MCMILLIAN v. CREST HOLLOW COUNTRY CLUB AT WOODBURY INC (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Crest Hollow Country Club at Woodbury, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Rhonda E. Fischer, J.), entered January 30, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of that defendant's cross-motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first amended complaint insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when a chair broke underneath her at a wedding reception.  The defendant Crest Hollow Country Club at Woodbury, Inc. (hereinafter Crest Hollow), cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the first amended complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground, among others, that the plaintiff's conduct in sitting down in the chair, after previously complaining about the chair being unsteady, superseded any potential negligence on Crest Hollow's part.  By order entered January 30, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied that branch of Crest Hollow's cross-motion.  Crest Hollow appeals.

“[A]n injured party's own reckless and extraordinary conduct can constitute ‘an intervening and superseding event which severs any causal nexus between the occurrence of the accident and any alleged negligence on the part of the defendants’ ” (Tisdell v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 139 A.D.3d 844, 846, 30 N.Y.S.3d 701, quoting Lynch v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 82 A.D.3d 716, 717, 917 N.Y.S.2d 685).  To sever the causal connection between a defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries, a superseding act must be “ ‘extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant's conduct’ ” (Kriz v. Schum, 75 N.Y.2d 25, 36, 550 N.Y.S.2d 584, 549 N.E.2d 1155, quoting Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666;  see Beier v. Giglio, 230 A.D.3d 733, 734, 215 N.Y.S.3d 527;  Jones v. Saint Rita's R.C. Church, 187 A.D.3d 727, 729, 133 N.Y.S.3d 40).  “Whether a plaintiff's act is a superseding cause or whether it is a normal consequence of the situation created by a defendant are typically questions to be determined by the trier of fact” (Dumbadze v. Schwatt, 291 A.D.2d 529, 529, 739 N.Y.S.2d 399;  see Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d at 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 414 N.E.2d 666).

Here, the evidence submitted by Crest Hollow in support of its cross-motion failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff's conduct was an unforeseeable superseding event absolving Crest Hollow of liability (see Beier v. Giglio, 230 A.D.3d at 734, 215 N.Y.S.3d 527;  Reilly v. Patchogue Props., Inc., 203 A.D.3d 765, 164 N.Y.S.3d 179;  Dumbadze v. Schwatt, 291 A.D.2d at 529, 739 N.Y.S.2d 399).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Crest Hollow's cross-motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the first amended complaint insofar as asserted against it, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).

DILLON, J.P., CHAMBERS, VENTURA and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.