TYRELL v. WALMART INC (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for assault and battery, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Maria G. Rosa, J.), dated August 11, 2023.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the motion of the defendant Walmart, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the first and third causes of action insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for assault and battery, alleging that he sustained injuries during an altercation at a store owned by the defendant Walmart, Inc. (hereinafter Walmart).  The complaint alleged that Walmart should be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employee, the defendant Lenard Copelin.  In an order dated August 11, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of Walmart's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action, alleging assault and battery, and the third cause of action, alleging false imprisonment, insofar as asserted against it.  The plaintiff appeals.

Under the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer “may be held vicariously liable for torts, including intentional torts, committed by employees acting within the scope of their employment” (Rivera v. State of New York, 34 N.Y.3d 383, 389, 119 N.Y.S.3d 749, 142 N.E.3d 641;  see Diluglio v. Liberty Mut. Group, Inc., 230 A.D.3d 643, 647, 217 N.Y.S.3d 607).  “An employee's actions fall within the scope of employment where the purpose in performing such actions is to further the employer's interest, or to carry out duties incumbent upon the employee in furthering the employer's business” (Maldonado v. Allum, 208 A.D.3d 470, 471, 173 N.Y.S.3d 295 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Rodriguez v. Judge, 132 A.D.3d 966, 967, 18 N.Y.S.3d 692).  “[T]he employer may be liable when the employee acts negligently or intentionally, so long as the tortious conduct is generally foreseeable and a natural incident of the employment” (Judith M. v. Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 N.Y.2d 932, 933, 693 N.Y.S.2d 67, 715 N.E.2d 95;  see Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 304, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300, 391 N.E.2d 1278).  “Conversely, where an employee's actions are taken for wholly personal reasons, which are not job related, his or her conduct cannot be said to fall within the scope of employment” (Beauchamp v. City of New York, 3 A.D.3d 465, 466, 771 N.Y.S.2d 129;  see Maldonado v. Allum, 208 A.D.3d at 471, 173 N.Y.S.3d 295).

Here, Walmart established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the first and third causes of action insofar as asserted against it by demonstrating that Copelin's allegedly tortious conduct was not within the scope of his employment (see Rivera v. State of New York, 34 N.Y.3d at 389, 119 N.Y.S.3d 749, 142 N.E.3d 641;  Diluglio v. Liberty Mut. Group, Inc., 230 A.D.3d at 647, 217 N.Y.S.3d 607).  Moreover, Walmart established that Copelin's actions were taken for wholly personal reasons and were not taken in furtherance of Walmart's business interests (see Lea v. McNulty, 227 A.D.3d 971, 975, 212 N.Y.S.3d 152;  Saint Robert v. BHAP Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 124 A.D.3d 752, 753, 3 N.Y.S.3d 49).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of Walmart's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first and third causes of action insofar as asserted against it.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, VOUTSINAS and HOM, JJ., concur.