PEOPLE v. MCCRIMMON (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Cassandra M. Mullen, J.), rendered September 8, 2016, convicting him of rape in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm, criminal contempt in the first degree, and assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court deprived him of the right to present a defense by denying his request to call a witness is without merit.  “A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to produce witnesses, and ‘absent a showing of bad faith, an application to produce witnesses whose testimony would be relevant to the defense should not be denied’ ” (People v. Bryant, 211 A.D.3d 848, 849, 180 N.Y.S.3d 242, quoting People v. Murray, 79 A.D.2d 993, 994, 434 N.Y.S.2d 720).  “However, a trial court may, in its discretion, exclude evidence that is of slight or remote significance, speculative, lacking a good-faith factual basis, or solely based on hearsay” (id.;  see People v. Strzelecki, 108 A.D.3d 644, 645, 968 N.Y.S.2d 196).

Here, the proposed testimony of the defendant's girlfriend regarding the complainant's knowledge of the relationship between the defendant and the defendant's girlfriend consisted largely of hearsay, was cumulative to other evidence, and was collateral to the issues at trial.  Consequently, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in precluding that testimony, and that ruling did not deprive the defendant of the right to present a defense (see People v. Bryant, 211 A.D.3d at 849, 180 N.Y.S.3d 242;  People v. Wilson, 163 A.D.3d 881, 882, 81 N.Y.S.3d 163;  People v. Strzelecki, 108 A.D.3d at 645, 968 N.Y.S.2d 196).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not err in admitting evidence of three prior uncharged incidents involving the defendant striking the complainant about the body.  “In domestic violence cases such as this one, evidence of the prior incidents is admissible because the aggression and bad acts are focused on one particular person, demonstrating the defendant's intent, motive, identity and absence of mistake or accident, and provides the necessary background as to the relationship between the defendant and the complainant” (People v. Smith, 186 A.D.3d 1269, 1270, 127 N.Y.S.3d 887 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Graham, 159 A.D.3d 1022, 1023, 73 N.Y.S.3d 587).  Moreover, any potential for prejudice was offset by the court's limiting instructions (see People v. Smith, 186 A.D.3d at 1270, 127 N.Y.S.3d 887;  People v. Lugo, 218 A.D.2d 711, 711, 630 N.Y.S.2d 370).

Contrary to the defendant's further contention, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the physical injury element of assault in the third degree pursuant to Penal Law § 120.00 (see People v. Chiddick, 8 N.Y.3d 445, 447, 834 N.Y.S.2d 710, 866 N.E.2d 1039;  People v. Williams, 146 A.D.3d 906, 909, 48 N.Y.S.3d 405;  People v. Monserrate, 90 A.D.3d 785, 787, 934 N.Y.S.2d 485).  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

GENOVESI, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, DOWLING and LOVE, JJ., concur.