9.) Plaintiff also argues that her allegations of defendant's behavior sufficiently establish that defendant was motivated by animus towards plaintiff's gender. (Id. at 9-10.)

On a CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion to dismiss, “the court must afford the pleading a liberal construction, accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff or petitioner the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory.” (1650 Broadway Assoc., Inc. v. Sturm, 228 A.D.3d 1, 4, 210 N.Y.S.3d 19 [1st Dept. 2024].)

Administrative Code § 10-1101, et seq., provides a civil cause of action for individuals claiming to be injured by a party who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender. Under Administrative Code § 10-1103, a “crime of violence motivated by gender” refers to “a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender.”

The First Department has discussed the requirements to sufficiently plead “animus” in the context of a case involving rape and sexual assault. (See Breest v. Haggis, 180 A.D.3d 83, 94, 115 N.Y.S.3d 322 [1st Dept. 2019].) There, the First Department stated that “sexual acts [without consent] ․ are a violation of the victim's bodily autonomy and an expression of the perpetrator's contempt for that autonomy.” (Id.) The Court was also careful to note that “other crimes of violence, such as assault, do not inherently involve gender animus and may require additional allegations to fall within VGM.” (Id. at 94 n. 12, 115 N.Y.S.3d 322.)

Plaintiff does not allege that defendant sexually assaulted her—conduct that automatically implies gender animus. (See id. at 94, 115 N.Y.S.3d 322.) This court concludes, however, that plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to support the existence of gender animus. Plaintiff alleges one instance in which she told defendant she was going to visit her parents from a month. (NYSCEF No. 2 at ¶34.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant “started screaming and shouting that he did not get married for Plaintiff to leave him alone for a period of time”; “threatened Plaintiff stating that if she thought that Defendant would allow Plaintiff to be away from him for a month, that ‘[Plaintiff] did not know [Defendant]’ ”; “ripped off his shirt and shouted that Plaintiff ‘was an animal’ ”; and then tried to punch plaintiff. (NYSCEF No. 2 at ¶¶35-38.) She alleges another instance when she asked defendant whether she should prepare dinner, and defendant threw a glass cup at her. (Id. at ¶¶20-23.)

The branch of defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action is denied.

B. CPLR 3211 (a) (5)

In the alternative, defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action on estoppel grounds.

Defendant contends that plaintiff should be equitably estopped from bringing these claims. Defendant claims he believed that plaintiff would bring no further claims against him and therefore, because of that, he agreed to the parties’ divorce settlement. The court is unpersuaded that plaintiff's decision to file the summons in this action while the divorce proceeding was pending is, alone, indicative of an intent to “dupe” defendant into settling the divorce action. (NYSCEF No. 17 at 14; see Wallace v. BSD-M Realty, LLC, 142 A.D.3d 701, 703, 36 N.Y.S.3d 884 [2d Dept. 2016] [“The elements of [equitable] estoppel are, with respect to the party estopped, ‘(1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) intention that such conduct will be acted upon by the other party; and (3) knowledge of the real facts.”] [internal quotation marks omitted].)

Additionally, defendant has neither alleged that he relied on a misrepresentation nor explained why defendant would be required to inform him that she was bringing this action before they settled the divorce. (See Wallace, 142 A.D.3d at 703, 36 N.Y.S.3d 884 [“The party asserting estoppel must show with respect to [itself]: (1) lack of knowledge of the true facts; (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) a prejudicial change in [its] position.”] [internal quotation marks omitted].) And defendant has not shown that the divorce settlement covered claims already pending between the parties in other forums.

Defendant further contends that judicial estoppel should preclude plaintiff's claims. But that “doctrine applies only where the party secured a judgment in his or her favor in the prior proceeding.” (Archer v. Beach Car Serv., Inc., 180 A.D.3d 857, 861, 120 N.Y.S.3d 98 [2d Dept. 2020].) Plaintiff did not secure a judgment in her favor. She both withdrew her family offense petition, and the parties settled their divorce.

Finally, to the extent defendant seeks, as alternative relief, summary judgment dismissing the complaint, that request is denied. Defendant does not put forth arguments on this basis. (See NYSCEF No. 17.)

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion to dismiss the third and fourth causes of action is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties appear for a telephonic preliminary conference on October 1, 2025; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on defendant and on the office of the County Clerk (using the NYSCEF document type “Notice to the County Clerk - CPLR § 8019 (c)”), which shall enter judgment accordingly.

Gerald Lebovits, J.