MCWILLIAMS v. THOMSEN (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Charles D. Wood, J.), dated September 25, 2023.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint and denied, as academic, the plaintiff's cross-motion, among other things, to compel discovery.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In March 2023, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, a former caseworker with the Cortland County Department of Social Services (hereinafter DSS) who had been part of an investigation of the plaintiff regarding the alleged abuse of children in the plaintiff's custody, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation in connection with statements made by the defendant at a hearing before an administrative law judge.  The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, that his actions as a caseworker were protected by the immunity afforded by Social Services Law § 419.  The plaintiff cross-moved, inter alia, to compel discovery of information regarding the defendant's financial arrangement with his attorneys.  In an order dated September 25, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion as academic.  The plaintiff appeals.

“On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court must give the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged therein as true, provide the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Pascall v. New York City Tr. Auth., 230 A.D.3d 1246, 1247, 219 N.Y.S.3d 116 [internal quotations marks omitted];  see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87–88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511).  However, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions and factual claims that are inherently incredible are not entitled to a favorable inference (see Browne v. Lyft, Inc., 219 A.D.3d 445, 446, 194 N.Y.S.3d 85;  Everett v. Eastchester Police Dept., 127 A.D.3d 1131, 1132, 8 N.Y.S.3d 360).  “ ‘The ultimate question is whether, accepting the allegations and affording these inferences, [the] plaintiff can succeed upon any reasonable view of the facts stated’ ” (Perez v. Y & M Transp. Corp., 219 A.D.3d 1449, 1450–1451, 196 N.Y.S.3d 145 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Doe v. Bloomberg L.P., 36 N.Y.3d 450, 454, 143 N.Y.S.3d 286, 167 N.E.3d 454).  “Dismissal is ‘warranted if the plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of the claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery’ ” (Browne v. Lyft, Inc., 219 A.D.3d at 446, 194 N.Y.S.3d 85, quoting Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 N.Y.3d 137, 142, 53 N.Y.S.3d 598, 75 N.E.3d 1159).

Here, the complaint and the exhibits thereto demonstrate that the defendant had been a caseworker employed by DSS and that, in that capacity and as a result of a call to DSS by the police, the defendant, among others, investigated the plaintiff and testified at a hearing in February 2023, which is the subject of the complaint.  Accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and affording a liberal reading of the complaint in view of the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant (see Oluwo v. Mills, 228 A.D.3d 879, 880, 214 N.Y.S.3d 75;  MTGLQ Invs., L.P. v. Makhnevich, 201 A.D.3d 931, 932, 157 N.Y.S.3d 746), the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to rebut the presumption of immunity afforded the defendant pursuant to Social Services Law § 419 (see id. §§ 413[1];  424;  Gentile v. Wegman, 212 A.D.3d 409, 179 N.Y.S.3d 568;  Matter of Bonilla v. Town of Hempstead, 131 A.D.3d 1166, 16 N.Y.S.3d 594;  Isabelle V. v. City of New York, 150 A.D.2d 312, 313, 541 N.Y.S.2d 809).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint and denied, as academic, the plaintiff's cross-motion, among other things, to compel discovery.

BARROS, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.