WRIGHT v. WHITE PLAINS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for employment discrimination in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e et seq.) and the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296[1][a]), the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (David F. Everett, J.), dated April 27, 2023.  The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In August 2018, the plaintiff was hired by the defendant as a phlebotomist, subject to a six-month probationary period.  On January 15, 2019, the plaintiff was informed that her employment was terminated.  In September 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for employment discrimination.  The amended complaint, filed in November 2019, alleged that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter title VII) (42 USC § 2000e et seq.) and the New York State Human Rights Law (hereinafter the NYSHRL) (Executive Law § 296[1][a]) by terminating her employment based upon her pregnancy.  The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.  In an order dated April 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual or to discharge such a person from employment on the basis of the individual's gender (see id.;  Golston–Green v. City of New York, 184 A.D.3d 24, 34, 123 N.Y.S.3d 656).  “Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is a form of gender discrimination” (Golston–Green v. City of New York, 184 A.D.3d at 34, 123 N.Y.S.3d 656;  see Lefort v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 203 A.D.3d 708, 709, 164 N.Y.S.3d 183).

The standards for establishing unlawful discrimination under the NYSHRL previously were the same as those governing title VII cases (see Rainer N. Mittl, Ophthalmologist, P.C. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 100 N.Y.2d 326, 330, 763 N.Y.S.2d 518, 794 N.E.2d 660;  Ferrante v. American Lung Assn., 90 N.Y.2d 623, 629, 665 N.Y.S.2d 25, 687 N.E.2d 1308).  In 2019, however, the New York State Legislature amended the NYSHRL, in pertinent part, to require that it “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article, have been so construed” (Executive Law § 300;  L 2019, ch 160, § 6;  see Golston–Green v. City of New York, 184 A.D.3d at 35 n 1, 123 N.Y.S.3d 656).  That amendment was effective August 12, 2019 (see L 2019, ch 160, § 16), and applies to causes of action, like the instant cause of action, that are filed on or after the effective date (see id. § 16[d];  Elco v. Aguiar, 226 A.D.3d 649, 651, 208 N.Y.S.3d 696;  Golston–Green v. City of New York, 184 A.D.3d at 35 n 1, 123 N.Y.S.3d 656).

As a result of the amendment, the NYSHRL now aligns with the standards of the New York City Human Rights Law (hereinafter the NYCHRL) (see Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–130[a], [b];  Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 41 N.Y.3d 446, 451, 211 N.Y.S.3d 819, 235 N.E.3d 351;  Cannizzaro v. City of New York, 82 Misc.3d 563, 577, 206 N.Y.S.3d 868 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. County];  Stickler v. IBM, Inc., 2024 WL 3952639, *2 n 4, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154797, *4 n 4 [S.D.N.Y., No. 22–CV–2449 (KMW)];  Harlow v. Molina Healthcare, Inc., 723 F.Supp.3d 116, 129 n 6 [N.D.N.Y.]).  Under the NYCHRL, unlawful discrimination must play “no role” in an employment decision (Singh v. Covenant Aviation Sec., LLC, 131 A.D.3d 1158, 1161, 16 N.Y.S.3d 611 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Lefort v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 203 A.D.3d at 711–712, 164 N.Y.S.3d 183).  Thus, a defendant's motion for summary judgment must be analyzed under both the familiar framework of (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668) and under the newer mixed-motive framework, which imposes a lesser burden on a plaintiff opposing such a motion (see Reichman v. City of New York, 179 A.D.3d 1115, 1117, 117 N.Y.S.3d 280;  Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 A.D.3d 665, 668, 115 N.Y.S.3d 53;  Hamburg v. New York Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 155 A.D.3d 66, 72–73, 62 N.Y.S.3d 26).  “A defendant must make ‘a prima facie showing that there is no evidentiary route that could allow a jury to believe that discrimination played a role in their challenged actions’ ” (Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 A.D.3d at 668, 115 N.Y.S.3d 53, quoting Cenzon–Decarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 101 A.D.3d 924, 927, 957 N.Y.S.2d 256;  see Lefort v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 203 A.D.3d at 712, 164 N.Y.S.3d 183).  “A plaintiff may defeat summary judgment by coming forward either with evidence that the defendant's stated reasons were a pretext for discrimination or with evidence that discrimination was one of the motivating factors for the defendant ‘s conduct” (Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 A.D.3d at 668, 115 N.Y.S.3d 53;  see Hamburg v. New York Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 155 A.D.3d at 73, 62 N.Y.S.3d 26).

Applying these principles here, we conclude that the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of the NYSHRL by demonstrating that there was no evidentiary route that could allow a jury to find that discrimination played a role in the decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment (cf.  Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 A.D.3d at 668, 115 N.Y.S.3d 53;  Kosarin–Ritter v. Mrs. John L. Strong, LLC, 117 A.D.3d 603, 604, 986 N.Y.S.2d 453).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the proffered explanations were a pretext for discrimination or whether discrimination was one of the motivating factors for the challenged action (cf.  Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 A.D.3d at 669, 115 N.Y.S.3d 53;  Hamburg v. New York Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 155 A.D.3d at 76, 62 N.Y.S.3d 26).  The plaintiff offered nothing but speculation that the decision to terminate her employment was motivated, even in part, by unlawful discrimination, which is insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Ellison v. Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 A.D.3d at 669, 115 N.Y.S.3d 53).

The plaintiff's remaining contention is without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.

BARROS, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WARHIT and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.