CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. VILLAGE OF MONROE (2005)

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the defendant Village of Monroe is estopped from denying the validity of a certain subdivision plat, certified by the Clerk of the Village of Monroe on March 16, 1990, and to recover damages for diminution of the value of real property, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Peter J. Patsalos, J.), dated April 9, 2003, as granted the motion of the defendant Village of Monroe for summary judgment on the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action, and denied the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment on those causes of action.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Orange County, for the entry of a judgment declaring that the Village of Monroe is not estopped from denying the validity of the subject subdivision plat.

 The determination of the Board of Trustees of the Village of Monroe, which, in effect, determined that the default approval of the subject subdivision plat on March 16, 1990, had expired, was a quasi-judicial discretionary determination.   Thus, the Village is absolutely immune from tort liability arising from that determination, even if it is later found to be erroneous (see 154 East Park Ave. Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 52 N.Y.2d 991, 438 N.Y.S.2d 288, 420 N.E.2d 86, cert. denied 454 U.S. 858, 102 S.Ct. 310, 70 L.Ed.2d 155;  Yan Shou Kong v. Town of Huntington, 4 A.D.3d 419, 771 N.Y.S.2d 378;  see also City of New York v. 17 Vista Assocs., 84 N.Y.2d 299, 307, 618 N.Y.S.2d 249, 642 N.E.2d 606;  Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A.D.2d 373, 249 N.Y.S.2d 330, affd. 15 N.Y.2d 831, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944, 205 N.E.2d 866;  cf. Koehler v. Town of Smithtown, 305 A.D.2d 550, 759 N.Y.S.2d 392;  HBP Assocs. v. State of New York, 254 A.D.2d 457, 678 N.Y.S.2d 781).   Moreover, contrary to the contention of the plaintiff landowner, F.A.S.A. Construction Corporation (hereinafter FASA), the Village did not waive its immunity by entering into a special relationship with FASA's predecessor-in-interest.  “If an injured party is attempting to challenge an act or conduct that is purely discretionary in nature, the municipality is simply immune from liability and no consideration need be given to whether a special relationship may exist” (Kelleher v. Town of Southampton, 306 A.D.2d 247, 248, 760 N.Y.S.2d 235;  see Boland v. State of New York, 218 A.D.2d 235, 244, 638 N.Y.S.2d 500).

 In addition, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the Village was not equitably estopped from denying the validity of the default approval.   Generally, “estoppel is not available against a governmental agency in the exercise of its governmental functions” (Matter of Daleview Nursing Home v. Axelrod, 62 N.Y.2d 30, 33, 475 N.Y.S.2d 826, 464 N.E.2d 130;  see Matter of Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274, 282, 525 N.Y.S.2d 176, 519 N.E.2d 1372, cert. denied 488 U.S. 801, 109 S.Ct. 30, 102 L.Ed.2d 9;  Scruggs-Leftwich v. Rivercross Tenants' Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 849, 852, 523 N.Y.S.2d 451, 517 N.E.2d 1337;  Matter of City of New York v. City Civ. Serv. Comm., 60 N.Y.2d 436, 449, 470 N.Y.S.2d 113, 458 N.E.2d 354;  Matter of Hamptons Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Moore, 52 N.Y.2d 88, 93-94, 436 N.Y.S.2d 239, 417 N.E.2d 533).   Although an exception to this general rule may be warranted in “unusual factual situations” to prevent injustice (Matter of E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v. Foster, 71 N.Y.2d 359, 369, 526 N.Y.S.2d 56, 520 N.E.2d 1345;  see Matter of Daleview Nursing Home v. Axelrod, supra at 33, 475 N.Y.S.2d 826, 464 N.E.2d 130;  Matter of Hamptons Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Moore, supra at 93 n. 1, 436 N.Y.S.2d 239, 417 N.E.2d 533;  Matter of Montipark Realty Corp. v. Village of Monticello, 174 A.D.2d 876, 877, 571 N.Y.S.2d 163;  Brennan v. New York City Hous. Auth., 72 A.D.2d 410, 412-414, 424 N.Y.S.2d 687), FASA may not avail itself of the exception here because it failed to undertake a reasonably-diligent inquiry into the applicability of relevant statutes (see Matter of Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, supra;  Waste Recovery Enters. v. Town of Unadilla, 294 A.D.2d 766, 768-769, 742 N.Y.S.2d 715, lv. denied 1 N.Y.3d 507, 776 N.Y.S.2d 223, 808 N.E.2d 359, cert. denied 542 U.S. 904, 124 S.Ct. 2839, 159 L.Ed.2d 267;  Matter of Montipark Realty Corp. v. Village of Monticello, supra ).

 Moreover, equitable estoppel cannot be invoked to relieve a party “from the mandatory operation of a statute” (Matter of Hauben v. Goldin, 74 A.D.2d 804, 805, 426 N.Y.S.2d 273;  see Waste Recovery Enters. v. Town of Unadilla, supra at 768-769, 742 N.Y.S.2d 715;  Matter of Scheurer v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 223 A.D.2d 379, 636 N.Y.S.2d 291;   Grishman v. City of New York, 183 A.D.2d 464, 466, 583 N.Y.S.2d 425;   Wood v. Cordello, 91 A.D.2d 1178, 1179, 459 N.Y.S.2d 150;  cf. Matter of Sea Cliff Manor v. Glen Cove Planning Bd., 39 Misc.2d 50, 239 N.Y.S.2d 1000, affd. 22 A.D.2d 855, 254 N.Y.S.2d 225).   Because FASA, in effect, sought relief from the mandatory consequences of Village Law § 7-728(11), estoppel against the Village was unavailable.

The Village thus established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and FASA failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition.   Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to the Village (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).