IN RE: Jennifer L. SERRANO (2024)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Gerald W. Connolly, J.), entered February 13, 2024 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent Board of Parole denying petitioner's request for parole release.

Petitioner is currently serving two consecutive prison sentences of 2 to 7 years upon her 2019 convictions of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree and leaving the scene of an incident without reporting.  She received an earned eligibility certificate and, in December 2022, appeared for her first time before respondent Board of Parole seeking to be released to parole supervision.  Following a hearing, the Board denied her release and ordered that she be held for an additional 24 months;  such determination was upheld on administrative appeal.  Petitioner then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul that determination.  Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and petitioner appeals.

We affirm.  “It is well settled that parole release decisions are discretionary and will not be disturbed as long as [the Board] complied with the statutory requirements set forth in Executive Law § 259–i” (Matter of Rodriguez v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 168 A.D.3d 1342, 1343, 92 N.Y.S.3d 482 [3d Dept. 2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted];  see Matter of Payne v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1577, 1577, 104 N.Y.S.3d 383 [3d Dept. 2019]).  To this end, “[t]he Board was not required to give equal weight to – or expressly discuss – each of the statutory factors” (Matter of Espinal v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 1817, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 [3d Dept. 2019];  see Matter of Brown v. Board of Parole–N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 197 A.D.3d 1424, 1425, 153 N.Y.S.3d 684 [3d Dept. 2021]), and it could, in its discretion, place greater emphasis upon the serious nature of petitioner's crimes (see Matter of Tafari v. Cuomo, 170 A.D.3d 1351, 1352, 94 N.Y.S.3d 458 [3d Dept. 2019], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 907, 2019 WL 2441507 [2019]).  Moreover, “the receipt of an earned eligibility certificate does not preclude the Board from denying parole” (Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872 [3d Dept. 2005], lv denied 6 N.Y.3d 706, 812 N.Y.S.2d 36, 845 N.E.2d 468 [2006];  see Correction Law § 805;  Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 1488, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 [3d Dept. 2017];  Matter of Furman v. Annucci, 138 A.D.3d 1269, 1270, 28 N.Y.S.3d 352 [3d Dept. 2016], lv dismissed 27 N.Y.3d 1188, 38 N.Y.S.3d 97, 59 N.E.3d 1209 [2016]).

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the record reflects that the Board considered the relevant statutory factors in reaching its determination, including the serious nature of petitioner's crimes, as well as her lack of prior criminal history, favorable institutional record, program, earned eligibility certificate and educational accomplishments, postrelease plans and her low score on the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment instrument (see Matter of Hibbert v. New York State Div. of Parole, 219 A.D.3d 1038, 1039–1040, 194 N.Y.S.3d 827 [3d Dept. 2023];  Matter of Jones v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 1652–1653, 108 N.Y.S.3d 505 [3d Dept. 2019]).  The Board's concern that petitioner demonstrated a disregard for the rule of law and continued to represent a danger to the community is supported by petitioner's lack of insight into her crimes.  In this regard, although petitioner expressed remorse at the parole hearing, she continued to make excuses for her actions at the time of and upon fleeing the accident, as well as for her decision to drive with a suspended license following arraignment on the underlying charges.  Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Board's decision evinces “irrationality bordering on impropriety” (Matter of Pulliam v. Board of Parole–Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 197 A.D.3d 1495, 1496, 153 N.Y.S.3d 704 [3d Dept. 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted];  see Matter of Payne v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d at 1577–1579, 104 N.Y.S.3d 383;  Matter of Maricevic v. Evans, 86 A.D.3d 879, 880, 927 N.Y.S.2d 471 [3d Dept. 2011]), and, therefore, we will not disturb it.  Petitioner's remaining contentions, to the extent not specifically addressed, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Clark, J.P., Pritzker, Reynolds Fitzgerald, Fisher and Powers, JJ., concur.