SIMPSON v. CLOUGH (2024)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Jodi Orlow, J.), dated December 18, 2019.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate a judgment of divorce of the same court entered April 24, 2019, upon his default in appearing at an inquest.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The parties were married in 2012.  In September 2016, the plaintiff commenced this action for a divorce and ancillary relief.  In February 2018, the defendant failed to appear for a court conference and later failed to appear at an inquest conducted on June 29, 2018.  Following the inquest, a judgment of divorce was entered on April 24, 2019.  The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the judgment of divorce.  By order dated December 18, 2019, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the motion.  The defendant appeals.

“ ‘Pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), a party seeking to vacate a default ordinarily must show a reasonable excuse for his or her default and a meritorious defense to the action or motion’ ” (Davis v. Davis, 219 A.D.3d 697, 699, 195 N.Y.S.3d 214, quoting Genzone v. Genzone, 146 A.D.3d 752, 753, 45 N.Y.S.3d 140).  “ ‘[I]n matrimonial actions, this Court applies a liberal policy with respect to vacating defaults’ ” (id.).  It is still “ ‘incumbent upon a movant to make the requisite showing’ ” (Matter of Gordon v. Ngoun, 218 A.D.3d 577, 579, 192 N.Y.S.3d 245, quoting Matter of Goldstein v. Goldstein, 190 A.D.3d 971, 972, 139 N.Y.S.3d 624).  “ ‘A motion to vacate a default is addressed to the trial court's sound discretion’ ” (Murray v. Giovannello, 208 A.D.3d 499, 500, 171 N.Y.S.3d 365, quoting Merlino v. Merlino, 171 A.D.3d 911, 913, 98 N.Y.S.3d 216).

Here, the defendant did not offer a reasonable excuse for his default in failing to appear at the inquest (see id.;  Celesia v. Celesia, 136 A.D.3d 854, 855, 26 N.Y.S.3d 292).  As the defendant failed to provide a reasonable excuse for his default, this Court “need not determine if he had a potentially meritorious defense” (Matter of Goldstein v. Goldstein, 190 A.D.3d at 973, 139 N.Y.S.3d 624;  see Murray v. Giovannello, 208 A.D.3d at 500, 171 N.Y.S.3d 365).

Further, the defendant's contention that the judgment of divorce should be vacated because it was entered at the time the proceedings should have been stayed pursuant to CPLR 321(c) is without merit.  The defendant was not entitled to a stay because he voluntarily discharged his attorney (see Matter of Cassini, 182 A.D.3d 13, 44, 120 N.Y.S.3d 103;  Matter of Wiley v. Musabyemariya, 118 A.D.3d 898, 900, 988 N.Y.S.2d 259).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the judgment of divorce.

CONNOLLY, J.P., MILLER, WARHIT and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.