KELLY v. PEDERSEN (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Vincent J. Martorana, J.), dated May 31, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In April 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained in October 2018 when a motor vehicle operated by the defendant Erik Pedersen and owned by the defendant S.F. Signorelli collided with a motor vehicle operated by the third-party defendant, Nancy Kelly, in which the plaintiff was a passenger.  The defendants moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that they were not liable for the plaintiff's injuries.  In an order dated May 31, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the defendants’ motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“ ‘Defendants moving for summary judgment in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident have the burden of establishing, prima facie, that they were not at fault in the happening of the accident’ ” (Woods v. Burgos, 220 A.D.3d 688, 689, 197 N.Y.S.3d 324, quoting Nesbitt v. Gallant, 149 A.D.3d 763, 763, 51 N.Y.S.3d 568;  see Morante v. Blaney, 234 A.D.3d 679, 680, 224 N.Y.S.3d 526;  Lancer Ins. Co. v. Cortes, 208 A.D.3d 1176, 1178, 175 N.Y.S.3d 97).  “An accident can have more than one proximate cause, and although it is generally for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause, it may be decided as a matter of law where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts” (Kirby v. Lett, 208 A.D.3d 1174, 1175, 175 N.Y.S.3d 87 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Qureshi v. Gleason, 231 A.D.3d 878, 879, 220 N.Y.S.3d 372).

“A driver who enters an intersection against a red traffic light in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1110(a) is negligent as a matter of law” (Degachi v. Faridi, 230 A.D.3d 634, 635, 217 N.Y.S.3d 190 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Kirby v. Lett, 208 A.D.3d at 1175, 175 N.Y.S.3d 87).  “The operator of a vehicle with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that others will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield” (Pei Ru Guo v. Efkarpidis, 185 A.D.3d 949, 951, 127 N.Y.S.3d 545;  see Angelillo v. Guerin, 219 A.D.3d 556, 557, 194 N.Y.S.3d 272), but “a driver traveling with the right-of-way may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if he or she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident” (Shuofang Yang v. Sanacore, 202 A.D.3d 1120, 1122, 163 N.Y.S.3d 605 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Ibas v. Peralta, 237 A.D.3d 680, 681–682, 230 N.Y.S.3d 664).  “However, a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision” (Morante v. Blaney, 234 A.D.3d at 681, 224 N.Y.S.3d 526 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Angelillo v. Guerin, 219 A.D.3d at 557, 194 N.Y.S.3d 272;  Kirby v. Lett, 208 A.D.3d at 1175, 175 N.Y.S.3d 87).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that Pedersen was free from fault in the happening of the accident and that the third-party defendant's conduct, which constituted negligence per se, was the sole proximate cause of the accident.  In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, transcripts of the parties’ deposition testimony, which demonstrated that Pedersen had the right-of-way, the third-party defendant failed to yield the right-of-way, having disregarded a red traffic signal, and Pedersen did not have sufficient time to react in order to avoid the accident (see Morante v. Blaney, 234 A.D.3d at 682, 224 N.Y.S.3d 526;  Smith v. Trail, 221 A.D.3d 928, 930, 199 N.Y.S.3d 683;  Sapienza v. Harrison, 191 A.D.3d 1028, 1030, 142 N.Y.S.3d 584).  Since he had the right-of-way, Pedersen was entitled to anticipate that the third-party defendant would obey the traffic laws which required her to yield (see Smith v. Trail, 221 A.D.3d at 930, 199 N.Y.S.3d 683;  Giwa v. Bloom, 154 A.D.3d 921, 922, 62 N.Y.S.3d 527).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  The plaintiff's contention that Pedersen was operating his vehicle at an excessive rate of speed was unsupported by any competent evidence, as the expert report relied upon by the plaintiff was conclusory and speculative (see Hayes v. County of Suffolk, 222 A.D.3d 950, 953, 202 N.Y.S.3d 427;  Leicht v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Sanitation, 131 A.D.3d 515, 516, 15 N.Y.S.3d 157).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

IANNACCI, J.P., MILLER, DOWLING and LOVE, JJ., concur.