PEOPLE v. ANDERSON (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Raymond L. Rodriguez, J.), rendered March 15, 2023, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, and reckless driving, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not err in permitting the admission into evidence of certain surveillance videos, ballistics evidence, and two 911 calls.  This evidence was “relevant to the very same crime for which the defendant [was] on trial” (People v. Duchi, 176 A.D.3d 968, 968, 108 N.Y.S.3d 355 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Frumusa, 29 N.Y.3d 364, 370, 57 N.Y.S.3d 103, 79 N.E.3d 495) and provided a complete “narrative of the events charged in the indictment” as well as “necessary background information” (People v. Jones, 206 A.D.3d 671, 673, 168 N.Y.S.3d 532 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Bonich, 208 A.D.3d 679, 680, 171 N.Y.S.3d 910;  People v. Martinez, 201 A.D.3d 658, 659, 159 N.Y.S.3d 140).  Moreover, any prejudice to the defendant was minimized by the court's limiting instructions (see People v. Blackwell, 219 A.D.3d 619, 621, 195 N.Y.S.3d 47;  People v. Taylor, 210 A.D.3d 807, 808, 177 N.Y.S.3d 709;  People v. Sterling, 162 A.D.3d 914, 914, 79 N.Y.S.3d 272).

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial due to improper remarks made by the prosecutor during summation is without merit.  The challenged remarks were fair response to arguments made by defense counsel in summation (see People v. Bethea, 159 A.D.3d 710, 712, 71 N.Y.S.3d 589;  People v. Nanand, 137 A.D.3d 945, 947, 26 N.Y.S.3d 585;  People v. Roscher, 114 A.D.3d 812, 813, 980 N.Y.S.2d 146).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of a certain witness is without merit.  Although a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to confront adverse witnesses through cross-examination (see U.S. Const 6th Amend;  NY Const, art I, § 6), “these rights do not guarantee unfettered cross-examination” (People v. Delgado, 221 A.D.3d 909, 911, 200 N.Y.S.3d 414;  see People v. Agosto, 203 A.D.3d 841, 842, 160 N.Y.S.3d 908) and do not give criminal defendants “carte blanche to circumvent the rules of evidence” (People v. Hayes, 17 N.Y.3d 46, 53, 926 N.Y.S.2d 382, 950 N.E.2d 118 [internal quotation marks omitted]).  “The trial court has broad discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination when the questions are irrelevant or only marginally relevant, concern collateral issues, or pose a danger of misleading the jury” (People v. Wingate, 184 A.D.3d 738, 739, 125 N.Y.S.3d 724 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Jones, 184 A.D.3d 751, 753, 126 N.Y.S.3d 147;  People v. Herrera–Machuca, 181 A.D.3d 901, 902, 119 N.Y.S.3d 886).  Here, the court did not limit defense counsel's line of questioning, and instead, defense counsel voluntarily withdrew the questions.  In any event, the limiting of the defense counsel's questioning of a certain witness would have been provident to avoid inquiry into a speculative and remote matter (see People v. Jones, 184 A.D.3d at 753, 126 N.Y.S.3d 147).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

CONNOLLY, J.P., MILLER, VENTURA and HOM, JJ., concur.