MARTINEZ v. NADER ENTERPRISES LLC (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Denise L. Sher, J.), entered October 8, 2021.  The order denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging common-law negligence and, in effect, the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200, and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.5(c)(3).

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging common-law negligence and, in effect, the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 is granted, and the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.5(c)(3) is denied.

In July 2018, the plaintiff was employed by Sunfar Contracting Corp. (hereinafter Sunfar), which was the general contractor at a construction site owned by the defendant.  The plaintiff allegedly was injured while cutting a cement block with a grinder without a blade guard when the grinder kicked back and cut the plaintiff's leg.  Sunfar owned and provided the subject grinder.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, asserting causes of action alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6).  Following the completion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging common-law negligence and, in effect, the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200.  The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.5(c)(3).  In an order entered October 8, 2021, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion.  The defendant appeals.

“Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty imposed on owners, contractors, and their agents to provide workers with a safe place to work” (Walsh v. Kenny, 219 A.D.3d 1555, 1557, 198 N.Y.S.3d 90 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290, 294, 590 N.Y.S.2d 55, 604 N.E.2d 117;  Saitta v. Marsah Props., LLC, 211 A.D.3d 1062, 1063, 182 N.Y.S.3d 141).  “Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories:  namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site, and those involving the manner in which the work is performed” (Walsh v. Kenny, 219 A.D.3d at 1557, 198 N.Y.S.3d 90 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Saitta v. Marsah Props., LLC, 211 A.D.3d at 1063–1064, 182 N.Y.S.3d 141).  Where, as here, “a claim arises out of alleged dangers or defects in the means and methods of the work, an owner may be held liable for common-law negligence or a violation of Labor Law § 200 only if he or she had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work” (Walsh v. Kenny, 219 A.D.3d at 1557, 198 N.Y.S.3d 90 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Saitta v. Marsah Props., LLC, 211 A.D.3d at 1063, 182 N.Y.S.3d 141).  “A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for the purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed” (Ortega v. Puccia, 57 A.D.3d 54, 62, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323;  see Flores v. Crescent Beach Club, LLC, 208 A.D.3d 560, 563, 173 N.Y.S.3d 574).  “The right to generally supervise the work, stop the contractor's work if a safety violation is noted, or ․ ensure compliance with safety regulations and contract specifications is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence” (Argueta v. City of New York, 223 A.D.3d 862, 865, 204 N.Y.S.3d 547 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Kefaloukis v. Mayer, 197 A.D.3d 470, 471, 148 N.Y.S.3d 906).  Likewise, where the manner and method in which the work was performed is at issue, “no liability will attach to the owner solely because it may have notice of the allegedly unsafe manner in which work was performed” (Pilato v. 866 U.N. Plaza Assoc., LLC, 77 A.D.3d 644, 646, 909 N.Y.S.2d 80 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Guallpa v. Canarsie Plaza, LLC, 144 A.D.3d 1088, 1093, 42 N.Y.S.3d 293;  Ortega v. Puccia, 57 A.D.3d at 61, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323).

Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that it did not have the authority to supervise or control the manner and method of the plaintiff's work (see Argueta v. City of New York, 223 A.D.3d at 865, 204 N.Y.S.3d 547;  Kefaloukis v. Mayer, 197 A.D.3d at 471, 148 N.Y.S.3d 906;  Mondragon–Moreno v. Sporn, 189 A.D.3d 1574, 1576, 138 N.Y.S.3d 606).  The defendant's submissions established that the defendant did not interact with Sunfar's employees during the construction and that it did not provide any equipment or tools to Sunfar's employees (see Mondragon–Moreno v. Sporn, 189 A.D.3d at 1576, 138 N.Y.S.3d 606).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging common-law negligence and, in effect, the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200.

“Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers” (Walsh v. Kenny, 219 A.D.3d at 1556, 198 N.Y.S.3d 90 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 N.Y.3d 511, 515, 882 N.Y.S.2d 375, 909 N.E.2d 1213;  Cruz v. 1142 Bedford Ave., LLC, 192 A.D.3d 859, 862, 145 N.Y.S.3d 77).  “[A]n owner or general contractor is vicariously liable without regard to their fault, and even in the absence of control or supervision of the worksite, where a plaintiff establishes a violation of a specific and applicable Industrial Code regulation” (Bazdaric v. Almah Partners LLC, 41 N.Y.3d 310, 317, 209 N.Y.S.3d 310, 232 N.E.3d 1244 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]).  Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23–1.5(c)(3), which provides that “[a]ll safety devices, safeguards and equipment in use shall be kept sound and operable, and shall be immediately repaired or restored or immediately removed from the job site if damaged,” is sufficiently specific to support a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) (see Tuapante v. LG–39, LLC, 151 A.D.3d 999, 1000, 58 N.Y.S.3d 421;  Perez v. 286 Scholes St. Corp., 134 A.D.3d 1085, 1086, 22 N.Y.S.3d 545).

Here, in cross-moving for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.5(c)(3), the plaintiff failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant had notice of any defect or unsafe condition in the subject grinder (see generally Desprez v. United Prime Broadway, LLC, 225 A.D.3d 518, 208 N.Y.S.3d 70;  Shaw v. Scepter, Inc., 187 A.D.3d 1662, 1665, 133 N.Y.S.3d 709;  Nicola v. United Veterans Mut. Hous. No. 2, Corp., 178 A.D.3d 937, 940, 116 N.Y.S.3d 296).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff's cross-motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the defendant's opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).

The defendant's remaining contention is not properly before this Court.

Accordingly, we reverse the order, grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging common-law negligence and, in effect, the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200, and deny the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23–1.5(c)(3).

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., MILLER, VOUTSINAS and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.