An Individual Described Herein by the Pseudonym, "Jane Doe," individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ABC CORPS 10 JOHN DOES 10 JANE DOES 10 (2025)

The following numbered papers were read on these motions: NYSCEF Doc Nos. 2-6, 9, 12-29, 31-35.

Upon the foregoing papers and having heard oral argument on the record, the within motion is determined as follows.

Background

This action was commenced pursuant to the New York City Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law, now codified at Administrative Code of the City of New York § 10-1101 et seq. Plaintiff moves for an order permitting her to proceed in this case anonymously:

1. pursuant to Civil Rights Law 50-b and the New York City Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-901 et seq., permitting the moving Plaintiff to proceed in this case anonymously by using a pseudonym in her publicly filed documents; and

2. requiring that in any publicly filed court papers, the parties refer to the moving Plaintiff by her pseudonym and refrain from otherwise disclosing the identity of the Plaintiff to anyone other than her attorneys (NYSCEF Doc No. 18 at 1-2).

Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually assaulted, abused, and harassed by Defendant Shneur Zalman Osdoba in her childhood home starting when she was ten years old and continuing through her teenage years. Plaintiff recalls an instance where Defendant Osdoba placed both of his hands around her neck, squeezing it, and choking her. Plaintiff states that she feels threatened by Defendant Osdoba after she confronted him about the abuse she suffered and alleges that he spread misinformation about her within her community.

Plaintiff argues that the public identification of her as a victim and/or survivor of sexual abuse and sexual assault would exacerbate the emotional and psychological harm she has already suffered and/or may result in physical harm to Plaintiff by Defendants. Defendant Osdoba opposes the motion, arguing that he will be prejudiced if Plaintiff's motion is granted.

Discussion

As discussed by this Court in JA-504 Doe v Diocese of Brooklyn (81 Misc 3d 1226[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50010[U], *1 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2024]), "[i]t is well established law in New York that survivors of sexual abuse may prosecute their actions anonymously due to the highly sensitive nature of the action's content." In determining whether anonymity is appropriate, courts must engage in a balancing test: weighing plaintiff's privacy interest against the presumption in favor of open trials and against any potential prejudice to the defendant (see Doe v Khandker, 221 AD3d 782, 782 [2d Dept 2023], quoting Roe v Harborfields Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 AD3d 853, 855 [2d Dept 2023]).

" 'Among the factors the court should consider are 1) whether the plaintiff is challenging governmental activity or an individual's actions, 2) whether the plaintiff's action requires disclosure of information of the utmost intimacy, 3) whether identification would put the plaintiff [or innocent third-parties] at risk of suffering physical or mental injury, 4) whether the defendant would be prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to proceed anonymously, and 5) the public interest in guaranteeing open access to proceedings without denying litigants access to the justice system' (Roe v Harborfields Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 AD3d at 855 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see PB-7 Doe v Amherst Cent. Sch. Dist., 196 AD3d at 13; Doe v MacFarland, 66 Misc 3d 604 [Sup Ct, Rockland County 2019]; Doe No. 2 v Kolko, 242 FRD 193, 195 [ED NY 2006])" (Doe v Khandker, 221 AD3d at 782-783).

Insofar as the first factor is concerned — whether the plaintiff is challenging governmental activity or an individual's actions — this matter does not challenge a governmental activity and, therefore, does not implicate a public interest. The second factor — whether the plaintiff's action requires disclosure of information of the utmost intimacy — is met by the very nature of the allegations against Defendant Osdoba, as it pertains to an alleged sexual assault and, therefore, is a personal and sensitive subject matter.

In assessing the third factor — whether identification would put the plaintiff — at risk of suffering physical or mental injury, this Court relies upon the affidavit submitted by Plaintiff, where she stated she is fearful that further psychological, emotional, and physical harm would ensue. Plaintiff has clearly expressed her feelings regarding her concerns of her name becoming public. Plaintiff's position is supported by the affirmation of Lisa Rosenblatt, LCSW, who avers, inter alia,

In conclusion, maintaining my client's anonymity is essential to her well-being and healing. Public exposure would not only retraumatize her but also significantly worsen her anxiety, self-worth, and emotional stability. Given her current psychological state, there is a serious concern that such distress could lead to suicidal ideation. She does not have the psychological resilience to endure the harm that would come from having her name publicized. To a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, revealing her identity would cause profound and lasting harm. Protecting her privacy is not just a matter of comfort—it is a necessity for her safety and recovery. (NYSCEF Doc No. 28 11.)

Ms. Rosenblatt present's a compelling analysis of what might very well transpire should the public circulation of Plaintiff's name occur.

Regarding the fifth factor, the public interest in guaranteeing open access to proceedings would not be impeded because the public will still have access to the records for the case; Plaintiff's name would simply appear as "Plaintiff" or "Jane Doe" to protect her identity.

The fourth factor — whether the defendant would be prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to proceed anonymously — is probably the most contentious. Defendant Osdoba argues that he would be prejudiced by allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously. Defendant Osdoba states Plaintiff does not live in the community in which she has commenced this legal proceeding and finds it ironic that Plaintiff is worried about the community exerting pressure on her if her name were to become public, as she had no reservations about naming Defendant Osdoba. He argues that allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously while he is named in the lawsuit places him at a severe disadvantage because he will be required to defend himself in a public forum. Defendant Osdoba cites to case law, including Doe v Shakur (164 FRD 359, 361 [SD NY 1996]), which noted that lawsuits are public events and the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the parties and facts. A plaintiff should be permitted to proceed anonymously only in exceptional circumstances, argues Defendant Osdoba, citing Doe v Frank (951 F2d 320, 323 [11th Cir 1992]). Defendant Osdoba contends that allowing Plaintiff to remain anonymous will create an imbalance in the case where he will have to face scrutiny from the public, while Plaintiff would not.

Additionally, Defendant Osdoba disputes Plaintiff's reliance on Civil Rights Law § 50-b, arguing that it is inapplicable to this matter, as Plaintiff has not provided enough evidence to prove that she is a victim of a sexual offense. Civil Rights Law § 50-b provides in pertinent part, "[t]he identity of any victim of a sex offense, as defined in article one hundred thirty or section 255.25, 255.26 or 255.27 of the penal law . . . shall be confidential. No report, paper, picture, photograph, court file or other documents, in the custody or possession of any public officer or employee, which identifies such victim shall be made available for public inspection. No such public officer or employee shall disclose any portion of any police report, court file, or other document, which tends to identify such a victim except as provided in subdivision two of this section." Based on the plain language of the statute, however, this argument is rejected.

Defendant Osdoba argues that Plaintiff's claims of suffering emotional distress are conclusory and do not support her motion to proceed anonymously. Defendant Osdoba goes on to further state that even if she substantiated her claims with factual support, her concern over her mental and physical injuries are insufficient to warrant anonymity, citing to Doe v Hirsch (2011 NY Slip Op 30689 [Sup Ct, NY County 2011]).

This Court finds that Defendant Osdoba's protestations against Plaintiff proceeding anonymously must be subordinate to the interests of Plaintiff, who likely will be traumatized by further public exposure. Defendant Osdoba can adequately defend himself because from his and his family's affirmations it is evident that the community in which the abuse allegedly occurred is already aware of Plaintiff's identity. Thus, to the extent that he needs to procure evidence that might cast doubt on Plaintiff's claims, he will be able to do so. Presently, Defendant Osdoba has not demonstrated prejudice. As this action proceeds, in the event that Defendant Osdoba shows an actual demonstrated impediment to defending himself by virtue of Plaintiff's proceeding anonymously, he can move accordingly. But, as of now, this Court sees no impediment.

Basically, Defendant Osdoba's argument is that since his name is public, which is embarrassing, Plaintiff should be compelled to suffer the same embarrassing exposure. The Court gleans this from Defendant Osdoba's memorandum of law, in which it is argued that "allowing the Plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym . . . would conceal her identity and diminish the reputational risks typically associated with such proceedings" (NYSCEF Doc No. 34 at 15). In other words, Plaintiff should suffer the risks to her reputation from commencing this action, just as Defendant Osdoba "has been made to feel shame" and "has experienced loss of professional goodwill" (id. at 14). This is a callous argument propounded by Defendant Osdoba and certainly one not legally cognizable.

Contrary to Defendant Osdoba's arguments, Plaintiff's claims are sufficient to warrant anonymity, as the potential injury to her emotional stability warrants anonymity; this is so even if there is no threat of physical harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's interest in remaining anonymous outweighs Defendant's concerns.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED TO THE FOLLOWING EXTENT: (1) Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in this case anonymously by using the pseudonym "Jane Doe" in her publicly filed documents; (2) in any publicly filed court papers the parties shall refer to Plaintiff by her pseudonym "Jane Doe"; and (3) the parties themselves shall not disclose the identity of Plaintiff to anyone but the parties' attorneys and medical witnesses. This granted relief differs slightly from that sought by Plaintiff in order to clarify that that Plaintiff's identity may be disclosed to one's attorneys and to enable Defendant Osdoba's medical expert to examine Plaintiff regarding alleged injuries.

Aaron D. Maslow, J.