PEOPLE v. SHEEHAN (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County (Kevin Dooley, J.), rendered February 22, 2022, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

Defendant was charged in a seven-count indictment with various weapon- and drug-related offenses.  Following the appointment of a special prosecutor, the assignment of new defense counsel and various pretrial motions and hearings, defendant was afforded the opportunity to plead guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree with the understanding that he would be sentenced, as a second violent felony offender, to a prison term of seven years, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision, upon his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and to a lesser, concurrent sentence upon the remaining conviction.  The plea agreement also required defendant to waive his right to appeal.  Defendant pleaded guilty in conformity with the agreement, and the matter was adjourned for sentencing.  Following an unsuccessful pro se motion to withdraw his plea and an application for a writ of habeas corpus, County Court imposed the agreed-upon sentence, and this appeal ensued.

We affirm.  To the extent that defendant's amended pro se supplemental brief may be read as challenging the validity of his waiver of the right to appeal, we find such claim to be unpersuasive.  Although the written waiver executed by defendant contained some overbroad language, both the written waiver itself, which defendant confirmed he had reviewed with counsel and understood, and County Court's oral waiver colloquy explained the separate and distinct nature of the waiver and made clear that defendant nonetheless retained certain appellate rights.  Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that defendant understood that some appellate review survived the appeal waiver and that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to appeal (see People v. Lewis, 234 A.D.3d 1209, 1209–1210, 225 N.Y.S.3d 779 [3d Dept. 2025], lv denied 43 N.Y.3d 1009, 234 N.Y.S.3d 818, 261 N.E.3d 953 [2025];  People v. Morse, 230 A.D.3d 1471, 1472, 218 N.Y.S.3d 850 [3d Dept. 2024];  People v. Baker, 221 A.D.3d 1198, 1198–1199, 200 N.Y.S.3d 153 [3d Dept. 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 1091, 204 N.Y.S.3d 787, 228 N.E.3d 600 [2024];  People v. Gincerowski, 205 A.D.3d 1152, 1153, 165 N.Y.S.3d 918 [3d Dept. 2022]).

In light of the valid appeal waiver, defendant's assertion that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial (see CPL 30.30) is precluded (see People v. Berry, 236 A.D.3d 1199, 1201 n., 229 N.Y.S.3d 692 [3d Dept. 2025];  People v. Lewis, 234 A.D.3d at 1210, 225 N.Y.S.3d 779;  People v. Sitts, 232 A.D.3d 995, 996, 221 N.Y.S.3d 352 [3d Dept. 2024];  People v. Wint, 222 A.D.3d 1050, 1051, 201 N.Y.S.3d 544 [3d Dept. 2023], lv denied 41 N.Y.3d 945, 206 N.Y.S.3d 248, 229 N.E.3d 1141 [2024];  People v. Dennis, 206 A.D.3d 1369, 1371, 168 N.Y.S.3d 905 [3d Dept. 2022]).  Defendant's related argument – that the People failed to comply with certain discovery demands and, hence, their certificate of compliance was illusory – “was forfeited by defendant's unchallenged guilty plea” (People v. Berry, 236 A.D.3d at 1200, 229 N.Y.S.3d 692;  see People v. MacLean, 226 A.D.3d 1178, 1180 n. 1, 209 N.Y.S.3d 213 [3d Dept. 2024], lv denied 41 N.Y.3d 1019, 214 N.Y.S.3d 324, 237 N.E.3d 1263 [2024];  People v. Smith, 217 A.D.3d 1578, 1578, 190 N.Y.S.3d 557 [4th Dept. 2023]).  Finally, defendant's claim that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial is unpreserved for our review, as none of the various motions filed in this matter were predicated upon this ground (see People v. Fisher, 221 A.D.3d 1355, 1359, 201 N.Y.S.3d 539 [3d Dept. 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 1092, 204 N.Y.S.3d 788, 228 N.E.3d 602 [2024];  People v. Persaud, 219 A.D.3d 983, 985, 194 N.Y.S.3d 820 [3d Dept. 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 998, 197 N.Y.S.3d 120, 219 N.E.3d 881 [2023];  People v. Rivera, 201 A.D.3d 1132, 1134, 159 N.Y.S.3d 760 [3d Dept. 2022];  People v. Votaw, 190 A.D.3d 1162, 1164, 139 N.Y.S.3d 455 [3d Dept. 2021], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1101, 144 N.Y.S.3d 127, 167 N.E.3d 1262 [2021]).  In any event, much of the approximately 13–month delay here can be attributed to extensive motion practice, various pretrial hearings, the appointment of a special prosecutor, the appointment of new counsel for defendant and delays occasioned by the COVID–19 pandemic (see People v. Hatch, 230 A.D.3d 908, 914, 217 N.Y.S.3d 283 [3d Dept. 2024], lv denied 42 N.Y.3d 1020, 221 N.Y.S.3d 495, 246 N.E.3d 938 [2024]).  Hence, were we to address this issue, we would find – upon due consideration of the relevant factors (see People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303 [1975]) – that defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.  Defendant's remaining arguments, to the extent not specifically addressed, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Mackey, J.

Garry, P.J., Pritzker, McShan and Powers, JJ., concur.