PEOPLE v. MOSES (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Michael Aloise, J.), rendered September 29, 2020, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant entered a plea of guilty to manslaughter in the first degree.  Prior to sentencing, the defendant moved, pro se, to withdraw his plea of guilty and separately moved for the assignment of new counsel.  The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motions, without a hearing, and imposed sentence.

“A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court, and generally the court's determination will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of the court's discretion” (People v. Roberts, 210 A.D.3d 1014, 1014, 179 N.Y.S.3d 150 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see CPL 220.60[3];  People v. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802).  In general, “[s]uch a motion must be premised upon some evidence of possible innocence or of fraud, mistake, coercion or involuntariness in the taking of the plea” (People v. McClurkin, 231 A.D.3d 748, 749, 219 N.Y.S.3d 137 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Spring, 222 A.D.3d 665, 666, 201 N.Y.S.3d 166).  “When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea, the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry ‘rest[s] largely in the discretion of the Judge to whom the motion is made’ and a hearing will be granted only in rare instances” (People v. Brown, 14 N.Y.3d 113, 116, 897 N.Y.S.2d 674, 924 N.E.2d 782, quoting People v. Tinsley, 35 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 365 N.Y.S.2d 161, 324 N.E.2d 544;  see People v. Kazimer, 210 A.D.3d 1109, 1110, 178 N.Y.S.3d 780).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying, without a hearing, the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty.  Reviewing the record as a whole and the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea (see People v. Sougou, 26 N.Y.3d 1052, 1055, 23 N.Y.S.3d 121, 44 N.E.3d 196), we conclude that the defendant's plea of guilty was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made (see People v. Kazimer, 210 A.D.3d at 1110, 178 N.Y.S.3d 780;  People v. Hollman, 197 A.D.3d 484, 484–485, 151 N.Y.S.3d 158).  The defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty were unsubstantiated and contradicted by the record of the plea proceeding (see People v. Haffiz, 19 N.Y.3d 883, 884, 951 N.Y.S.2d 690, 976 N.E.2d 216;  People v. Kazimer, 210 A.D.3d at 1110, 178 N.Y.S.3d 780).

Moreover, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for the assignment of new counsel.  “ ‘The right of an indigent criminal defendant to the services of a court-appointed lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at [the] defendant's option’ ” (People v. King, 161 A.D.3d 772, 774, 77 N.Y.S.3d 70, quoting People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d 822, 824, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233).  “A trial court's duty to consider substitution arises only where [the] defendant makes a seemingly serious request” (People v. Milonovich, 215 A.D.3d 764, 765, 185 N.Y.S.3d 713 [internal quotation marks omitted]).  A request is seemingly serious if it contains “specific factual allegations of serious complaints about counsel” (People v. English, 201 A.D.3d 733, 734, 156 N.Y.S.3d 885 [internal quotation marks omitted]).  Here, the defendant's motion contained no specific allegation that indicated a serious complaint about the representation he received.

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

LASALLE, P.J., FORD, VOUTSINAS and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.