ESALEN INSTITUTE v. FIRST SPECIALTY INSURANCE CORPORATION (2025)

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52 were read on this motion to/for REARGUMENT/RECONSIDERATION.

Upon the foregoing documents, it is

Plaintiff Esalen Institute commenced this declaratory judgment and breach of contract action against defendant First Specialty Insurance Corporation after defendant denied coverage for plaintiff's business interruption claim. Defendant previously moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred under the 24-Month Suit Limitation Provision in the policy (Mot. Seq. 001). Defendant now timely moves pursuant to CPLR § 2221 to reargue its motion to dismiss and, upon reargument, to dismiss the complaint (Mot. Seq. 002).

By order dated May 20, 2022, the Court (Nock, J.) denied defendant's motion to dismiss. It held that this action would have been time-barred under the 24-Month Suit Limitation Provision, but defendant was equitably estopped from enforcing that provision. The Court found that plaintiff commenced this action in “direct reliance” on representations defendant made in support of its motion to dismiss an earlier California action on the basis of the parties’ New York forum selection clause, to the effect that New York was an available forum to resolve plaintiff's claim. As defendant emphasizes, plaintiff commenced the California action about one day before the expiration of the limitation period, and despite the New York forum selection provision in the policy; thus, defendant's assertions concerning New York as a forum were made months after the limitation period had expired.

A motion for leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221(d) “shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offered on the prior motion.” Such motion to reargue must be made within 30 days after service of the copy of the order determining the prior motion and written notice of its entry (CPLR § 2221[d][3]).

Upon review of the parties’ papers, the Court finds that it previously erred on the law in determining that defendant is equitably estopped from enforcing the 24-Month Suit Limitation Provision. Because the statements defendant made in support of its California dismissal motion occurred after the expiration of the limitations period, plaintiff could not have relied on them in failing to timely commence suit in New York, as required under the policy (Gilbert Frank Corp. v Federal Ins. Co., 70 NY2d 966, 968 [1988]; Botach Mgt. Group v Gurash, 138 AD3d 771, 773-774 [2d Dept 2016]; Thomas Hamilton Pharmacy, Inc. v Nationwide Mut. Insur. Co., 29 Misc 3d 1214[A], *2 [Sup Ct, Westchester Co. 2008], aff'd 68 AD3d 853 [2d Dept 2009]; see also Iken-Murphy v State Farm Insurance Co., 195 AD3d 470, 470-471 [1st Dept 2021]; Beekman Regent Condominium Ass'n v Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 45 AD3d 311, 311 [1st Dept 2007]; JCH Delta Contracting, Inc. v City of New York, 44 AD3d 403, 404 [1st Dept 2007]; Carnegie Hill 90th Street, Inc. v Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 271 AD2d 333, 334 [1st Dept 2000]; Soltex Thread Co., Inc. v Rueff Bros., Inc., 111 AD2d 84, 84 [1st Dept 1985]).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant's motion for leave to reargue its prior motion to dismiss is GRANTED and, upon reargument, defendant's motion to dismiss this action as time-barred is granted and the action is dismissed with prejudice.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Ashlee Crawford, J.