Amanda Perez De Corcho, appellant, v. Robert Deforest, et al., respondents. (2024)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff Amanda Perez De Corcho appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Anna Culley, J.), dated May 18, 2023.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Robert Deforest and Devin J. Deforest which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them by the plaintiff Amanda Perez De Corcho on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff Amanda Perez De Corcho (hereinafter the plaintiff), among others, commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident.  The defendants Robert Deforest and Devin J. Deforest (hereinafter together the defendants) moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them by the plaintiff on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident.  In an order dated May 18, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the motion.

The Supreme Court properly determined that the defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197;  Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176).  Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180).

On appeal, the plaintiff does not challenge the Supreme Court's determination that her opposition papers failed to raise a triable issue of fact to defeat summary judgment.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them by the plaintiff on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident.

CHAMBERS, J.P., MALTESE, GENOVESI and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.