MTGLQ INVESTORS LP v. 595 LLC (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant 595 E. 3 Street, LLC, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Cenceria P. Edwards, J.), dated July 19, 2022.  The order granted the plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to conduct a foreclosure sale of the subject property.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In this action to foreclose a foreclosure, the Supreme Court issued an order and judgment of foreclosure and sale dated January 3, 2017, which, inter alia, directed the sale of the subject property.  By order dated April 9, 2019, the plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to conduct the foreclosure sale of the property was granted, and thereafter, by order dated December 18, 2019, the court appointed a substitute referee in this action.  Subsequently, the plaintiff moved again for an extension of time to conduct the foreclosure sale of the property pursuant to the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale.  The defendant 595 E. 3 Street, LLC (hereinafter the defendant), opposed the motion.  In an order dated July 19, 2022, the court granted the plaintiff's motion.  The defendant appeals.

“As amended effective December 20, 2016, RPAPL 1351(1) requires that a judgment direct the sale of the subject property within 90 days” (Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Ramsamooj, 219 A.D.3d 1402, 1403, 196 N.Y.S.3d 148;  see L 2016, ch 73, § 1, part Q, § 8 [eff Dec. 20, 2016]).  However, under CPLR 2004, “[e]xcept where otherwise expressly prescribed by law, the court may extend the time fixed by any statute, rule or order for doing any act, upon such terms as may be just and upon good cause shown, whether the application for extension is made before or after the expiration of the time fixed.”  “The determination of whether to grant a request for an extension of time [pursuant to CPLR 2004] is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court” (Leader v. Steinway, Inc., 186 A.D.3d 1207, 1209, 127 N.Y.S.3d 879;  see Tewari v. Tsoutsouras, 75 N.Y.2d 1, 11–12, 550 N.Y.S.2d 572, 549 N.E.2d 1143).  “In exercising its discretion to grant an extension of time pursuant to CPLR 2004, a court may consider such factors as the length of the delay, the reason or excuse for the delay, and any prejudice to the opponent of the motion” (Ibrahim v. Nablus Sweets Corp., 161 A.D.3d 961, 963, 77 N.Y.S.3d 439 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Tewari v. Tsoutsouras, 75 N.Y.2d at 11–12, 550 N.Y.S.2d 572, 549 N.E.2d 1143).

Here, the plaintiff established that the foreclosure sale could not be conducted within the 90–day period from the date of the last extension issued due to a moratorium enacted during the COVID–19 pandemic.  Further, the defendant does not contend that the delay caused it any prejudice.  Thus, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to conduct the foreclosure sale of the property (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Dunn, 230 A.D.3d 1327, 217 N.Y.S.3d 238;  Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Ramsamooj, 219 A.D.3d at 1403, 196 N.Y.S.3d 148).

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.

CHAMBERS, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, LOVE and GOLIA, JJ., concur.