SHARIF v. PRITAM PROPERTY INC (2024)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from (1) a decision of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Pam B. Jackman Brown, J.), entered November 9, 2021, and (2) a judgment of the same court entered March 11, 2022.  The judgment, insofar as appealed from, upon an order of the same court (Timothy J. Dufficy, J.) entered August 27, 2020, granting the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment on the issue of liability against the defendant, and upon the decision, made after an inquest on the issue of damages, is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the principal sum of only $100,000.

ORDERED that the appeal from the decision is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as no appeal lies from a decision (see Schicchi v. J.A. Green Constr. Corp., 100 A.D.2d 509, 472 N.Y.S.2d 718);  and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law and the facts, by increasing the award of damages to the plaintiff from the principal sum of $100,000 to the principal sum of $400,000;  as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment

The plaintiff was injured on June 17, 2019, when he slipped and fell off a chain-link fence on property owned by the defendant.  The plaintiff thereafter commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries, asserting causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6) and common-law negligence.  After the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment on the issue of liability against the defendant in an order entered August 27, 2020, the plaintiff proceeded to an inquest on the issue of damages.  After an inquest, the court awarded the plaintiff damages in the principal sum of $100,000.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the award of damages is inadequate since it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation for his injuries.  A determination with respect to an award for pain and suffering will not be set aside unless the award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501[c];  Quijano v. American Tr. Ins. Co., 155 A.D.3d 981, 983, 65 N.Y.S.3d 221;  Kayes v. Liberati, 104 A.D.3d 739, 741, 960 N.Y.S.2d 499;  Guallpa v. Key Fat Corp., 98 A.D.3d 650, 651, 950 N.Y.S.2d 165).  “The ‘reasonableness’ of compensation must be measured against relevant precedent of comparable cases” (Kayes v. Liberati, 104 A.D.3d at 741, 960 N.Y.S.2d 499;  see Buckham v. 322 Equity, LLC, 229 A.D.3d 669, 674, 215 N.Y.S.3d 463;  Halsey v. New York City Tr. Auth., 114 A.D.3d 726, 727, 980 N.Y.S.2d 487).  “Although prior damage awards in cases involving similar injuries are not binding upon the courts, they guide and enlighten them with respect to determining whether a verdict in a given case constitutes reasonable compensation” (Miller v. Weisel, 15 A.D.3d 458, 459, 790 N.Y.S.2d 189;  see Vainer v. DiSalvo, 107 A.D.3d 697, 698–699, 967 N.Y.S.2d 107).

Based upon the proof submitted at the inquest, the award of damages deviated materially from what would be reasonable compensation to the extent indicated herein.

IANNACCI, J.P., MALTESE, WAN and GOLIA, JJ., concur.