PEOPLE v. HALL (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vincent M. Del Giudice, J.), rendered February 7, 2020, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 20 years to life.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the sentence imposed from an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 20 years to life to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 15 years to life;  as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial due to the Supreme Court's admission of evidence pursuant to People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, claiming that it was erroneous for the court to permit testimony that he had reported that his vehicle had previously been broken into, with property stolen from within, that he and the victim had argued over a parking spot, and that the defendant's wife had reported that someone had slashed the tires of their vehicle.  However, these contentions are unpreserved for appellate review, as the defendant failed to raise these specific objections before the court (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Delacruz, 207 A.D.3d 652, 653, 171 N.Y.S.3d 575), and, in any event, without merit.

The testimony in question was not necessarily indicative of prior bad acts (see People v. Brewer, 28 N.Y.3d 271, 274, 44 N.Y.S.3d 339, 66 N.E.3d 1057), was probative of the defendant's motive for the shooting, and provided necessary background information (see People v. Delacruz, 207 A.D.3d at 654, 171 N.Y.S.3d 575;  People v. Knight, 194 A.D.3d 752, 753, 143 N.Y.S.3d 581).  “[T]he probative value of the admitted evidence outweighed the risk of prejudice resulting from its admission” (People v. Knight, 194 A.D.3d at 753, 143 N.Y.S.3d 581).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in admitting the challenged testimony.

It was improper for the Supreme Court to have admitted evidence that the defendant had been issued a police summons for excessive window tinting, as that evidence was unnecessary to prove his connection to the vehicle in question (see People v. Weinstein, 42 N.Y.3d 439, 457, 223 N.Y.S.3d 531, 248 N.E.3d 691;  People v. Leonard, 29 N.Y.3d 1, 7, 51 N.Y.S.3d 4, 73 N.E.3d 344).  However, the error was harmless, since the evidence of the defendant's guilt, which included testimony from three different individuals who knew the defendant and identified him as the person who had been arguing with the victim shortly before the shooting, as well as surveillance video footage from which the defendant was identified as the person following the victim and appearing to shoot a firearm in the victim's direction, was overwhelming, and there is no significant probability that any error in this regard contributed to the defendant's conviction (see People v. Garcia, 203 A.D.3d 1071, 162 N.Y.S.3d 771).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improperly permitted a person who was not a witness to the shooting to testify that, in her opinion, the person depicted in a surveillance video of the shooting was the defendant, is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Alleyne, 114 A.D.3d 804, 979 N.Y.S.2d 845) and, in any event, without merit (see People v. Ruiz, 7 A.D.3d 737, 737, 777 N.Y.S.2d 193;  People v. Magin, 1 A.D.3d 1024, 1025, 767 N.Y.S.2d 366).  The People established that the witness had sufficient contact and familiarity with the defendant to aid the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the person in the surveillance video, which did not provide a particularly clear depiction of the perpetrator's face, was indeed the defendant (see People v. Mosley, 41 N.Y.3d 640, 647–648, 215 N.Y.S.3d 303, 239 N.E.3d 928;  People v. Russell, 79 N.Y.2d 1024, 1025, 584 N.Y.S.2d 428, 594 N.E.2d 922).

The testimony of a police detective regarding the defendant's identification as the perpetrator of the charged crimes did not constitute improper bolstering because it was offered for the relevant, nonhearsay purpose of establishing the reasons behind the detective's actions and to complete the narrative of events leading to the defendant's arrest, weeks after the shooting (see People v. Ragsdale, 68 A.D.3d 897, 897–898, 889 N.Y.S.2d 681;  see also People v. Iwanczyk, 151 A.D.3d 745, 746, 55 N.Y.S.3d 420).  In any event, any error in the admission of this testimony was harmless, as the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there is no significant probability in this case that the alleged error would have affected the verdict (see People v. Crudup, 197 A.D.3d 656, 658–659, 153 N.Y.S.3d 114).

Moreover, “inasmuch as the trial court delivered instructions regarding the identification of the defendant, the general factors to be considered in evaluating the witnesses’ credibility, and the People's burden of proving identification beyond a reasonable doubt, its charge was proper” (People v. Love, 244 A.D.2d 431, 431, 664 N.Y.S.2d 91;  see generally People v. Walker, 26 N.Y.3d 170, 174, 21 N.Y.S.3d 191, 42 N.E.3d 688).

The sentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated herein (see People v. Brisman, ––– N.Y.3d ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 00123;  People v. Morales, 189 A.D.3d 1464, 1468, 137 N.Y.S.3d 387;  People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

BARROS, J.P., WARHIT, TAYLOR and GOLIA, JJ., concur.