The People of the State of New York, v. Timothy Nathan, Defendant. (2025)

Defendant Timothy Nathan is charged by the above-referenced Indictment with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, in violation of Section 265.03(3) of the Penal Law; and, Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, in violation of Section 265.02(1) of the Penal Law. Defendant moved the Court for an order suppressing tangible evidence, and statements allegedly made to police officers. The court granted a Mapp (Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]) and Huntley (People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]) hearing which was held on May 12, 2025, and continued May 16, 2025. The People presented the testimony of Officers James Breen and Javier Algarin and Detective Julius Peterson of the Rochester Police Department ("RPD"). The defendant did not present any witnesses.

Findings of Fact

The court makes the following findings of fact based upon the credible testimony offered at the hearing and the exhibits in evidence.

On October 16, 2024, at approximately 8:43 p.m., Officer Breen was operating a marked RPD patrol vehicle, along with his partner Javier Algarin riding in the passenger seat, working a "pro-active detail" in the Hudson Avenue area of the City of Rochester. Officer Breen was directed by his supervisor, Lieutenant Adams, to a blue Dodge Charger vehicle. As the officers followed the blue Charger, they noticed the plate lamp was not working and initiated a traffic stop. Officer Breen testified that the Charger continued on for a few houses after the stop was initiated and pulled into a driveway of a private residence on Pomeroy Street. Officer Breen followed and parked behind the Charger (see Officer Breen's BWC camera footage of the traffic stop received into evidence as People's Exhibit 2).

Both officers approached the driver's side of the vehicle, due to a hedge blocking the passenger side, with their firearms drawn.As they came up to the driver's door, the driver's door opened slightly, after which the Officers directed the driver to exit the vehicle. The driver was immediately placed into handcuffs and led to the officers' patrol vehicle and placed in the back seat. Officer Breen asked the driver's name which was given as Timothy Nathan. Officer Breen identified defendant in court as the driver of the blue Dodge Charger.

Officer Breen ran a DMV report using defendant's name and date of birth and learned defendant's license was suspended. The car was registered to defendant's mother and was properly registered and insured.

A man appeared on the front porch of the residence as defendant was being led to the patrol vehicle and identified himself to officers as defendant's uncle. According to Officer Breen, the man was polite and did not appear to be intoxicated.

Officer Breen testified that he decided to tow the vehicle upon learning defendant's license was suspended as defendant could be charged with Aggravated Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Second Degree. Officer Algarin conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and located a semi-automatic handgun under the driver's seat.

Officer Algarin testified that the tow and search procedure was conducted in accordance with RPD General Order 511 ("G.O. 511") concerning vehicle towing, storage, seizure and tow report. A copy of G.O. 511 was received into evidence as People's Exhibit 5.

Detective Peterson, along with Sergeant Angel Pagan, later interviewed defendant at the Clinton Section Offices at 630 North Clinton Avenue. Defendant was asked pedigree questions and then Miranda rights and warnings were read to him verbatim from RPD form 1185. The form was received into evidence as People's Exhibit 3. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights and agreed to speak to police. Detective Peterson did not deny any request by defendant for food, drink or use of a restroom. No force, threats or promises were made. An audio/video recording of the interview was made and came into evidence as People's Exhibit 4.

Conclusions of Law

"[I]n evaluating the legality of police conduct, [a court] must determine whether the action taken was justified in its inception and at every subsequent stage of the encounter" (People v Howard, 129 AD3d 1654 [4th Dept 2015] [quotations omitted]; People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 215 [1976]). "The police may lawfully stop a vehicle when they have probable cause to believe that the driver of [a vehicle] has committed a traffic violation, and they may lawfully stop a vehicle when there exists at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime" (People v White, 27 AD3d 1181, 1182 [4th Dept 2006][citations and quotations omitted]). That the primary motivation of police may have been to investigate other matters is not relevant to the determination of reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop (People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 [2001]).

The court finds police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. Where a vehicle is required to display a number plate on the rear, as here, there must be "a white light which shall illuminate the numerals on such plate in such manner as to render such numerals legible for at least fifty feet from the rear" (V&TL § 375(a)(4). Here, Officer Breen credibly testified that defendant's rear license plate lamp was not working, a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

The People contend that the warrantless search of the car, yielding the firearm, was a valid inventory search. It is well established that the People bear the burden to establish the validity of the inventory search (People v Padilla, 21 NY3d 268, 272 [2013]; People v Galak, 80 NY2d 715, 719 ([1993]). Following a lawful arrest where the vehicle is to be towed or impounded, the police may conduct an inventory search of the vehicle (see e.g., People v Padilla, 21 NY3d at 272). "However, an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. To guard against this danger, the search must be conducted pursuant to an established procedure clearly limiting the conduct of the individual officers that assures that the searches are carried out consistently and reasonably. While incriminating evidence may be a consequence of an inventory search, it should not be its purpose" (People v Padilla, 21 NY3d at 272 [internal citations and quotations omitted]).

For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds the People did not meet their burden to show the warrantless inventory search of defendant's vehicle was conducted pursuant to established RPD regulations (People v Padilla, 21 NY3d at 272).

Officer Breen testified that he determined to have the vehicle towed, thus requiring an inventory search because the driver was being arrested for Aggravated Unlicensed Operation in the second degree. Rochester Police Department G.O. 511(IV)(C)(2) provides that where:

"the operator of a vehicle is charged with Aggravated Unlicensed Operation (AUO) 1 or 2 (NYS V & T § 511.2 or 3) and any of the following conditions exist, the vehicle will be towed . . .

a) The operator is the registered owner;

b) The vehicle is not properly registered;

c) No valid proof of insurance; or,

d) the operator is not the owner and no one else is available who can legally drive the vehicle."

(RPD G.O. 511(IV)(C)(2)[emphasis supplied]).

Conditions "a," "b", and "c" are not applicable here as Officer Breen testified that defendant was not the registered owner of the vehicle, and the vehicle was properly registered and insured. As to the fourth condition, "d," there was no testimony that the officers made a determination that "no one else [wa]s available who can legally drive the vehicle." In this case, defendant's uncle was present at the scene and identified to the officers, the officers conversed with him but failed to ascertain whether he was available to legally drive the vehicle.

Additionally, condition "d" does not appear to even be relevant to the situation encountered by officers here as, although defendant was not the owner, it was not necessary to seek another person to legally drive the vehicle. Whether another person is available to drive the vehicle is a provision that appears to chiefly apply to vehicles that may be towed if on public property in situations incidental to arrest (G.O. 511 [II][C][10]). Moreover, where a vehicle is on private property due to RPD initiated incident, such as the case here, and the vehicle is not being held for evidence, the vehicle will be towed only where the owner of the property has no knowledge of the vehicle, or objects to presence of the vehicle. Here, the vehicle was parked on private property belonging to the uncle, who was present and identified to the officers and did not object to the vehicle on his property (G.O. 511 [IV][B][2]).

Accordingly, the Court does not find the decision to tow defendant's vehicle "was made in accordance with 'standard criteria' set forth in the police department's written policy' " (People v Tardi, 28 NY3d 1077 [2016][quoting Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367, 375 (1987)]). The People argue that defendant's vehicle being on defendant's uncle's private property was as the result of defendant evading police. Officer Breen, however, testified that after the stop was initiated defendant only continued to drive "a few more houses eastbound and then pulled into the driveway" (Hearing Transcript May 12, 2025, p. 6, lns. 20-21). Driving "a few more houses" after the stop is initiated does not constitute fleeing or evading a traffic stop, nor does it provide a basis to find officers here need not follow written RPD procedures when deciding to tow a vehicle and conduct and inventory search. Indeed, as referenced above, the procedures specifically contemplate that a vehicle may end up on private property as a result of a police-initiated incident resulting in an arrest (G.O. 511 [IV][B][2]). Accordingly, the firearm found in the vehicle as result of the search must be suppressed.

Any statements made by defendant in reference to the firearm recovered from his vehicle during the unlawful warrantless search are suppressed as "fruit the poisonous tree" (People v Turriago, 219 AD2d 383, 387 [1st Dept 1996]["the search violated defendant's rights under New York Constitution, article I, § 12 ( People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434 [1991]) suppression of the evidence that emanated therefrom, including defendant's statements to the New York State Troopers, is required pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wong Sun v United States (371 US 471 [1963]) as fruit of the poisonous tree]).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, that defendant's motion to suppress tangible evidence and statements is granted.

The above constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: July 3, 2025.

Rochester, New York

HONORABLE CHARLES A. SCHIANO, JR.

Supreme Court Justice

Charles A. Schiano, Jr., J.