PEOPLE v. CEBALLOS (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Michael J. Yavinsky, J.), rendered September 8, 2022, convicting him of attempted assault in the second degree, criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, assault in the third degree, endangering the welfare of a child, attempted assault in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, upon a jury verdict, of attempted assault in the second degree, criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, assault in the third degree, endangering the welfare of a child, attempted assault in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree, arising from two incidents involving his girlfriend, with whom he shares a child.  The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in admitting evidence of certain events and communications that occurred immediately after the second incident.

“Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible unless its admission violates some exclusionary rule” (People v. Robinson, 170 A.D.3d 893, 894, 96 N.Y.S.3d 101 [internal quotation marks omitted]).  “However, relevant evidence may still be excluded by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unduly prejudicing the defendant” (id.).  “Certain postcrime conduct is [viewed as] ‘indicative of a consciousness of guilt, and hence of guilt itself’ ” (People v. Bennett, 79 N.Y.2d 464, 469, 583 N.Y.S.2d 825, 593 N.E.2d 279, quoting People v. Reddy, 261 N.Y. 479, 486, 185 N.E. 705).

Here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant's conduct in fleeing from Queens to Brooklyn after the second incident and of his efforts to evade arrest, as this evidence was indicative of a consciousness of guilt, its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice, and the court gave an appropriate limiting instruction (see People v. Jackson, 125 A.D.3d 1002, 1004, 2 N.Y.S.3d 625;  People v. Fitzgerald, 84 A.D.3d 1397, 1397, 924 N.Y.S.2d 289).  Furthermore, the limited background testimony of a detective as to his role as a hostage negotiator was not prejudicial (see People v. Hardy, 146 A.D.2d 645, 645, 536 N.Y.S.2d 546).

However, the Supreme Court erred in admitting into evidence the defendant's communications with the detective over the phone and by text message, concerning the child, as this evidence was not relevant to the issues at trial regarding the charged offenses (see People v. Brown, 224 A.D.3d 922, 924, 206 N.Y.S.3d 668;  People v. Chambers, 168 A.D.3d 1092, 1093, 92 N.Y.S.3d 396).  Nevertheless, the errors did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and were harmless, as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt without the irrelevant evidence, and no significant probability exists that the errors contributed to the convictions (see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241–242, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787;  People v. Brown, 224 A.D.3d at 924, 206 N.Y.S.3d 668;  People v. Cherry, 163 A.D.3d 706, 707, 81 N.Y.S.3d 123).

IANNACCI, J.P., MILLER, DOWLING and LOVE, JJ., concur.