HARRIS v. RCH HOLDINGS LLC (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Michael G. Hayes, J.), dated September 25, 2024.  The order denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained at the defendant's premises when the ladder he was using moved, causing him to fall.  At his deposition, the plaintiff testified, among other things, that the ladder moved due to the presence of holes and cracks in the concrete floor.  The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that there was no dangerous or defective condition in the area of the concrete floor where the plaintiff fell from the ladder and that if there was such a condition, it was trivial and not actionable.  Additionally, the defendant argued that it had no notice of any dangerous or defective condition in that area of the floor.  The plaintiff opposed the motion.  In an order dated September 25, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the motion.  The defendant appeals.

“In order for a landowner to be liable in tort to a plaintiff who is injured as a result of an allegedly defective condition upon property, it must be established that a defective condition existed and that the landowner affirmatively created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of its existence” (Lezama v. 34–15 Parsons Blvd, LLC, 16 A.D.3d 560, 560, 792 N.Y.S.2d 123;  see Wilks v. City of New York, 144 A.D.3d 673, 674, 40 N.Y.S.3d 504).  “[W]hether a dangerous or defective condition exists on the property of another so as to create liability depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case and is generally a question of fact for the jury” (Trincere v. County of Suffolk, 90 N.Y.2d 976, 977, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d 489 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Toro v. McComish, 227 A.D.3d 1120, 1120, 212 N.Y.S.3d 192).  Additionally, “while injuries resulting from trivial defects are generally not actionable” (Sanna v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 271 A.D.2d 595, 595, 706 N.Y.S.2d 156), “[a] defendant seeking dismissal of a complaint on the basis that the alleged defect is trivial must make a prima facie showing that the defect is, under the circumstances, physically insignificant and that the characteristics of the defect or the surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it poses” (Hutchinson v. Sheridan Hill House Corp., 26 N.Y.3d 66, 79, 19 N.Y.S.3d 802, 41 N.E.3d 766;  see Tamburo v. Long Is. Univ., 229 A.D.3d 828, 829, 216 N.Y.S.3d 232).

Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that there was no dangerous or defective condition in the area of the concrete floor where the accident occurred (see Voloshin v. Trump Vil. Section 3, Inc., 209 A.D.3d 797, 798, 174 N.Y.S.3d 902) or that any such condition was trivial and, therefore, not actionable as a matter of law (see Hutchinson v. Sheridan Hill House Corp., 26 N.Y.3d at 82–83, 19 N.Y.S.3d 802, 41 N.E.3d 766;  Voloshin v. Trump Vil. Section 3, Inc., 209 A.D.3d at 798, 174 N.Y.S.3d 902).  Further, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not have actual or constructive notice of a dangerous or defective condition in that area (see Cummins v. New York Methodist Hosp., 85 A.D.3d 1082, 1083, 926 N.Y.S.2d 313;  Scala v. Port Jefferson Free Lib., 255 A.D.2d 574, 574, 681 N.Y.S.2d 77).

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.

Accordingly, since the defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court properly denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).

BARROS, J.P., CHAMBERS, WARHIT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.