FERNANDEZ v. FEOKTISTOV (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Richard Velasquez, J.), dated January 31, 2024.  The order granted the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to serve a second amended summons and second amended complaint to add Marianna Feoktistov as an additional defendant.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On September 8, 2022, the plaintiff allegedly was injured when he was struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant Daniel Feoktistov and owned by the defendant Aleksander Feoktistov (hereinafter Aleksander).  The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained during the accident.

Thereafter, the plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to serve a second amended summons and a second amended complaint to add Marianna Feoktistov (hereinafter Marianna), Aleksander's wife, as an additional defendant on the ground that she co-owned the subject vehicle.  In an order dated January 31, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion.  The defendants appeal.

“In the absence of prejudice or surprise, leave to amend a pleading should be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit” (Garanin v. Hiatt, 219 A.D.3d 960, 960, 194 N.Y.S.3d 326;  see CPLR 3025[b];  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Spatafore, 183 A.D.3d 853, 122 N.Y.S.3d 557).  “The burden of demonstrating prejudice or surprise, or that a proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, falls upon the party opposing the motion” (Oppedisano v. D'Agostino, 196 A.D.3d 497, 498, 151 N.Y.S.3d 150;  see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Spatafore, 183 A.D.3d at 854, 122 N.Y.S.3d 557;  Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 A.D.3d 220, 229, 851 N.Y.S.2d 238).  “ ‘No evidentiary showing of merit is required under CPLR 3025(b)’ ” (First Natl. Bank of Long Is. v. Four Keys Realty, LLC, 213 A.D.3d 639, 641, 182 N.Y.S.3d 274, quoting Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 A.D.3d at 229, 851 N.Y.S.2d 238).

“A certificate of title ․ is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 2108[c];  see Portillo v. Carlson, 167 A.D.3d 792, 793, 89 N.Y.S.3d 270;  Corrigan v. DiGuardia, 166 A.D.2d 408, 409, 560 N.Y.S.2d 472).  Here, the defendants produced a certificate of title dated two weeks after the accident.  Although the date of the certificate of title was not raised as an issue, the question of whether any presumption arising from the certificate of title was “rebutted by evidence demonstrating that another individual owns the subject vehicle” was raised;  such evidence “may include evidence that a person other than the title holder exercised ‘dominion and control’ over the vehicle’ ” (Portillo v. Carlson, 167 A.D.3d at 793, 89 N.Y.S.3d 270, quoting RLI Ins. Co. v. Steely, 88 A.D.3d 975, 977, 932 N.Y.S.2d 80;  see Corrigan v. DiGuardia, 166 A.D.2d at 409, 560 N.Y.S.2d 472;  Young v. Seckler, 74 A.D.2d 155, 157, 426 N.Y.S.2d 311).

The fact that Marianna was a named co-insured of the vehicle created an issue as to de facto ownership sufficient to justify leave to serve a second amended summons and second amended complaint to add her as party to the action (see Young v. Seckler, 74 A.D.2d at 157, 426 N.Y.S.2d 311).  Although the admissibility of the insurance policy is contested, Marianna's status as a named co-insured on that policy is not contested, and Aleksander acknowledged that Marianna was named as a primary insured on the policy.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to serve a second amended summons and second amended complaint to add Marianna Feoktistov as an additional defendant was properly granted.

BARROS, J.P., WOOTEN, LOVE and HOM, JJ., concur.