CORREA v. CANNON (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Carmen R. Velasquez, J.), dated September 29, 2023.  The order granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied.

On September 29, 2022, the plaintiffs Jeimy Moreno Aguado, Angela Patricia Ospina Tabares, and Laura Camila Perez Munoz were passengers in a vehicle operated by the plaintiff Maria Camila Ospina Correa (hereinafter the plaintiff driver) on the Van Wyck Expressway.  A vehicle operated by the defendant Page L. Cannon (hereinafter the defendant driver) and owned by the defendant Hermann Forwarding Co. struck the rear of the plaintiffs' vehicle.

The plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries that they allegedly sustained in connection with the accident.  The plaintiffs moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the issue of liability.  In an order dated September 29, 2023, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion.  The defendants appeal.

“A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle” (Laureano v. EAN Holdings, LLC, 225 A.D.3d 754, 755, 207 N.Y.S.3d 153 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]).  Thus, “[a] rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision” (Thompson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 208 A.D.3d 815, 817, 175 N.Y.S.3d 66).

Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting an affidavit of the plaintiff driver, which demonstrated that the plaintiffs' vehicle was stopped for a traffic condition ahead when it was struck in the rear by the defendants' vehicle (see Laureano v. EAN Holdings, LLC, 225 A.D.3d at 756, 207 N.Y.S.3d 153;  Genao v. Cassetta, 214 A.D.3d 626, 627, 182 N.Y.S.3d 904).  However, an affidavit of the defendant driver, submitted in opposition to the motion, raised triable issues of fact as to how the accident occurred and whether the defendants had a nonnegligent explanation for their vehicle striking the rear of the plaintiffs' vehicle.  According to the defendant driver, the plaintiff driver was solely at fault in causing the accident by making a sudden stop for no apparent reason in the middle of their lane of traffic on the highway (see Laureano v. EAN Holdings, LLC, 225 A.D.3d at 757, 207 N.Y.S.3d 153;  Salako v. Nassau Inter–County Express, 131 A.D.3d 687, 15 N.Y.S.3d 444;  Amador v. City of New York, 120 A.D.3d 526, 527, 991 N.Y.S.2d 637;  Chepel v. Meyers, 306 A.D.2d 235, 235–237, 762 N.Y.S.2d 95).

In light of our determination, the defendants' remaining contention is academic.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

BARROS, J.P., FORD, WAN and LOVE, JJ., concur.