PEOPLE v. TURNER (2025)

The defendant moves to be sentenced under the Domestic Violence Survivor's Act (see PL § 60.12). The Act allows courts to impose reduced alternative sentences in certain cases involving domestic violence.

Briefly, the People alleged that the defendant and his paramour — Ms Washington — had a dispute and that Ms Washington threw the defendant out of her apartment. Later that evening, defendant somehow gained entry back into the apartment and found Ms Washington in bed with a new paramour. The defendant stabbed the new paramour and fled. The People oppose defendant's motion.

“The language of the DV Survivor's Act clearly and unambiguously sets forth three factors for a court to consider, namely: (1) whether the defendant was a victim of domestic violence inflicted by a member of the same family or household; (2) whether the abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior; and (3) whether, having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character, and condition of the defendant, a sentence in accordance with the customary statutory sentencing guidelines would be unduly harsh” (People v Addimando, 197 AD3d 106. 111 [NY App Div 2021]).

Here, defendant's motion fails, on its face, at factor two. By defendant's pleadings, whatever abuse he suffered can not have been a significant contributing factor to his criminal behavior, because according to defendant, he is not guilty. In both his pre-sentence interview with probation, and in papers attached as exhibits to his own motion, the defendant declares his innocence and blames the crime on his former paramour Ms Washington.

“The legislative history [of PL § 60.12] reveals that the statute sought to address harsh punishment received by victims of domestic violence who commit crimes against their abusers” (see Addmiando, supra at 112). Here, according to defendant, he committed no crime against his abuser ¹ .

We, therefore, conclude that defendant has not raised any factual issues to be resolved at the hearing he seeks, and accordingly deny his motion (see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 [1993]; People v Hernandez, 236 AD3d 530 [1st Dept 2025]).

FOOTNOTES

1.   While courts have held that PL § 60.12 may cover criminal acts fueld by domestic abuse against a third party (see People v Burns, 207 AD3d 646 [2nd Dept 2022]) the enquiry is, obviously, very fact specific. Accordingly, this Court need not reach the question presented by these facts — ie if the Act applies when the abusee surreptitiously gains entry to the abuser's domicile in the dead of night and stabs the abuser's new paramour.

Eugene M. Guarino, J.