IN RE: Michael JACKSON (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Nisha Menon, J.), dated January 11, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, denied the father's petition for parental access with the subject child.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The parties are the unmarried parents of a child who was born in May 2007 and has resided solely with the mother since 2009.  In January 2016, the father filed a petition for parental access with the child.  After a hearing, the Family Court denied the father's petition.  The father appeals.

“Parental access is a joint right of the noncustodial parent and of the child” (Matter of Munroe v. Smith, 189 A.D.3d 1595, 1598, 138 N.Y.S.3d 154 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Zwillman v. Kull, 90 A.D.3d 774, 775, 934 N.Y.S.2d 333).  “When adjudicating [parental access] rights, the court's first concern is the welfare and interests of the child” (Matter of Stones v. Vandenberge, 127 A.D.3d 1213, 1215, 7 N.Y.S.3d 535 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Anthony M.P. v. Ta–Mirra J.H., 125 A.D.3d 868, 868, 4 N.Y.S.3d 117).  Inasmuch as the best interests of the child generally lie in being nurtured and guided by both parents (see Matter of Gonzalez v. Santiago, 167 A.D.3d 887, 889, 90 N.Y.S.3d 134), “[i]t is generally in the best interest of the child for a rapport to be established with the noncustodial parent” (Matter of Schack v. Schack, 98 A.D.2d 802, 802, 469 N.Y.S.2d 813;  see Zafran v. Zafran, 28 A.D.3d 753, 755, 814 N.Y.S.2d 669).  Thus, “[a] noncustodial parent is entitled to meaningful parental access, and denial of that right must be based on substantial evidence that parental access would be detrimental to the welfare of the child” (Matter of Justice F. [Jessica V.], 192 A.D.3d 1025, 1027, 140 N.Y.S.3d 762;  see Matter of Rodriguez v. Silva, 121 A.D.3d 794, 795, 993 N.Y.S.2d 733).

“ ‘[T]he determination of [parental access] is within the sound discretion of the trial court based upon the best interests of the child, and its determination will not be set aside unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record’ ” (Matter of Justice F. [Jessica V.], 192 A.D.3d at 1027, 140 N.Y.S.3d 762, quoting Matter of Sinnott–Turner v. Kolba, 60 A.D.3d 774, 775, 875 N.Y.S.2d 512).  While the express wishes of children are not controlling, they are entitled to great weight, particularly where the children's age and maturity would make their input particularly meaningful (see Matter of Kocowicz v. Kocowicz, 306 A.D.2d 285, 760 N.Y.S.2d 334;  Koppenhoefer v. Koppenhoefer, 159 A.D.2d 113, 117, 558 N.Y.S.2d 596).  However, a court may not delegate its authority to determine parental access to either a parent or a child (see Mondschein v. Mondschein, 175 A.D.3d 686, 687, 108 N.Y.S.3d 461).

Here, giving due consideration to the wishes, age, and maturity of the child, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to schedule parental access between the father and the child, who was almost 17 years old at the time of the court's determination and had a strained relationship with the father (see Matter of Sullivan v. Plotnick, 145 A.D.3d 1018, 1021, 47 N.Y.S.3d 329).

The father's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHAMBERS, VOUTSINAS and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.