TROTMAN v. PRIORITY AUTO INC (2024)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Richard J. Montelione, J.), dated December 7, 2022.  The order granted the defendants’ separate motions pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them for lack of personal jurisdiction.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff, a New York resident, commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against the defendants, both of which are Vermont corporations.  The plaintiff alleged that he was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a Budget rental truck in Brooklyn and that the truck recently had been repaired and/or serviced by the defendants at their place of business in Vermont.  The defendants separately moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them for lack of personal jurisdiction.  In an order dated December 7, 2022, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ separate motions.  The plaintiff appeals.

In order for a New York court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary, two requirements must be satisfied:  “the action is permissible under the long-arm statute (CPLR 302) and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process” (Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 33 N.Y.3d 523, 528, 106 N.Y.S.3d 237, 130 N.E.3d 833).  If either the statutory or constitutional requirement is lacking, then the action may not proceed (see id.).

“The ultimate burden of proving a basis for personal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting jurisdiction” (Fanelli v. Latman, 202 A.D.3d 758, 759, 162 N.Y.S.3d 140).  However, “[w]hen opposing a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction over the moving defendant exists” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, in opposing the defendants’ separate motions, the plaintiff asserted that jurisdiction over each of them was proper pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3).  Accepting as true for purposes of these motions the plaintiff's allegations that the defendants committed tortious acts without New York State causing injury to him within the State (see Serota v. Cooper, 216 A.D.3d 1019, 1022, 190 N.Y.S.3d 96), the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the defendants regularly did or solicited business, or engaged in any other persistent course of conduct, or derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in New York (see CPLR 302[a][3][i];  Ingraham v. Carroll, 90 N.Y.2d 592, 597, 665 N.Y.S.2d 10, 687 N.E.2d 1293;  cf.  Allen v. Canadian Gen. Elec. Co., 65 A.D.2d 39, 43, 410 N.Y.S.2d 707, affd 50 N.Y.2d 935, 431 N.Y.S.2d 526, 409 N.E.2d 998) or that the defendants expected or should reasonably have expected their alleged tortious conduct to have consequences in New York and that they derive substantial revenue from interstate commerce (see CPLR 302[a][3][ii];  Ingraham v. Carroll, 90 N.Y.2d at 598–599, 665 N.Y.S.2d 10, 687 N.E.2d 1293;  cf.  LaMarca v. Pak–Mor Mfg. Co., 95 N.Y.2d 210, 215, 713 N.Y.S.2d 304, 735 N.E.2d 883;  Allen v. Canadian Gen. Elec. Co., 65 A.D.2d at 41, 410 N.Y.S.2d 707).

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the issue of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with due process (see LaMarca v. Pak–Mor Mfg. Co., 95 N.Y.2d at 216–219, 713 N.Y.S.2d 304, 735 N.E.2d 883).  In any event, the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants “had the requisite ‘minimum contacts’ with New York such that the prospect of defending a suit here comported with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’ as required by the Federal Due Process Clause” (Waggaman v. Arauzo, 117 A.D.3d 724, 725–726, 985 N.Y.S.2d 281, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95;  see World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490;  cf.  LaMarca v. Pak–Mor Mfg. Co., 95 N.Y.2d at 217–219, 713 N.Y.S.2d 304, 735 N.E.2d 883).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ separate motions pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them for lack of personal jurisdiction.

BARROS, J.P., MALTESE, WOOTEN and DOWLING, JJ., concur.