TOLEDO v. PASCAL (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Peter P. Sweeney, J.), dated February 23, 2023.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging common-law negligence and dismissing the defendants’ sixth and eighth affirmative defenses.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when a vehicle he was driving was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant Raul Pascal (hereinafter the defendant driver) and owned by the defendant Almeida Concrete Pumping and Equipment, Inc. The plaintiff moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging common-law negligence and dismissing the defendants’ sixth and eighth affirmative defenses, which alleged, respectively, that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that he was comparatively negligent.  In an order dated February 23, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion.  The defendants appeal.

A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a];  Grecco v. Altice USA, Inc., 230 A.D.3d 655, 656, 216 N.Y.S.3d 694;  Ordonez v. Lee, 177 A.D.3d 756, 757, 110 N.Y.S.3d 339).  Thus, a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle (see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726;  Martin v. Copado–Esquivel, 226 A.D.3d 668, 669, 209 N.Y.S.3d 83;  Yawagyentsang v. Safeway Constr. Enters., LLC, 225 A.D.3d 827, 827, 207 N.Y.S.3d 608).  A sudden stop of the lead vehicle may constitute a nonnegligent explanation for a rear-end collision (see Quinones v. Grace Indus., LLC, 219 A.D.3d 765, 766, 194 N.Y.S.3d 314;  Harding v. Royal Waste Servs., Inc., 208 A.D.3d 762, 763, 174 N.Y.S.3d 414), but vehicle stops that are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden, must be anticipated by the driver who follows (see Yawagyentsang v. Safeway Constr. Enters., LLC, 225 A.D.3d at 828, 207 N.Y.S.3d 608;  Mahmud v. Feng Ouyang, 208 A.D.3d 861, 861–862, 174 N.Y.S.3d 721).

Here, in support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted his own affidavit, which established, prima facie, that the defendant driver was negligent when his vehicle struck the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle, which was stopped at a red traffic light, and that the plaintiff was not comparatively negligent in the happening of the accident (see Yawagyentsang v. Safeway Constr. Enters., LLC, 225 A.D.3d at 828, 207 N.Y.S.3d 608;  Mahmud v. Feng Ouyang, 208 A.D.3d at 862, 174 N.Y.S.3d 721;  Newfeld v. Midwood Ambulance & Oxygen Serv., Inc., 204 A.D.3d 813, 814, 164 N.Y.S.3d 497;  Grier–Key v. Lyons, 195 A.D.3d 798, 799, 145 N.Y.S.3d 819).  In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the defendant driver's claim that the plaintiff suddenly stopped as the light changed from yellow to red, after having partially entered the intersection, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants had a nonnegligent explanation for the accident or whether the plaintiff negligently contributed to the accident (see Yawagyentsang v. Safeway Constr. Enters., LLC, 225 A.D.3d at 828, 207 N.Y.S.3d 608;  Mahmud v. Feng Ouyang, 208 A.D.3d at 862, 174 N.Y.S.3d 721;  Parshina v. Celestin, 146 A.D.3d 791, 792, 45 N.Y.S.3d 157;  Cheow v. Cheng Lin Jin, 121 A.D.3d 1058, 1059, 995 N.Y.S.2d 186).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging common-law negligence and dismissing the defendants’ sixth and eighth affirmative defenses.

DUFFY, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WARHIT and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.