VASQUEZ v. COASTAL CHARTER SERVICE CORP (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Karina E. Alomar, J.), dated August 14, 2023.  The order granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and denied the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident is granted, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied as academic.

In July 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident.  The plaintiff thereafter moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability.  The defendants opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident.  In an order dated August 14, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion and denied the defendants' cross-motion.  The defendants appeal.

Preliminarily, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, biomechanical experts are qualified to render opinions on causation (see Osorio v. Punjab Enter. Inc., 215 A.D.3d 494, 494, 187 N.Y.S.3d 35;  Holmes v. Brini Tr. Inc., 123 A.D.3d 628, 628, 1 N.Y.S.3d 27;  see generally Plate v. Palisade Film Delivery Corp., 39 A.D.3d 835, 837, 835 N.Y.S.2d 324).  Here, an affidavit of Andrew J. Rentschler, the defendants' biomechanical expert, demonstrated that, based on his skill, training, education, and experience as a biomechanical engineer, he was qualified to render an opinion as to whether the accident could have generated enough force to cause the plaintiff's injuries, and sufficiently laid a foundation for his opinions on causation.

The Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  The defendants met their prima facie burden of establishing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 355, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197;  Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176).  In support of their cross-motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, Rentschler's affidavit, in which Rentschler opined that the accident did not generate sufficient force to cause the alleged injuries to the plaintiff's left shoulder and the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine.  Accordingly, the defendants established, prima facie, that the injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff were not caused by the accident (see Ramos v. Jahar, 233 A.D.3d 999, 1000, 222 N.Y.S.3d 664;  Windisch v. Fasano, 105 A.D.3d 1039, 1039, 963 N.Y.S.2d 401;  Jilani v. Palmer, 83 A.D.3d 786, 787, 920 N.Y.S.2d 424).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to rebut Rentschler's conclusions or otherwise raise a triable issue of fact (see Ramos v. Jahar, 233 A.D.3d at 1000, 222 N.Y.S.3d 664).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident, and denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability as academic.

DILLON, J.P., WOOTEN, WARHIT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.