PEOPLE v. ROBERTSON (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Donald Leo, J.), rendered March 10, 2022, convicting him of criminal sexual act in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

On December 26, 2014, the defendant allegedly sexually abused the complainant, who, at the time of the alleged offense, was seven years old.  At trial, the People presented, inter alia, the testimony of the complainant, as well as the testimony of certain members of her family, who testified as to their observations of the complainant's behavior after the subject incident and regarding her eventual disclosure of the abuse.  A jury convicted the defendant of criminal sexual act in the first degree.

The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review, as defense counsel made only a general motion for a trial order of dismissal, which failed to specify any particular error (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946).  In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Arroyo, 54 N.Y.2d 567, 578, 446 N.Y.S.2d 910, 431 N.E.2d 271;  People v. Clas, 54 A.D.3d 770, 771, 863 N.Y.S.2d 493).  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).  In this regard, neither the absence of additional witnesses to the abuse, nor minor inconsistencies in the complainant's trial testimony, rendered her account incredible (see People v. Turse, 150 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 52 N.Y.S.3d 657).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d at 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1).

“While it is generally improper to introduce testimony that [a] witness had previously made prior consistent statements to bolster the witness's credibility, the use of prior consistent statements is permitted to demonstrate a prompt outcry, rebut a charge of recent fabrication, or to assist in explaining the investigative process and completing the narrative of events leading to the defendant's arrest” (People v. Honghirun, 29 N.Y.3d 284, 289, 56 N.Y.S.3d 275, 78 N.E.3d 804 [internal quotation marks omitted]).  “The prompt outcry rule ․ permits evidence that a timely complaint was made, but does not allow further testimony as to the details of the incident” (People v. Gross, 172 A.D.3d 741, 743, 99 N.Y.S.3d 367 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Rosario, 17 N.Y.3d 501, 511, 934 N.Y.S.2d 59, 958 N.E.2d 93).  “A victim's outcry is prompt if it is made at the first suitable opportunity, which is a relative concept dependent on the facts, so that what might qualify as prompt in one case might not in another” (People v. Gross, 172 A.D.3d at 743, 99 N.Y.S.3d 367 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. McDaniel, 81 N.Y.2d 10, 17, 595 N.Y.S.2d 364, 611 N.E.2d 265).  However, “[a] significant delay in reporting does not necessarily preclude outcry evidence, especially where the victim is a child” (People v. Maisonette, 192 A.D.3d 1325, 1328, 144 N.Y.S.3d 752 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Rosario, 17 N.Y.3d at 513, 934 N.Y.S.2d 59, 958 N.E.2d 93).

Here, the Supreme Court permitted testimony concerning the complainant's first outcries to her sister and her mother approximately 41/212 years after the subject incident.  Under the circumstances of this case, including the complainant's young age, the ongoing and quasi-familial relationship between the complainant and the defendant, the defendant's statement to the complainant as she fled, and the complainant's fear of making the complaint sooner, the court properly admitted evidence of the complainant's outcries (see People v. Evangelista, 155 A.D.3d 972, 972–973, 65 N.Y.S.3d 240;  People v. Urbina, 143 A.D.3d 924, 925, 39 N.Y.S.3d 489).  Moreover, the nonspecific testimony regarding the complainant's later report of sexual abuse did not constitute improper bolstering, as it was offered for the nonhearsay purpose of completing the narrative of events (see People v. Lides, 200 A.D.3d 990, 991, 160 N.Y.S.3d 88;  People v. Jimenez, 148 A.D.3d 1054, 1055, 50 N.Y.S.3d 435).  Further, the testimony was accompanied by appropriate limiting instructions, which are presumed to have been heeded (see People v. Craig, 187 A.D.3d 1039, 1040, 131 N.Y.S.3d 185;  People v. Rosario, 100 A.D.3d 660, 661, 953 N.Y.S.2d 299).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court should have excluded certain testimony about changes in the complainant's behavior shortly after the subject incident is without merit.  This testimony was relevant to corroborate the complainant's testimony that the abuse in fact occurred, and was not unduly prejudicial (see People v. Palaguachi, 119 A.D.3d 447, 447, 990 N.Y.S.2d 22;  People v. Kidwell, 88 A.D.3d 1060, 1062, 931 N.Y.S.2d 148).  Similarly, the court properly admitted testimony about the complainant's demeanor while recounting the subject incident, as it was relevant to the credibility of the complainant's testimony that the abuse in fact occurred, after her credibility was called into question (see People v. Ludwig, 24 N.Y.3d 221, 231, 997 N.Y.S.2d 351, 21 N.E.3d 1012;  People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 452 n 2, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620;  People v. Perez–Castellanos, 211 A.D.3d 646, 647, 181 N.Y.S.3d 67).

The defendant contends that the Supreme Court should have excluded certain testimony about the effects that the allegations of abuse had on the complainant's other family members.  However, contrary to the defendant's contention, this testimony was relevant to explain the complainant's delay in disclosing the abuse (see People v. Hughes, 93 A.D.3d 889, 890, 940 N.Y.S.2d 183;  People v. Khan, 88 A.D.3d 1014, 1014–1015, 931 N.Y.S.2d 393), and any error with respect to the admission of this testimony was harmless (see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court violated his right of confrontation by limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of the complainant is without merit.  “[A]lthough a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to confront adverse witnesses through cross-examination, the trial court has broad discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination when the questions are irrelevant or only marginally relevant, concern collateral issues, or pose a danger of misleading the jury” (People v. Herrera–Machuca, 181 A.D.3d 901, 902, 119 N.Y.S.3d 886;  see People v. Anderson, 235 A.D.3d 993, 994, 228 N.Y.S.3d 292).  Here, the defendant was afforded the opportunity to challenge the credibility and accuracy of the complainant's testimony, and the court providently exercised its discretion to the extent that it limited defense counsel's cross-examination (see People v. Anderson, 235 A.D.3d at 994, 228 N.Y.S.3d 292;  People v. Wingate, 184 A.D.3d 738, 739, 125 N.Y.S.3d 724).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.

CONNOLLY, J.P., GENOVESI, TAYLOR and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.