PEOPLE v. FENNELL (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant, as limited by his motion, from a sentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County (John T. Hecht, J.), imposed March 27, 2023, upon his plea of guilty, on the ground that the sentence was excessive.

ORDERED that the sentence is affirmed.

The record reflects that the defendant's waiver of his right to appeal was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent (see People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970;  People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145).  Although much of the discussion of the waiver of the right to appeal took place after the defendant admitted his guilt, the defendant, through counsel, acknowledged that the waiver of the right to appeal was a component of the plea agreement prior to the defendant pleading guilty and admitting his guilt.  Thus, it cannot be said that the defendant “received no material benefit from his appeal waiver” or that the waiver “was a gratuitous, after-the-fact ․ demand asserted after the bargain had already been struck” (People v. Sutton, 184 A.D.3d 236, 245, 125 N.Y.S.3d 739;  see People v. Bryant, 28 N.Y.3d 1094, 1095–1096, 45 N.Y.S.3d 335, 68 N.E.3d 60;  People v. Williams, 227 A.D.3d 480, 481, 211 N.Y.S.3d 48).  Based upon the Supreme Court's explanation of the right to appeal and the waiver, the fact that the defendant acknowledged signing and understanding the written appeal waiver, and considering the defendant's age, experience, and background, the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent (see People v. Sanders, 25 N.Y.3d 337, 340, 12 N.Y.S.3d 593, 34 N.E.3d 344;  People v. Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 264, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645).  Accordingly, the defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal precludes appellate review of his excessive sentence claim.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., WOOTEN, FORD, TAYLOR and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.