OLIVEIRA v. ROCKAWAY VILLAGE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT FUND CORPORATION (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Robert I. Caloras, J.), dated March 22, 2022.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 and so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(e)(2).

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 and so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(e)(2) are denied.

In May 2020, the plaintiff, an employee of RC Structures, allegedly was injured on a construction site when he purportedly tripped over a shovel.  The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, Rockaway Village Housing Development Fund Corporation, the owner of the property, and Lettire Construction Corp., the general contractor overseeing the construction project, alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6).  The defendants moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 and so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(e)(2).  In an order dated March 22, 2022, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of the defendants’ motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“Labor Law § 241(6) imposes on owners and contractors a nondelegable duty to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to persons employed in, or lawfully frequenting, all areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed” (Bayron Chay Mo v. Ultra Dimension Place, LLC, 236 A.D.3d 721, 723, 229 N.Y.S.3d 504 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Martinez v. Shore Oaks, LLC, 235 A.D.3d 959, 960, 227 N.Y.S.3d 705).  “To establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff or a claimant must demonstrate that his [or her] injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable under the circumstances of the case” (Bayron Chay Mo v. Ultra Dimension Place, LLC, 236 A.D.3d at 723, 229 N.Y.S.3d 504 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Graziano v. Source Bldrs. & Consultants, LLC, 175 A.D.3d 1253, 1258, 109 N.Y.S.3d 115).

Here, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(e)(2).  The defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether they violated 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(e)(2) by allegedly permitting an accumulation of debris, dirt, scattered tools, and materials (see Velasquez v. RS JZ Driggs, LLC, 232 A.D.3d 700, 700–701, 221 N.Y.S.3d 210).  Additionally, contrary to the defendants’ contentions, their submissions in support of their motion for summary judgment, including a transcript of the plaintiff's deposition testimony, failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the shovel that allegedly caused the accident was an “integral part” of the work the plaintiff was completing at the time of the accident (O'Sullivan v. IDI Constr. Co., Inc., 7 N.Y.3d 805, 806, 822 N.Y.S.2d 745, 855 N.E.2d 1159;  see Murphy v. 80 Pine, LLC, 208 A.D.3d 492, 497, 173 N.Y.S.3d 552).

The Supreme Court also erred in granting those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200.  Labor Law § 200 is a “codification of the common-law duty of owners, contractors, and their agents to provide workers with a safe place to work” (Southerton v. City of New York, 203 A.D.3d 977, 979, 164 N.Y.S.3d 661 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Doto v. Astoria Energy II, LLC, 129 A.D.3d 660, 663, 11 N.Y.S.3d 201).  “Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories, namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site, and those involving the manner in which the work is performed” (Southerton v. City of New York, 203 A.D.3d at 979–980, 164 N.Y.S.3d 661 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Torres v. City of New York, 127 A.D.3d 1163, 1165, 7 N.Y.S.3d 539).  As relevant here, “[w]here a plaintiff's injuries arise not from the manner in which the work was performed, but from a dangerous condition on the premises, a defendant may be liable under Labor Law § 200 if it either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition” (Ramos v. Kent & Wythe Owners, LLC, 236 A.D.3d 693, 697, 229 N.Y.S.3d 462 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Hamm v. Review Assoc., LLC, 202 A.D.3d 934, 938, 163 N.Y.S.3d 223).

Here, the plaintiff's accident arose from an allegedly dangerous condition on the premises, not the manner in which the work was performed.  The defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they did not have constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition that caused the plaintiff's accident (see Ramos v. Kent & Wythe Owners, LLC, 236 A.D.3d 693, 229 N.Y.S.3d 462;  Chuqui v. Amna, LLC, 203 A.D.3d 1018, 1022, 166 N.Y.S.3d 192).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 and so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(e)(2).

CHAMBERS, J.P., WOOTEN, WARHIT and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.