PEOPLE v. AUSTIN (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (John Ingram, J.), rendered July 1, 2016, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree arising out of the stabbing death of his coworker at a subway station in the Flatbush section of Brooklyn in 2009, which the defendant maintains was in self-defense.

“The right to present a defense constitutes ‘a fundamental element of due process of law’ ” (People v. Butts, 184 A.D.3d 660, 661, 125 N.Y.S.3d 463, quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019), “and it is one of the ‘minimum essentials of a fair trial’ ” (id., quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297;  see People v. Gibian, 76 A.D.3d 583, 585, 907 N.Y.S.2d 226).  “ ‘The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it may decide where the truth lies’ ” (People v. Butts, 184 A.D.3d at 661, 125 N.Y.S.3d 463, quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920;  see People v. Taylor, 40 A.D.3d 782, 784, 835 N.Y.S.2d 442).

“ ‘Once a proper foundation is laid, a party may show that an adversary's witness has, on another occasion, made oral or written statements which are inconsistent with some material part of the trial testimony, for the purpose of impeaching the credibility and thereby discrediting the testimony of the witness’ ” (People v. Butts, 184 A.D.3d at 661, 125 N.Y.S.3d 463, quoting People v. Bradley, 99 A.D.3d 934, 936, 952 N.Y.S.2d 260;  see People v. Duncan, 46 N.Y.2d 74, 80, 412 N.Y.S.2d 833, 385 N.E.2d 572;  Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6–411 [Farrell 11th ed]).  In order to sufficiently lay the foundation for the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement, there must be an actual inconsistency between the statements at issue (see People v. Wise, 46 N.Y.2d 321, 326, 413 N.Y.S.2d 334, 385 N.E.2d 1262;  People v. Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d 75, 88, 350 N.Y.S.2d 369, 305 N.E.2d 461;  Larkin v. Nassau Elec. R.R. Co., 205 N.Y. 267, 269, 98 N.E. 465).  A “ ‘direct and positive contradiction’ ” is not required:  “ ‘[i]t is enough that the testimony and the statements are inconsistent and tend to prove differing facts’ ” (People v. Wise, 46 N.Y.2d at 326, 413 N.Y.S.2d 334, 385 N.E.2d 1262, quoting Larkin v. Nassau Elec. R.R. Co., 205 N.Y. at 269, 98 N.E. 465).  In case of doubt regarding whether an allegedly contradictory statement may be admitted for impeachment purposes, “the balance should be struck in favor of admissibility, leaving to the jury the function of determining what weight should be assigned the impeachment evidence.  Applied in this fashion, the law of previous contradictory statements will advance rather than impede the truth-seeking process” (id. at 327, 413 N.Y.S.2d 334, 385 N.E.2d 1262).

Here, the witness's inability to recall his prior testimony was insufficient to lay a foundation for impeachment using prior inconsistent statements because it did not “tend to prove differing facts” from his earlier more definite testimony (id. at 326, 413 N.Y.S.2d 334, 385 N.E.2d 1262 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Ayala, 121 A.D.3d 1124, 1125, 997 N.Y.S.2d 81;  Edmonds v. Quellman, 277 A.D.2d 579, 581, 715 N.Y.S.2d 768;  People v. Eli, 250 A.D.2d 418, 418–419, 673 N.Y.S.2d 93;  Varela v. Previti, 64 A.D.2d 560, 406 N.Y.S.2d 830).  “When a witness testifies under oath that he or she cannot recollect a particular fact, his or her prior statement as to that fact is inadmissible as a prior inconsistent statement” (Edmonds v. Quellman, 277 A.D.2d at 581, 715 N.Y.S.2d 768;  see People v. Ayala, 121 A.D.3d at 1125, 997 N.Y.S.2d 81;  People v. Eli, 250 A.D.2d at 418–419, 673 N.Y.S.2d 93;  Varela v. Previti, 64 A.D.2d 560, 406 N.Y.S.2d 830;  see also 34 N.Y. Jur 2d, Criminal Law:  Procedure § 2385).

The defendant's contention that his constitutional rights were violated by the admission of autopsy records through a medical examiner who did not perform or observe the autopsy is waived.  The defendant's counsel assented to that medical examiner's testimony upon the Supreme Court's instruction to make clear that the medical examiner did not perform the autopsy and that his testimony was based on his review of autopsy photographs (see People v. Rodriguez, 50 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 429 N.Y.S.2d 631, 407 N.E.2d 475;  People v. Borgella, 189 A.D.3d 872, 872, 133 N.Y.S.3d 443;  People v. Armstrong, 138 A.D.3d 877, 878–879, 29 N.Y.S.3d 475;  People v. Ramos, 127 A.D.3d 996, 997, 6 N.Y.S.3d 651).  In any event, even if the defendant had not waived this contention, the defendant's constitutional rights were not violated, as the court's instruction ensured that the People met their obligation to “establish that their testifying experts, who did not perform or observe the relevant autopsy, reached their conclusions themselves based upon a review of the proper materials rather than the conclusions of the performing examiner” (People v. Ortega, 40 N.Y.3d 463, 478, 203 N.Y.S.3d 868, 227 N.E.3d 302;  see Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661–662, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610;  People v. John, 27 N.Y.3d 294, 308–309, 33 N.Y.S.3d 88, 52 N.E.3d 1114).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

LASALLE, P.J., FORD, VOUTSINAS and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.