PEOPLE v. ARCHIBALD (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Danny K. Chun, J.), both rendered April 25, 2022, convicting him of grand larceny in the third degree under Indictment No. 5090/19, and grand larceny in the fourth degree and immigrant assistance services fraud in the first degree under Superior Court Information No. 71767/22, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.

ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.

The defendant pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the third degree under Indictment No. 5090/19, and grand larceny in the fourth degree and immigrant assistance services fraud in the first degree under Superior Court Information No. 71767/22, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of probation.  The Supreme Court imposed a condition of probation requiring the defendant to support his dependents and meet other family responsibilities (hereinafter Condition No. 14), as well as a condition of probation requiring the defendant to consent to a search by a probation officer of his person, vehicle, and place of abode (when such place of abode is legally under his control), and the seizure of any illegal drugs, drug paraphernalia, gun/firearm, or other weapon or contraband found during the search (hereinafter Condition No. 28).  The defendant appeals.

“Pursuant to Penal Law § 65.10(1), the conditions of probation ‘shall be such as the court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him [or her] to do so’ ” (People v. Mensah, 221 A.D.3d 732, 733, 199 N.Y.S.3d 637;  see People v. Mantilla, 236 A.D.3d 925, 229 N.Y.S.3d 600).  “In Penal Law § 65.10(2), the Legislature set forth a list of conditions intended as rehabilitative” (People v. Joseph D., 226 A.D.3d 922, 923, 209 N.Y.S.3d 516;  see People v. Hakes, 32 N.Y.3d 624, 629, 94 N.Y.S.3d 221, 118 N.E.3d 883), including the condition that a defendant “[s]upport his [or her] dependents and meet other family responsibilities” (Penal Law § 65.10[2][f]).  The statutory list “does not purport to be complete, nor must every requirement be imposed in every case” (People v. Hale, 93 N.Y.2d 454, 461, 692 N.Y.S.2d 649, 714 N.E.2d 861).  Thus, Penal Law § 65.10(2) also includes “a catchall provision which allow[s] ․ courts to set ‘any other conditions reasonably related to [the defendant's] rehabilitation’ ” (People v. Hakes, 32 N.Y.3d at 629, 94 N.Y.S.3d 221, 118 N.E.3d 883, quoting Penal Law § 65.10[2][l]).  “Sentencing courts may also impose conditions ‘requir[ing] that the defendant comply with any other reasonable condition [as the court shall determine to be] necessary or appropriate to ameliorate the conduct which gave rise to the offense or to prevent the incarceration of the defendant’ ” (People v. Brazeal, 235 A.D.3d 890, 891–892, 227 N.Y.S.3d 700 [alteration omitted], quoting Penal Law § 65.10[5]).  “Therefore, sentencing courts may require a defendant to consent to searches by his or her probation officer for weapons or other contraband, so long as the condition is ‘reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation, or necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life’ ” (People v. Mantilla, 236 A.D.3d at 926, 229 N.Y.S.3d 600, quoting People v. Mensah, 221 A.D.3d at 733, 199 N.Y.S.3d 637;  see People v. Hale, 93 N.Y.2d at 461, 692 N.Y.S.2d 649, 714 N.E.2d 861).  “To satisfy this standard, courts must ensure that the condition is ‘individually tailored in relation to the offense’ (People v. Dranchuk, 203 A.D.3d 741, 743, 160 N.Y.S.3d 653) and the defendant's particular circumstances, including his or her ‘background, history, and proclivities’ (People v. Hale, 93 N.Y.2d at 461, 692 N.Y.S.2d 649, 714 N.E.2d 861)” (People v. Mantilla, 236 A.D.3d at 926, 229 N.Y.S.3d 600;  see People v. Brazeal, 235 A.D.3d at 892, 227 N.Y.S.3d 700).

Here, the Supreme Court properly imposed Condition No. 14, as the defendant has a child or children for whom he is obligated to provide support (see Penal Law § 65.10[2][f];  cf.  People v. Sobers, 235 A.D.3d 908, 227 N.Y.S.3d 694).  The defendant's constitutional challenge to so much of this condition as required him to “meet other family responsibilities” is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Saraceni, 153 A.D.3d 1559, 61 N.Y.S.3d 748), and we decline to reach it in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court also properly imposed Condition No. 28 upon the defendant.  This condition was individually tailored in relation to the underlying offenses, which involved, among other things, the defendant's wrongful possession of certain passports, and was, therefore, reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation or necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life (see People v. Hale, 93 N.Y.2d at 461, 692 N.Y.S.2d 649, 714 N.E.2d 861;  People v. Grandstand, 236 A.D.3d 817, 818, 227 N.Y.S.3d 750;  cf.  People v. Mensah, 221 A.D.3d at 733, 199 N.Y.S.3d 637;  People v. Dranchuk, 203 A.D.3d at 743, 160 N.Y.S.3d 653).  Moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, this condition was not otherwise unlawful (see People v. Grandstand, 236 A.D.3d at 818, 227 N.Y.S.3d 750).

The sentences imposed were not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

CHAMBERS, J.P., WOOTEN, DOWLING and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.