EDERI v. MENDEZ (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Peter P. Sweeney, J.), dated June 5, 2023.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence is granted.

The plaintiff Maytal Ederi (hereinafter the plaintiff driver), and her husband suing derivatively, commenced this action against the defendants, Merlin Mendez and Lantev Distributing Corp. (hereinafter Lantev), to recover damages for injuries the plaintiffs alleged they sustained in May 2021 when a vehicle operated by Mendez and owned by Lantev collided with a vehicle operated by the plaintiff driver in Brooklyn.  The plaintiffs moved, among other things, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence.  In an order dated June 5, 2023, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion.  The plaintiffs appeal.

“ ‘A driver who enters an intersection against a red traffic light in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1110(a) is negligent as a matter of law’ ” (Angelillo v. Guerin, 219 A.D.3d 556, 557, 194 N.Y.S.3d 272, quoting Wynter v. City of New York, 173 A.D.3d 1122, 1123, 104 N.Y.S.3d 645).  “A driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that other drivers will obey traffic laws that require them to yield” (Pivetz v. Brusco, 145 A.D.3d 806, 807, 43 N.Y.S.3d 457).  Moreover, “a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield cannot be comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision” (Silva v. Rabbani, 227 A.D.3d 1026, 1027–1028, 212 N.Y.S.3d 655 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Higgins v. Stelmach, 208 A.D.3d 1165, 1166, 175 N.Y.S.3d 74).

“[T]he issue of a plaintiff's comparative negligence may be decided in the context of a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff moves for summary judgment dismissing a defendant's affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence” (Seizeme v. Levy, 208 A.D.3d 809, 810, 174 N.Y.S.3d 421 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Yongyong Zhu v. Shrestha, 229 A.D.3d 844, 845, 216 N.Y.S.3d 60).  Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence by demonstrating that the plaintiff driver entered the intersection with a green traffic light and had the right-of-way and that Mendez's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Lanicci v. Hansen, 153 A.D.3d 687, 688, 59 N.Y.S.3d 753;  Jiang–Hong Chen v. Heart Tr., Inc., 143 A.D.3d 945, 946, 39 N.Y.S.3d 504).  In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff driver was comparatively negligent in causing the accident (see Ali v. Alam, 223 A.D.3d 642, 644, 203 N.Y.S.3d 159;  Batts v. Page, 51 A.D.3d 833, 834, 858 N.Y.S.2d 748).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the defendants’ affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence.

DUFFY, J.P., MILLER, CHRISTOPHER and VENTURA, JJ., concur.